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Sensory Experience and the Sensible Qualities
Brian Christopher Cutter, Ph.D.
The University of Texas at Austin, 2015
Supervisor:  Michael Tye
Co-Supervisor: Adam Pautz
My dissertation defends a package of interrelated positions on the metaphysics of the 
sensible qualities (shape, color, pitch, loudness, flavor, heat, cold, etc.) and sensory 
experience. It is organized around four questions at the core of philosophical theorizing 
about the sensible qualities. The first is the question of reductionism: are the sensible 
qualities reducible to either physical properties (i.e. properties definable in the canonical 
vocabulary of the physical sciences) or response-dependent properties (e.g. Lockean 
dispositions to affect perceivers in certain ways)? I put forward novel arguments and 
refined versions of traditional arguments in support of a negative answer to this question. 
For at least some of the sensible qualities, including many of those traditionally classified 
as “secondary qualities,” reductionism is untenable.
If I am correct that the sensible qualities are not reducible to physical or response-
dependent properties of external objects, the next question arises: do they belong to 
external objects at all? This is the question of realism. Many philosophers have held that 
a negative answer to the question of reductionism leads—or should lead—to a negative 
answer to the question of realism. Against these philosophers, I defend an affirmative 
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answer to the question of realism and respond to arguments from non-reductionism to 
irrealism.
If I am correct that the sensible qualities really belong to external objects but 
aren’t reducible to any of their physical properties, a third question arises: how are the 
sensible qualities (especially the so-called “secondary qualities”) related to physical 
reality? This is the question of integration, a special case of the more general question of 
how, in Sellars’s terminology, the Manifest Image is related to the Scientific Image. In 
response to this question, I develop and defend a theory structurally parallel to Russellian 
monist positions on the mind-body problem. I argue that the Russellian monist 
framework is actually poorly suited to answer the question it was originally designed to 
answer—the question of how conscious experience is related to physical reality—but 
well suited to answer the corresponding question about the sensible (especially 
secondary) qualities.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1    The Manifest Image and the Scientific Image
Many of the philosophical questions that have occupied philosophers since the advent of 
modern science are questions arising from tensions between two images of the world—
what Sellars (1963) calls the “Manifest Image” and the “Scientific Image.” Roughly 
speaking, the Manifest Image is the image or description of the world suggested to us by 
ordinary experience, whereas the Scientific Image is the image or description of the world 
suggested to us by modern science. Prima facie tensions between these two images 
abound. To mention a few:
Free will: Our ordinary experience of deliberating and acting suggests that we 
sometimes act freely—that we sometimes freely choose among a range of mutually 
incompatible actions, each of which is, at some point just prior to action, within our 
power to perform. On the other hand, scientific accounts of human behavior from 
psychology and neuroscience suggest that our behavior is caused by prior conditions over 
which we have no control. Such descriptions seem to omit any mention of an agent’s 
powers to do otherwise than he actually did, and seem, at first blush anyway, to be in 
conflict with the assumption that agents have such powers.
Intentionality: The Manifest Image portrays us as having intentional states—states 
that are about things in the world, states that predicate properties of objects, states that 
are apt to be true or false. But such properties and relations as aboutness, predication, 
truth, and falsity seem to be absent from our physical or scientific descriptions of humans 
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and other animals. The conciliatory position—that each image offers an accurate, but 
incomplete, portrait of human beings—is tempting here, but it is also problematic for at 
least two reasons. First, it offends against ontological parsimony. Second, the intentional 
states of the Manifest Image seem to be in causal competition with the physical states of 
the Scientific Image. If the physical states attributed to us by the Scientific Image (e.g. by 
neuroscience) are distinct from the intentional states attributed to us by the Manifest 
Image, it’s hard to see how the latter could have the sort of causal relevance the Manifest 
Image represents them as having. For the causal roles ascribed to intentional states by the 
Manifest Image are occupied, according to the Scientific Image, by (ostensibly non-
intentional) physical states.
Conscious Experience: When your arm is sharply pinched, you feel a momentary 
pain—or so introspection (whose testimony partly constitutes the Manifest Image) 
suggests. But the scientific description of what goes on in such a case—beginning with 
the stimulation of nociceptors in the arm, followed by complex patterns of activity in 
somatosensory cortex, insular cortex, and anterior cingulate cortex, leading in turn to a 
pattern of signals from the motor cortex to muscles in the arm, resulting finally in your 
withdrawing your arm from the stimulus—seems to leave out entirely the feeling of pain. 
If the feeling of pain really exists, it seems we must accept that it is therefore something 
different from, something over and above, the processes and events described by the 
physical sciences. But this conciliatory position is problematic, again because it offends 
against ontological parsimony and also because the causal roles ascribed to the feeling of 
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pain by the Manifest Image (e.g. causing withdrawal behavior) are occupied, according to 
the Scientific Image, by (ostensibly non-experiential) physical processes and events.
The “Secondary Qualities”: Sensory experience (whose testimony partly 
constitutes the Manifest Image) represents tomatoes as red, strawberries as sweet, ice 
cubes as cold, and the squeaks produced by my floorboards as high pitched. But such 
qualities do not seem to show up in our scientific descriptions of the world. Science 
describes the surface of a tomato as having a certain complex molecular structure, a 
certain surface reflectance, certain powers to affect human nervous systems, and so forth. 
But redness—that vibrant quality I experience as spread out across the surface of the 
tomato when I visually behold the tomato—seems to be entirely left out of the scientific 
description. Once again, the conciliatory position, according to which the tomato really is 
red but its redness is something over and above its scientific properties, is tempting, but 
again problematic for reasons of ontological parsimony and causal exclusion, inter alia.
Other examples could easily be given from many other areas of philosophy, e.g. 
the philosophy of time (does time pass? is the present moment somehow more real than 
the past and future?), metaethics (are there normative facts, or just natural/descriptive 
facts?), the philosophy of perception (in perception, are we directly acquainted with 
external objects?), the philosophy of biology (do bodily organs or their activities 
genuinely have purposes or functions, or is all biological activity to be explained solely in 
terms of efficient causes?), and the philosophy of action (are human actions performed in 
response to reasons or merely produced by arational causes?).
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The Grand Question that animates this dissertation is this: is it possible to accept 
the Manifest Image and the Scientific Image, both in their full vigor, without diluting 
either? I regard it as obvious that we should take each image seriously, that we should not 
dismiss either from the outset, and that we should not deny or dilute either without very 
good reason. We cannot embrace the Scientific Image while wholly dismissing the 
Manifest Image, for the latter is the epistemic foundation of the former. Nor can we 
embrace the Manifest Image while disparaging the Scientific Image—say, by adopting 
some sort of instrumentalist or anti-realist attitude toward science—for to disparage 
science is to disparage the common sense at the core of the Manifest Image. As T.H. 
Huxley (1888) wrote,
Science is […] nothing but trained and organized common sense, differing from the 
latter only as a veteran may differ from a raw recruit: and its methods differ from 
those of common sense only as far as the guardsman's cut and thrust differ from the 
manner in which a savage wields his club. (p. 77)
Of course, the Grand Question above is much too large a question to address 
adequately in a single work (or perhaps in a single lifetime). But a single work can 
address this question as it pertains to certain interesting fragments of the Manifest and 
Scientific Images. This is what I hope to do in this dissertation for those fragments of the 
Manifest and Scientific Images that pertain to the sensible qualities. “The philosopher,” 
Sellars tells us, “is confronted by two conceptions, equally public, equally non-arbitrary, 
of man-in-the-world and he cannot shirk the attempt to see how they fall together in one 
stereoscopic view” (p. 5). This dissertation attempts to present a stereoscopic view of the 
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relevant fragments of the Manifest and Scientific Images, a view in which neither image 
is marginalized and in which each contributes its full color. 
1.2    A Summary of Things to Come
By the “sensible qualities” I mean those qualities which are presented to us in 
sensory experience and which we experience as belonging to the objects of sensory 
experience. At a minimum, they include shape, color, motion, texture, pitch, loudness, 
timbre, heat, cold, flavor, and scent. I shall focus especially, though not exclusively, on 
the so-called “secondary qualities.” which minimally include color, pitch, loudness, 
timbre, heat, cold, flavor, and scent. An important terminological note: here and 
throughout, I use the term “secondary quality” merely to denote those sensible qualities 
traditionally classified under the heading “secondary quality.” By calling a quality a 
secondary quality, I do not mean to suggest that it satisfies any of the substantive criteria 
that have historically been associated with that term, e.g. that it is not a “catholick 
affection,” that our idea of it does not resemble it, or that it does not inhere in material 
bodies. The same goes, mutatis mutandis, for my use of the term “primary quality.”
This dissertation is organized around three questions at the heart of philosophical 
theorizing about the sensible qualities. The first, which is addressed in chapters 2 and 3, is 
the question of reductionism: are the sensible qualities reducible to either response-
dependent properties or response-independent physical properties? Here I argue that 
reductionism fails for many classes of sensible qualities, including (probably all, but at 
least many of) the secondary qualities. The varieties of reductionism about a given class 
of sensible qualities may be divided into two broad kinds, relationist theories and 
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physicalist theories. Relationist theories identify the relevant qualities with certain 
response-dependent properties. A response-dependent property may be understood 
roughly as property whose instantiations constitutively depend on the subjective 
responses of perceivers. Put another way, response-dependent properties are relational 
properties constituted by relations to perceivers or their sensory experiences. Paradigms 
of response-dependent properties include dispositional relational properties like the 
disposition to produce heat sensations in (or feel hot to) normal perceivers under normal 
conditions, or the disposition to produce reddish sensations in (or look red to) me in this 
specific viewing condition, as well as non-dispositional relational properties like the 
property of occurrently producing bitter sensations in (or tasting bitter to) some or other 
perceiver, or the property of occurrently producing greenish sensations in (or looking 
green to) me in this specific viewing condition. In chapter 2, I put forward four arguments 
against relationist theories of the secondary qualities. The first is the argument from 
intrinsicality, which derives the falsity of relationism from the apparent second-order fact 
that colors and many other secondary qualities are intrinsic properties. The second is the 
argument from categoricity, which derives the falsity of (not all forms, but) the most 
popular forms of relationism from the apparent second-order fact that colors and other 
secondary qualities are categorical properties. The third is the argument from modal 
relations, which concludes that relationism is false on the basis of (inter alia) an 
intuitively plausible principle about the modal relationship between color and spatial 
extension—viz., it is impossible for something to have a color without being spatially 
extended. Finally, after criticizing the well-known argument from perceptual variation for 
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relationism, I put forward an argument from perceptual variation against relationism, 
arguing that the empirical facts of perceptual variation, far from supporting relationism, 
actually constitute powerful evidence against relationism.
Physicalist theories of a given class of sensible qualities, in contrast to relationist 
theories, identify the qualities in question with response-independent physical properties. 
A response-independent property is a property that is not response-dependent. “Physical 
property” here is intended in a fairly narrow sense to mean a property that admits of real 
definition in terms of the canonical vocabulary of the physical sciences. (Properties that 
merely supervene on, but are not identical to, such properties do not qualify as “physical” 
in my sense.) Paradigms of response-independent physical properties include the surface 
spectral reflectance of a tomato, the fundamental frequency, amplitude, and wave shape 
of a pressure wave, the temperature and conductivity of a surface, and so forth. In chapter 
3, I advance three arguments (or, better, three classes of argument) against physicalist 
theories of the secondary qualities. The first class of arguments is the class of structural-
mismatch arguments. Structural-mismatch arguments begin with the the empirical 
premise that there is no (relevant) class of physical properties that has the structural 
features (e.g. the resemblance structure) of a given class Q of secondary qualities, and 
from here conclude by Leibniz’s Law that physicalism about Q is false. The second 
argument is the argument from categoricity, which derives the falsity of (not all forms, 
but) some popular forms of physicalism from the apparent second-order fact that colors 
and other secondary qualities are categorical properties. The final class of anti-physicalist 
arguments I discuss are what I call disjunctive-property arguments. Applied specifically 
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to color physicalism, these are arguments with the following form: (i) If color 
physicalism is true, then color shades are disjunctive (physical) properties. (ii) Color 
shades have feature F. (iii) No disjunctive property has feature F. (iv) Therefore, color 
physicalism is false. I consider five promising instances of this argument form, four of 
which I discuss only briefly, and one of which (the similarity-grounding argument) I 
develop and defend at length.
Physicalism and relationism, though mutually exclusive, do not jointly exhaust 
the space of possible positions. The portion of logical space left uncovered by (the 
disjunction of) relationism and physicalism about a given class of sensible qualities 
corresponds to the view I call non-reductionism, according to which the the qualities in 
question are response-independent, non-physical properties.  The upshot of chapters 2 1
and 3 is that non-reductionism is true of the secondary qualities.
If I am correct that (at least many of) the sensible qualities aren’t reducible to 
either response-dependent properties or response-independent physical properties of 
material objects, the question arises: are they instantiated in the (“external”) material 
world at all? This is the question of realism, the topic of chapter 4. Here I defend the 
claim that realism is true about every major class of sensible qualities, where realism 
about a class of sensible qualities is the thesis that qualities in that class are instantiated 
 Often the term “primitivism” is used to cover roughly this region of logical space. I prefer “non-1
reductionism” to “primitivism” because the latter suggests that the relevant qualities are unanalyzable or 
lack non-trivial real definitions. But in some cases this seems to rule out reasonable alternatives to 
physicalism and relationism. For example, suppose one holds that a certain shade of orange can be 
analyzed in terms of primitive hue magnitudes, e.g. being reddish to degree x and yellowish to degree y. On 
such a view, some determinate colors would have non-trivial real definitions and hence they would not be 
“primitive.” Such an alternative to physicalism and relationism therefore seems to fit more comfortably 
under the heading “non-reductionism” than “primitivism.” 
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by ordinary physical things, more or less as they seem to be. In this part of the 
dissertation, in addition to responding to a number of objections to realism, I put forward 
two positive reasons to accept realism, both of which apply to every major class of 
sensible qualities. The first is that the various sensible qualities seem or appear to be 
instantiated in our environment (and in our bodies). Here I rely on the prosaic idea that 
we ought to trust appearances in the absence of sufficiently strong countervailing reasons 
(cf. Huemer 2001, Pryor 2000), and I argue at length that there are no such reasons to 
reject realism. I respond to a range of objections to (non-reductive) realism about the 
secondary qualities, as well as a recent objection to realism about primary qualities (e.g. 
shape) from modern physics.
The second positive reason to accept realism comes from the independently 
motivated thesis of phenomenal relationism. According to phenomenal relationism, the 
phenomenal properties associated with sensory experience (e.g. the property 
characterizing what it’s like for you to look at a lime in good lighting, or to taste black 
coffee, or to hear floor boards squeak) are relational properties of a certain kind. More 
specifically, according to phenomenal relationism, what it is for a subject to have a given 
(sensory) phenomenal property is for the subject to bear a certain relation—which might 
variously be called “sensory awareness,” “sensory acquaintance,” or “sensory 
representation”—to a certain sensible quality or complex of sensible qualities (Campbell 
1993, Johnston 2004, Chalmers 2006, Pautz 2009, Byrne 2009, Tye 2014). I argue that, 
given phenomenal relationism, the assumption of realism about the sensible qualities 
makes the “hard problem” of consciousness much more tractable. The basic idea is this: 
 9
consider the phenomenal property you instantiate when you have a visual experience as 
of something green. Call this property “G.” Given phenomenal relationism, G is identical 
to (something like) the relational property sensorily representing greenness. Now, if color 
realism is false, then greenness is nowhere instantiated in the universe. In that case, we 
don’t bear any physical, causal, or informational relations to greenness. But if don’t bear 
any physical, causal, or informational relations to greenness, it’s hard to see how we 
could manage to stand in any interesting natural relations to greenness, such as is 
involved in sensorily representing greenness. On the other hand, if color realism is true, 
then greenness is instantiated in the world more or less as it seems to be. In that case, we 
do stand in various interesting physical, causal, and informational relations to greenness. 
In terms of these we can at least begin to sketch out possible explanations (either 
reductive or non-reductive) of how we come to sensorily represent greenness. Realism 
therefore helps us to explain how we come to enjoy phenomenal properties like G, 
whereas irrealism renders this fact an intractable mystery. Realism is therefore supported 
on abductive grounds.
Chapters 2-4, summarized above, jointly constitute a defense of a non-reductive 
realism (i.e., the conjunction of non-reductionism and realism) about the secondary 
qualities. A major theme of these chapters is that the reductionist and irrealist alternatives 
to non-reductive realism are inconsistent with the way things appear and so fail to respect 
the Manifest Image. More specifically, irrealism is inconsistent with the first-order 
appearances (apparently true propositions attributing (first-order) sensible qualities to 
concrete things in our environment), and reductionism is inconsistent with the second-
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order appearances (apparently true propositions that attribute second-order properties to 
the sensible qualities themselves). If we are to respect appearances, we must accept non-
reductive realism.
Now, if I am correct that the sensible qualities really belong to material objects 
but (at least many of them) aren’t reducible to any physical properties of material objects, 
a third question arises: how are the sensible qualities (especially the secondary qualities) 
related to physical reality? This is the question of integration, a special case of the more 
general question of how the Manifest Image is related to the Scientific Image. I address 
this question in chapter 5. Here I develop and defend a theory structurally parallel to 
Russellian Monist positions on the mind-body problem, which I call Secondary Quality 
Russellian Monism (SQRM). At the foundation of Russellian Monism is the observation, 
due to Russell (1927), Eddington (1928), and others, that physics characterizes matter in 
terms of its relational structure, including especially its abstract causal and mathematical 
structure, but does not reveal its intrinsic qualitative nature. To a first approximation, 
SQRM says that the secondary qualities are grounded in the intrinsic qualities of matter 
that physics leaves unspecified, perhaps together with the structural properties in terms of 
which physics characterizes matter, but not in the latter properties alone. As I shall argue 
in chapter 5, non-reductive realism leads naturally to SQRM; SQRM is therefore 
indirectly supported by my arguments for non-reductive realism in chapters 2-4. In 
addition, I offer a handful of more-or-less independent arguments and considerations in 
favor of SQRM. A central theme of this chapter is that the Russellian Monist framework 
is actually poorly suited to answer the question it was originally designed to answer—the 
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question of how conscious experience is related to physical reality—but well suited to 
answer the corresponding question about the secondary qualities.  
 12
Chapter 2: Against Relationism
2.1    Introduction
In this chapter, I advance several arguments against relationist theories of the secondary 
qualities. It will be useful to focus on a representative example of a secondary quality in 
what follows; for this reason I focus heavily, though not exclusively, on relationist 
theories of color. However, many of the objections I raise to relationist theories of color 
apply equally to relationist theories of other secondary qualities. Moreover, it is 
antecedently plausible that if relationism is false about color, it is also false about the 
other secondary qualities. I’m not aware of anyone who accepts a non-relationist theory 
of color together with a relationist view of (say) heat, cold, flavor, or pitch. So if we can 
show that relationism about color is false, then it’s a fair bet that relationist theories of 
other secondary qualities are false as well.
In §2.2, I briefly discuss two apparent truths about (at least some of) the 
secondary qualities that are inconsistent with relationism in all of its forms or in its most 
popular form. In §2.3, I argue that the modal relationship between color and shape—in 
particular, the fact that nothing can have a color without being spatially extended—makes 
relationist views of color untenable. In §2.4, I examine the relevance of perceptual 
variation to relationist theories of the secondary qualities. It is widely held that the 
phenomenon of perceptual variation supports relationism. On the contrary, I argue that 
the phenomenon of perceptual variation provides no support for relationism and in fact 
constitutes powerful evidence against relationism.
 13
2.2    Intrinsicality and Categoricity
When, for example, a ripe tomato looks red to me, […] I do not experience any part 
of the surface as producing a certain sort of response in me or anyone else. On the 
contrary, I surely experience redness as intrinsic to the surface, just as I experience 
the shape of the surface as intrinsic to it.
—Michael Tye (1995, p. 145)
What standard experiences of color do seem to suggest is that redness (e.g.) is 
intrinsic and categorical. […] this much is true of lots of properties—roundness for 
instance.
—Stephen Yablo (1995, p. 490)
Things in our environment appear to have certain sensible qualities. For example, my 
desk appears to be brown, rectangular, hard, and smooth. These are first-order 
appearances—apparently true propositions that attribute first-order properties to concrete 
particulars. But not only do concrete particulars appear to have certain first-order 
properties; these first order properties themselves appear to have certain second-order 
properties. For example, roundness seems to be an intrinsic, categorical, and non-
disjunctive property; it seems to be incompatible with the squareness, and it seems to 
entail spatial extension. These are second-order appearances—apparently true 
propositions that attribute second-order properties to first-order properties.
There is an interesting question about the manner in which sensible qualities 
appear to us to have these second-order features. One possibility is that they perceptually 
seem to have these features. On this option, we might say that perceptual experience, in 
addition to having first-order content which ascribes to concrete objects various first order 
properties like colors and shapes, also has second-order content which ascribes to these 
first-order properties various second-order properties like being intrinsic, being 
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categorical, etc. Some philosophers have repudiated this view of perceptual content. For 
example, Byrne and Hilbert (2003b) write, “lemons look yellow, but yellowness does not 
look any way at all” (p. 793, cf. Byrne 2003). Another possibility is that the sensible 
qualities intellectually seem to have certain second-order features upon rational 
reflection. On this option, the way in which roundness seems to be intrinsic or softness 
seems to entail spatial extension is similar to the way in which the identity relation seems 
to be transitive or knowledge seems to be factive. The proponent of this option may 
nonetheless maintain that the relevant seemings are intimately connected with perceptual 
experience, even if the sensible qualities do not perceptually seem to have these features. 
For example, it is plausible that in order for shapes, colors, or flavors to seem thus-and-so 
upon rational reflection, one must possess certain shape/color/flavor concepts (in a non-
deferential manner), which in turn plausibly requires having experienced the relevant 
qualities (or, in the case of shapes, having experienced certain basic spatial qualities from 
which the relevant shapes may be constructed). For our purposes, however, it is not 
necessary to take a position on the manner in which the sensible qualities appear to have 
certain second-order properties.
It will be a recurrent theme of this dissertation that the alternatives to my non-
reductive realist view of the secondary qualities are inconsistent with the way things 
appear. More specifically, I shall urge that irrealism is inconsistent with the first-order 
appearances, and reductionism is inconsistent with the second-order appearances. If we 
are to respect appearances, we must accept non-reductive realism. Of course, there is no 
general guarantee that things are as they appear to be, so the fact that irrealism and 
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reductionism are inconsistent with appearances is no guarantee that they are false. 
Nonetheless, I take for granted in this dissertation what is sometimes called the Principle 
of Phenomenal Conservatism: if it seems to one that p, then one has at least prima facie 
justification to believe that p (Huemer 2001, cf. Pryor 2000). In other words, we ought to 
trust appearances in the absence of (sufficiently strong) countervailing considerations.
In this section, I discuss two apparent second-order truths about color, one of 
which is inconsistent with all forms of relationism, and one of which is inconsistent with 
the most popular form of relationism.
The first apparent second-order truth that bears on relationism is:
Intrinsicality: colors are intrinsic properties.2
As many have observed, we experience colors as intrinsic or local properties of the 
surfaces of objects (Chalmers 2006, p. 66; McGinn 1996, p. 542; Johnston 1992, p. 223; 
Yablo 1995, p. 489, Tye 1995, p. 145). Intuitively, an intrinsic or local property is a 
property whose instantiation by an object does not constitutively depend on the object’s 
relations to things wholly distinct from itself. In this respect, colors seem to be like 
shapes. Just as the apparent shape of a golf ball seems to be an intrinsic feature of the golf 
ball, so too does the apparent color of the golf ball. As Tye (2000) remarks,
[O]ur ordinary experiences of color place (many) object colors on the surfaces of 
objects independently of what is going on elsewhere in the surroundings. In this 
respect, color seems to me like shape. We experience the redness of a ripe tomato 
 I ignore so-called “unsteady” or “relational” colors, such as are found in holograms and glossy materials 2
(Johnston 1992, p. 227) 
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as not involving anything away from the facing surface of the tomato, as being a 
local feature of that surface, just as we do its shape. To take a relational view of 
color is to repudiate this commonsense fact. (p. 153)
Colors appear to be intrinsic. And as Tye observes, this apparent truth is flatly 
inconsistent with any relationist theory of color. If we respect appearances, we will reject 
relationism.
The second apparent truth that bears on relationist theories of color is: 
Categoricity: Colors are categorical (non-dispositional, non-hypothetical, manifest) 
properties.
The notion of a categorical property is, intuitively, the notion of a wholly non-modal 
property, a property the instantiation of which does not constitutively depend on what 
goes on in other possible worlds. Yablo (1992) helpfully points out a loose parallel 
between the notion of an intrinsic property and the notion of a categorical property: 
intrinsic properties stand to ordinary physical space roughly as categorical properties 
stand to modal space. The intrinsic properties of an object are, very loosely speaking, 
those of its properties that don’t depend on what’s going on elsewhere in ordinary 
physical space. Analogously, the categorical properties of an object are those of its 
properties that don’t depend on what’s going on elsewhere in modal space.
If we set aside the secondary qualities, perhaps the clearest examples of 
categorical properties are shapes. Contrast shape properties like being triangular or being 
spherical with paradigmatic hypothetical properties like being dangerous, being 
poisonous, or being fragile. If an object is triangular, then its being triangular is, as it 
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were, a situation wholly contained within actuality. Being triangular is not a matter of 
how the object would be or behave in counterfactual circumstances, but purely a matter 
of how it actually is. By contrast, if something is fragile, its being fragile is, in some 
intuitive sense, a situation not wholly contained within actuality. Being fragile is at least 
partly a matter of how the object would behave under certain counterfactual 
circumstances.
Just as colors seem to be like shapes in respect of being intrinsic, so too colors 
seem to be like shapes in respect of being categorical. As Dancy and Hookway (1986) 
remark, “the way in which color appears [...] seems to me at least to be stubbornly non-
dispositional” (cf. Yablo 1995, p. 489; McGinn 1996, p. 545; Boghossian and Velleman 
1989, p. 86). Kripke (1980) similarly remarks, concerning those who accept a Lockean 
dispositionalist version of color relationism, “I suspect many have been bothered by the 
‘gut feeling’ that yellowness is a manifest property, just as much ‘right out there’ as 
hardness or spherical shape” (p. 140n). Yablo (1995), defending what he calls the “naive 
view” of color, writes, “But what is the argument that redness does not look to be what 
the naive view says it is: an intrinsic non-dispositional sui generis color property? This 
would seem to be exactly how it looks” (p. 489). Similar claims apply, I think, to all or 
nearly all the secondary qualities.
There are, then, good prima facie grounds for accepting Categoricity. How does 
this bear on relationism? Categoricity is not inconsistent with relationism as such, but it is 
inconsistent with the most popular version of relationism, namely dispositionalist 
relationism (Locke 1689/1996, Reid 1764/1983, McGinn 1983, Johnston 1992, Cohen 
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2009). According to dispositionalist relationism, the colors we experience objects to have 
in color perception are dispositions to produce color experiences of a certain kind in (or 
dispositions to look a certain way to) certain perceivers under certain conditions.  Hence, 3
the dispositionalist relationist will accept analyses along the lines of:
x is red (for such-and-such perceivers in so-and-so conditions) =: x is disposed to 
produce reddish sensations (in such-and-such perceivers in so-and-so conditions).
If we respect appearances, we will accept Categoricity and so reject dispositionalist forms 
of relationism. To accommodate the apparent fact that colors are categorical properties, 
the relationist must adopt some non-dispositionalist form of relationism. A natural 
suggestion is to identify colors not with dispositional response-dependent properties like 
the disposition to produce reddish sensations, but with categorical response-dependent 
properties like the property of occurrently producing reddish sensations.
In my view, this non-dispositionalist form of relationism, or something in the 
vicinity, is the most plausible form of relationism. But it is not very popular among 
relationists. I suspect that the main reason why relationists typically find a dispositionalist 
account more attractive than a non-dispositionalist account is that the former allows 
objects to retain their colors when no one is looking. The ripe tomato on my kitchen 
counter now has the disposition to produce reddish sensations in normal human 
perceivers under normal viewing conditions, even though it is not now producing any 
reddish sensations. The dispositionalist relationist can therefore accept the commonsense 
 Dispositionalist relationism is often just called “dispositionalism.” But the former name is preferable 3
because many non-relationists about color also identify colors with dispositions, such as (response-
independent) dispositions to alter light in certain ways (Byrne & Hilbert 2003a, Tye 2000, Matthen 1988).
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claim that the tomato on my kitchen counter is red right now—that it has now, when no 
one is looking, the very color quality I experienced it as having this morning. But the 
non-dispositionalist relationist cannot accommodate this commonsense claim.
2.2.1    Revelation?
I have claimed that colors appear to have certain features and that absent good evidence 
to the contrary, we should trust these appearances. In §§2.3-4, I will argue that other 
apparent second-order features of colors raise further difficulties for relationist theories of 
color, and in §3, I argue that the apparent second-order features of color raise difficulties 
for physicalist theories of color as well. Some may worry that these claims bring me 
dangerously close to the much maligned doctrine of “Revelation,” according to which the 
intrinsic nature of any color is fully revealed by a standard visual experience of it 
(Johnston 1992, p. 223). 
The misguided nature of this worry is fully revealed by a moment’s reflection on 
it. I suppose that second-order properties like being intrinsic and being categorical 
pertain to the intrinsic nature of those qualities that possess them. So I suppose I am 
committed to the view that the intrinsic natures of colors are at least partially revealed to 
us, either in visual experience or in rational reflection. But I am not committed to (and 
indeed I would reject) the view that the intrinsic natures of colors are fully revealed to us. 
Nor is there a slippery slope from the former to the latter, as an analogy with the 
perception of the first-order features of concrete objects makes clear. Perception informs 
us of some of the intrinsic features of objects in our environment, e.g. their shapes. In this 
way, the intrinsic character of an object is at least partially revealed to us in ordinary 
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perceptual experience. From this truism, though, there is no pressure to accept the first-
order analogue of Revelation: that the intrinsic character of an object is fully revealed to 
us in perception, i.e. that perception informs us of all of the object’s intrinsic features.
Let us give the name “Weak Revelation” to the thesis that some necessary or 
essential truths about colors are knowable on the basis of ordinary experiences of those 
colors. Even if I am not committed to the strong thesis of Revelation formulated above, it 
might be suggested that my commitment to Weak Revelation is somehow problematic. 
But such a suggestion would be misguided, for Weak Revelation cannot plausibly be 
denied. Consider the following claims:
R1. Red is more similar to orange than it is to green. 
R2. Yellow is not identical to blue. 
R3. If something is purple, then it is spatially extended (or at least spatially located). 
R4. Nothing can be both yellow (all over) and blue (all over). 
R5. Scarlet is not a shade of green. 
R6. Red is a unitary color, and orange is a binary color. 
It is plausible (to say the least) that at least some of R1-R6 are necessary or essential 
truths about color and can be known on the basis of ordinary color experience. If so, then 
Weak Revelation is true.
It may be tempting to deny that the self-evidence of R1-R6 is really a matter of 
these truths being revealed to us in ordinary experiences of the colors, maintaining 
instead that R1-R6 merely register facts about how we have collectively decided to use 
color words. For example, it might be suggested that the self-evidence of R2 and R4 only 
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reflects the fact that the way we use color words ensures that no pair of properties deserve 
the names “yellow” and “blue” unless they are distinct and mutually exclusive properties, 
just as the way physicists use their theoretical vocabulary ensures that no pair of 
properties deserve the names “unit positive charge” and “unit negative charge” unless 
they are distinct and mutually exclusive properties. But this suggestion is mistaken, as is 
evident when we observe that R1-R6 express facts which can be known on the basis of 
ordinary experience without making use of English color terms; they can be known, for 
example, under perceptual demonstrative concepts, as when we know, when looking at a 
yellow thing next to a blue thing, that this quality is not that quality (R2), or that this 
quality excludes that quality (R4), or when looking at a purple object, that this quality 
could not be possessed by a spatially unextended object (R3).
2.2.2 The Look of a Lack or the Lack of a Look?
Sometimes it is denied that colors look, or in any other way seem to be, intrinsic or 
categorical, as I have claimed, and that our temptation to think they do stems from a kind 
of scope confusion. In particular, from the fact that colors do not look relational or 
dispositional, we mistakenly come to think that colors look non-relational and non-
dispositional (cf. Smart 1975, Tye 2009, p. 142, Armstrong 1968b, pp. 48-9). In other 
words, according to the present objection, we confuse the lack of a look for the look of a 
lack.  More precisely, our mistake is owed to a fallacious shift in scope from4
A1. It is not the case that colors seem to be relational (dispositional, disjunctive, . . .),
wherein the negation takes wide scope, to 
 I owe this clever turn of phrase to Mark Sainsbury (personal communication).4
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A2. Colors seem not to be relational (dispositional, disjunctive, . . .), 
wherein the negation takes narrow scope. 
There are two serious problems with this scope-shift objection. The first is that the 
alleged fallacy is so flagrant that it is scarcely believable that one could commit it. An 
analogy: I happen to endorse the following de re modal claim: 
B1. Necessarily, Socrates is not a cow (▢¬Cow(s))
Perhaps I am mistaken, though. Perhaps Socrates has a thinner, less restrictive essence 
than I think. But if I am mistaken, it is not because I am unconsciously sliding from the 
evident fact that 
B2. It is not the case that, necessarily, Socrates is a cow (¬▢Cow(s)), 
wherein the negation takes wide scope, to B1, wherein the negation takes narrow scope. 
Like any philosopher, I am liable to make the occasional philosophical mistake. But I 
flatter myself that I do not make such egregious mistakes as this. The problem with the 
scope-shift objection is that it attributes to advocates of claims like A2 a precisely 
analogous mistake.
Perhaps it will be said that while we are not apt to make this kind of fallacious 
shift across some operators, e.g. “necessarily,” we are apt to make these fallacious shifts 
across operators like “seems” or “appears.” But we aren’t. It is not the case that the water 
in the glass before me visually appears to be 72 degrees Fahrenheit, or to be composed of 
exactly 1018 molecules. But there is no temptation to think that it visually appears not to 
be. The same holds for second-order appearances. When I attend to the shade of blue on 
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the curtains before me, it is not the case that this color seems to have the property of 
being Jones’s favorite color. But there is no temptation to think that it seems not to be 
favored by Jones. 
The second problem with the scope-shift objection is that it makes a mystery of 
why we make the specific “mistakes” we do. The proponent of the scope-shift objection 
maintains that 
C1. It is not the case that colors seem to be intrinsic (categorical)
One wonders, then, why we would make the fallacious shift from A1 to A2 rather than 
making the parallel shift from C1 to
C2. Colors seem not to be intrinsic (categorical) 
The scope-shift objection leaves it mysterious why we are disposed to believe A2 rather 
than C2. The most straightforward explanation for this fact is that, pace the scope-shift 
objection, A2 is true but C2 is not. 
2.2.3    Confusing Color Qualia with Colors?
Some reductionists about color accept the following package of commitments, which I 
shall call the Qualia View:
Color experiences have certain intrinsic, introspectively available qualities called 
“color qualia.” The color qualia exemplified by a color experience determine or 
constitute the phenomenal character of the experience—i.e. what it’s like to undergo 
the experience. Color qualia, so understood, are distinct from colors. Colors are the 
properties represented by color experiences—the properties attributed to or 
predicated of—ordinary material objects by color experience. Colors are, in other 
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words, the properties we visually experience as belonging to such things as the 
surfaces of tomatoes. On the other hand, color qualia are intrinsic properties of color 
experience, which are not attributed to ordinary material objects by color experience 
(Block 1990, Peacocke 1983). Although we experience, or are aware of, color qualia, 
we do not experience color qualia as belonging to such things as the surfaces of 
tomatoes. 
The Qualia View opens up a natural line of response to Intrinsicality and Categoricity 
objections above. Specifically, it might be suggested that when we judge that colors are 
intrinsic and categorical, we are confusing the color qualia exemplified by our color 
experiences with the colors represented by our color experiences. On this suggestion, 
when I look at a ripe tomato and judge that that color—the color that I experience as 
belonging to the surface of the tomato—is intrinsic and categorical, I am registering 
certain genuine features of the reddish quale exemplified by my experience, but I am 
mistakenly projecting these onto the external (represented) color.
This sort of response is commonly used against objections to reductionist theories 
of color, relationist and physicalist alike. For example, a common objection to color 
physicalism is that the apparent resemblance structure of color space is not shared by any 
collection of physical properties which might reasonably be identified with the colors 
(§3.2). In response, many color physicalists say that when we make judgments ostensibly 
about the resemblance relations among colors, e.g. that red is (intrinsically) more similar 
to orange than it is to green, we are really just registering facts about the resemblance 
relations among color qualia or color experiences, e.g. the fact that the reddish quale is 
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(intrinsically) more similar to the orangish quale than it is to the greenish quale (cf. Lewis 
1997, p. 330; McLaughlin 2003, p. 115; Cohen 2003, p. 88).
The problem with this line of response is that the Qualia View is false. There are 
no introspectively accessible qualities associated with color experience distinct from the 
colors (levels of illumination, etc.) that appear to belong to the surfaces of objects in our 
environment. I urge you to place a ripe tomato (or some acceptable surrogate) in the 
middle of your visual field. All sides agree that there is a certain consciously accessible 
quality somehow associated with the middle of your visual field which is in some way 
constitutive of what it’s like to undergo your current visual experience. Call this quality 
Q. I am quite sure that Q and similar qualities are what proponents of the Qualia View 
have in mind when they talk about “color qualia.” But I am also quite sure that they have 
mischaracterized such qualities. For our purposes, the most important observation to 
make about Q is this: you experience Q as belonging to the surface of the tomato. In other 
words, Q appears (looks, seems) to you to belong to the surface of the tomato. (Doesn’t 
it?)  And that means that Q does not satisfy the characterization of color qualia given by 5
the Qualia View. Color qualia, unlike colors, are supposed to be intrinsic qualities of 
experience, and not qualities we experience as belonging to external objects. So Q is not 
a color quale, as defined above. But if Q is not a color quale, then nothing is a color 
quale. So there are no color qualia.
 This observation is closely related to the oft-made observation that color experience is “diaphanous” or 5
“transparent” (Harman 1990, Tye 1992).
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The Qualia View might be revised to accommodate the fact that we experience Q 
and other such qualities as belonging to external objects. The Revised Qualia View agrees 
with the original Qualia View in holding that color experiences, in addition to 
representing color properties, have certain introspectively accessible intrinsic qualities 
(distinct from the colors they represent), and that these are properly called “color qualia.” 
Where the Revised Qualia View diverges from the original Qualia View is that the former 
allows that we do (at least sometimes) experience these qualia as belonging to external 
material objects like the surfaces of tomatoes. In such cases, however, we are victims of a 
projective illusion, seeing what is in fact a quality of our experience as belonging to the 
object of our experience. This Revised Qualia View also allows us to explain away 
judgments like Categoricity and Intrinsicality in the manner described above.
But given that Q and similar qualities are experienced as belonging to ordinary 
material objects like the surfaces of tomatoes, surely we can recognize a legitimate sense 
of the word “color” on which Q and similar properties qualify as colors. Importantly, 
when I claim that non-reductive realism is true about colors, I mean these theses to apply 
to Q and other such qualities—the qualities which are directly presented to us in color 
experience, and which we experience as belonging to the objects of color experience. 
Concerning colors in my sense, the Revised Qualia View is just a form of irrealism, not 
reductive realism; it is a view on which our color experience of Q and other such qualities 
as features of external objects is a grand illusion. I shall defend realism against such 
views in §4. But crucially, the Revised Qualia View cannot be used to respond to my 
objections to relationism above, because on the question at issue—whether colors are 
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response-dependent properties of ordinary external objects—the Revised Qualia View 
agrees with me: they are not.
2.3    The Argument from Modal Relations
It is common for relationists to adopt an inegalitarian view of shape and color, according 
to which shape is “objective” or response-independent and color is “subjective” or 
response-dependent. That is, inegalitarianism combines a relationist view of color with a 
non-relationist view of shape. The next argument against relationism, which I call the 
argument from modal relations, has two stages. In the first stage, I argue that the modal 
relations between color and shape make the inegalitarian view untenable. We must 
embrace some form of egalitarianism, according to which shape and color are either both 
response-independent (objective egalitarianism) or both response-dependent (subjective 
egalitarianism). The argument against inegalitarianism begins with the following 
principle about the modal relations between shape and color: it is impossible for 
something to have a color without having a shape, i.e. without being spatially extended in 
some way. I then proceed to argue that, given reasonable assumptions, inegalitarianism 
contradicts this principle. Given the immense plausibility of the latter, I conclude that we 
should reject inegalitarianism in favor of some form of egalitarianism. In the second stage 
of the argument, I argue that, given egalitarianism, we ought to accept objective 
egalitarianism in particular. The upshot is that (not only shapes, but also) colors are 
response-independent properties, so relationism is false.
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2.3.1    Preliminaries
For simplicity, in what follows I’ll assume the color relationist accepts a simple 
dispositionalist form of relationism according to which redness (for example) is identified 
with the disposition to produce experiences with a reddish phenomenal character 
(“reddish sensations”) in normal perceivers under normal conditions. Likewise, I’ll 
assume the relationist about shape accepts a similar dispositionalist form of relationism 
according to which roundness (for example) is identified with the disposition to produce 
experiences with a roundish phenomenal character (“roundish sensations”) in normal 
perceivers under normal conditions. However, the arguments given in this section are 
largely independent of this assumption and are adaptable to a wide range of possible 
relationist views (including, inter alia, non-dispositionalist relationist views like those 
described in §2.2).
I will use expressions like “subjective redness” (or “subjective roundness”) to 
denote the response-dependent property that the relationist about color (shape) identifies 
with redness (roundness). Subjective colors include subjective redness, subjective 
whiteness, and their ilk. Subjective shapes include subjective roundness, subjective 
squareness, and their ilk.
 There is a minor technical complication that is worth mentioning here, if only to 
justify ignoring it in what follows. It is common for relationists to relativize color 
properties to kinds of perceivers or to particular perceivers and viewing conditions. On 
such views, there is no such thing as the property of being red. Rather, there are many 
kind-relative, or perceiver-and-viewing-condition-relative, properties of being red, whose 
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analyses take the form: “x is red for K =: x is disposed to produce experiences reddish 
sensations in normal members of K in circumstances which are normal for members of 
K,” or “x is red for S in C =: x is disposed to produce reddish sensations in subject S in 
circumstance C.” The commitment to the relativity of color in standard forms of 
relationism means that there are more color properties than we might initially have 
suspected. But for our purposes, what is important to recognize is that, given relationism, 
this proliferation of relativized color properties just gives us more color properties. So if 
colors are relativized to kinds, or to perceivers and circumstances, then whatever is 
necessarily true of color properties as such must be true of these relativized color 
properties. For example, suppose that (as I will claim in §2.3.2) it is necessarily true of 
color properties as such that they are only instantiated by things which have a shape, i.e. 
things which are spatially extended in some way. Then by Leibniz’s Law, if color 
relationism is true, this must be necessarily true of the kind-relative response-dependent 
properties with which the relationist identifies color properties. Because my arguments 
depend only on claims about what is necessarily true about color properties as such, I 
shall hereafter (harmlessly) ignore this technical complication about color relativity in 
typical relationist views.
2.3.2    Against Inegalitarianism
“Come then, let us try to tell you what shape is.” says Socrates to Meno. “Let us say that 
shape is that which alone of existing things always follows color.” (75b). Whatever the 
shortcomings of this as an analysis of shape, Socrates’s suggestion certainly seems to be 
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correct in one respect: shape, as a matter of necessity, always follows color, in that 
whatever has a color must also have a shape. Equivalently, color “modally depends” on 
shape, in the following sense:
Modal Dependence (MD): It is (metaphysically) impossible for something to have a 
color without having a shape.6
MD has been widely accepted, and indeed regarded as a truism, throughout the history of 
philosophy. Locke (1689/1996) writes, “It is true, solidity cannot exist without extension, 
neither can scarlet color exist without extension” (Bk II, ch. 13). In Berkeley’s 
(1713/1979) Three Dialogues, Hylas tells us (and Philonous evidently agrees) that “color 
can’t exist without extension,” treating this claim as an obvious truth that any 
philosophical theory must respect (First Dialogue; cf. Berkeley 1710/1982). Later 
philosophers, taking MD as self-evident, have treated it as a paradigm of the synthetic a 
priori (Husserl 1900/2001, Bonjour 1998, Hospers 1997).  And in recent philosophy, MD 7
(or something equivalent) is regularly used as a clear-cut, illustrative example of a 
 Two points: first, in saying that color “modally depends” on shape, I mean nothing more than is contained 6
in the above formulation. I do not mean to suggest that shape properties are in any interesting sense 
“ontologically prior” to color properties, or that the former “metaphysically ground” the latter. Second, one 
might object to MD by claiming that it’s possible for a point-sized object to have a color, but that such an 
object is not correctly described as having a shape. However, my arguments will not be affected if we 
interpret “having a shape” broadly, so that point-sized objects count as having a shape.
 Some of those cited here mention instead the non-modal proposition that all colored things are extended 7
rather than the modal proposition MD as a example of the synthetic a priori, but they each take for granted 
that the former is a necessary truth, and so take for granted the truth of MD.
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necessary truth in service of more general philosophical discussions about metaphysical 
modality.8
MD is the key background assumption in my argument against inegalitarianism. I 
regard MD as a basic intuition about the nature of color and shape. It seems to be far 
more plausible than any specific theory about the nature of color and shape. Theoretical 
claims of the latter sort are to be tested in part by their ability to accommodate truisms 
like MD. At the very least, if a philosophical theory conflicts with MD, this should be 
regarded as a serious, if not decisive, cost for the theory. 
From here, the argument against inegalitarianism appeals to one further premise: 
P. If inegalitarianism is true, then possibly, something has a subjective color without 
having a shape. 
MD together with P entail the falsity of inegalitarianism. For assume MD and P are true, 
and now suppose for reductio that inegalitarianism is true. Inegalitarianism and P jointly 
entail: (1) possibly, something has a subjective color without having a shape. But for the 
inegalitarian, subjective colors are colors. So inegalitarianism and (1) jointly entail: (2) 
possibly, something has a color without having a shape. But (2) contradicts MD. So 
(given MD and P) inegalitarianism is false.
All that remains, then, is to establish the truth of P. To do so, it will suffice to 
describe a scenario w such that (i) in w, something has a subjective color without having 
 A typical example from the opening sentences of Kroedel (2012), a paper addressing general issues about 8
the epistemology of metaphysical modality: “We seem to have plenty of modal knowledge, that is, 
knowledge that such-and-such is metaphysically necessary and that so-and-so is metaphysically possible. 
For instance, we know that necessarily everything that is colored is spatially extended, and we know that 
there might have been flying pigs” (p. 1). Cf. Sider (2003, p. 184).
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a shape, and (ii) if inegalitarianism is true, then w is a genuine (metaphysical) possibility. 
As I shall argue, these conditions are satisfied by the following scenario, which I call W.
W is an entirely non-spatial world inhabited by a vast host of non-spatial objects
—objects that are neither spatially extended (though they possess other, non-spatial 
intrinsic properties), nor spatially related to one another (though they stand in various 
non-spatial relations, including causal relations, to one another). Among the inhabitants 
of W are minds—that is, subjects of mental states. We might suppose that these minds are 
mereologically simple, as Descartes held actual minds to be. Or we might instead 
suppose that these minds are mereologically complex, as materialists hold actual minds to 
be, built up from simpler parts which causally interact with one another in complex ways 
that structurally parallel the causal interactions among the parts of an actual human brain. 
The minds of W, like ours, undergo a wide range of experiences, whose subjective 
characters co-vary in systematic ways with certain intrinsic features of the extra-mental 
objects which cause them, at least in normal circumstances. Some such extra-mental 
objects are disposed to produce reddish sensations in normal perceivers under normal 
conditions. Others are so disposed to produce greenish sensations, others blueish 
sensations, and so forth. 
In other words, some objects in W possess subjective-colors. But because 
everything in W is entirely non-spatial, these objects are devoid of any shape. So W 
satisfies condition (i) above. What about condition (ii)? Is W a genuine metaphysical 
possibility? W seems to be a conceivable scenario. Conceiving P, in the relevant sense—a 
sense involving the appearance of possibility (cf. Yablo 1993, Chalmers 2002)—
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plausibly provides prima facie justification to believe that P is possible.  In other words, 9
given the conceivability of W, we ought to believe that W is possible unless there are 
sufficiently strong countervailing considerations. It’s also worth noting that similar 
scenarios familiar from discussions of external-world skepticism are widely regarded as 
possible. For example, the scenario Descartes imagines in Meditations I-II, in which his 
sensory impressions, including his color sensations, are produced in him by a non-spatial 
being (an immaterial demon) and in which “body, shape, extension, movement, and place 
are all chimeras” (p. 63), strikes most readers as possible. And indeed, some 
philosophers, such as David Chalmers (2006, 2012), hold that something like W actually 
obtains.  Nonetheless, I do not positively claim that W is possible. For reasons to be 10
discussed shortly, there may be grounds for denying its possibility. What I do claim, 
however, is that whatever grounds there may be for denying the possibility of W are not 
available to the inegalitarian. For, as we’ll see, these grounds rely on assumptions about 
 This principle of modal epistemology is entailed by, but does not entail, the more general principle of 9
Phenomenal Conservatism mentioned in §2.2. The latter principle, or something like it, is likely to be 
attractive to color relationists. Color relationists are generally color realists, and their rejection of the 
irrealist alternative is often justified on something like Phenomenal Conservative grounds. (See, e.g., Cohen 
2009, p. 65.)
 More precisely, Chalmers maintains that “Edenic” shapes—roughly speaking, the shape properties 10
directly presented to us in experience, and others under the same determinable—are not instantiated in the 
actual world. If we restrict our attention to Edenic spatial properties, Chalmers would take my description 
of W to be true of the actual world. However, he allows that “ordinary” or “imperfect” shapes, picked out 
as those properties, whatever they are, that serve as the normal causal basis of our experience as of Edenic 
shape, are instantiated in the actual world. 
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the nature of shape and the nature of experience that cannot be comfortably combined 
with the commitments of inegalitarianism.11
There is one ground for denying the possibility of W which is available to an 
egalitarian of a subjectivist stripe. W is stipulated to be a world in which some things 
have subjective colors. But it’s somewhat plausible that there is a modal relation between 
subjective color and subjective shape analogous to the modal relation between color and 
shape. In other words, it’s somewhat plausible that the following modal-dependence 
principle is true:
Subjective Modal Dependence (SMD): It is impossible for something to have a 
subjective color without having a subjective shape.
This claim might be supported by arguing that nothing can produce the subjective 
response-type associated with any color without producing a subjective response-type 
associated with some shape. Perhaps it’s a “law of appearance” that one cannot have 
(say) an experience as of something red without having an experience as of something 
spatially extended in some way. If SMD is correct, then given relationism about shape, W 
 Some may find the idea of an entirely non-spatial world, or of non-spatial objects with causal powers, so 11
bizarre that they are hesitant even to accept that there is a prima facie case for the possibility of W. For 
philosophers in this group, it’s worth noting that there is a somewhat less bizarre alternative scenario that 
would serve our purposes nearly as well as W, which I’ll call W* (This scenario was suggested to me by 
Adam Pautz). W* is just like W except that the entities that produce color experiences are point particles 
rather than non-spatial entities. If we ran the argument with W* instead of W, we would have to give a 
somewhat stronger interpretation to MD than that given in fn. 6 by taking the notion of “having a shape” in 
such a way as to exclude point-sized objects. The resulting interpretation of MD, though stronger than the 
official interpretation, is nonetheless very plausible. I rely on W here rather than W* because I’m more 
certain of the official interpretation of MD than the stronger interpretation. But if one finds the two 
interpretations of MD about equally plausible, and one has significantly more confidence in the possibility 
of W* than in the possibility of W, then one should keep this alternative version of the argument in mind in 
what follows.
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is impossible. For W is stipulated to be a world in which things have subjective colors but 
lack shapes. If it’s impossible for something to have a subjective color without having a 
subjective shape, and shapes just are subjective shapes, then it’s impossible for 
something to have a subjective color without having a shape.
But of course, the inegalitarian does not identify shapes with subjective shapes. 
SMD may be true, in which case W is a world where everything with a subjective color 
also has a subjective shape. But for the inegalitarian, having a shape is not simply a 
matter of having a subjective shape. So for the inegalitarian, the fact (if it is a fact) that 
nothing can have a subjective color without having a subjective shape is no reason to 
think that nothing can have a subjective color without having a shape, and so provides no 
reason to think that W is impossible.
But perhaps SMD opens up another line of response for the inegalitarian.  In 12
particular, the inegalitarian might claim that MD is false and that it only seems plausible 
because we confuse it with SMD. I find this debunking strategy unconvincing for three 
reasons. First, it seems that the intuition that MD is true persists even when we are given 
this alternative explanation of why MD seems plausible. In this respect, the proposed 
debunking strategy differs from other successful cases of explaining away modal 
appearances through suggestions of “proposition confusion,” such as Kripke’s 
explanation of the appearance that water could have been distinct from H2O, which 
claims (on one interpretation of Kripke) that we’re confusing the proposition <possibly, 
water ≠ H2O> with (something like) the proposition <possibly, the watery stuff around 
 Thanks to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.12
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here ≠ H2O> (Kripke 1980). Second, we would not find analogous debunking strategies 
convincing for other intuitive modal claims, such as (i) it is impossible for something to 
be a bicycle without being spatially extended, or (ii) it is impossible for something to be 
both round and triangular. It’s plausible that nothing could appear bicyle-ish without 
appearing spatially extended, and it’s also plausible that nothing could appear both round 
and triangular. But these facts have no tendency to undermine the intuitive support for (i) 
and (ii). Why, then, should SMD undermine the intuitive support for MD? Third, it seems 
to me that we’re not generally prone to confusions of this kind. For example, arguably 
nothing could appear red to me without appearing to be before me, but this fact (if it is a 
fact) does not fool me into thinking that nothing could be red without being before me. It 
therefore seems doubtful that we would be subject to this sort of confusion in the case at 
hand.
A second reason for denying the possibility of W comes from phenomenal 
externalism (Dretske 1995, Tye 1995, Lycan 2001a, Byrne and Tye 2006). According to 
phenomenal externalism, the phenomenal character of a sensory experience constitutively 
depends on the subject’s extrinsic relations to features of her environment. According to 
one common version of phenomenal externalism, the phenomenal character of one’s 
experience is determined by the properties represented by the experience, where one’s 
experience represents a property just in case, very roughly, one’s current internal state 
“tracks” or causally co-varies with instances of that property under normal conditions. 
Hence, according to this “tracking” externalist view, in order to have a square-ish 
sensation—i.e. an experience with the subjective character associated with our 
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experiences as of squares—one must token an internal state which causally co-varies 
(under normal conditions) with instances of squareness. But in W, squareness is never 
instantiated, nor is any other shape property. So the internal states of the subjects in W 
don’t causally co-vary with instances of squareness or any other shape property. Given 
this version of phenomenal externalism, then, the subjects in W will not undergo shape 
phenomenology. If it is indeed a law of appearance that color experience entails shape 
experience, it follows that the subjects in W could not have color experiences. As W was 
stipulated to be a world in which subjects do have color experiences, it follows that W is 
not a possible world.
However, it is not clear that this line of reasoning is available to the inegalitarian. 
This is because the inegalitarian is committed to color relationism, and as many others 
have pointed out, phenomenal externalism cannot be happily married with color 
relationism (Tye 1995, pp. 144-5; Dretske 1995, pp. 88-93). How, for example, could the 
color relationist give a phenomenal-externalist account of our color experience? The 
color relationist holds that for an object to have a given color property C is for it to be 
disposed to produce subjective responses of type RC in normal perceivers under normal 
conditions. If she proceeds to endorse a phenomenal externalist position, according to 
which what it is for one to token the subjective response-type RC is for one to be in an 
internal state which tracks instances of C, then she courts vicious circularity. The 
resulting view, on which C = the disposition to produce instantiations of the property of 
being in some state or other that tracks instances of C, has the absurd consequence that C 
is one of several constituents out of which C itself is constructed—that C is a constituent 
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of itself. As Johnston (2001) remarks about a related view, the envisaged position 
“identif[ies] a property […] with the relation to a holding of another relation that has that 
very property as a relatum. But a property cannot be contained within itself in this 
way” (p. 195, cf. Pautz 2010b).  Furthermore, it seems implausible to suppose that our 13
internal states track properties of this sort. When I have an experience of red17, perhaps I 
am in an internal state which, under normal conditions, is caused by a certain physical 
property, perhaps a surface reflectance type. But it is not plausible that my internal states 
are caused by objects’ dispositions to produce experiences of a certain type in normal 
perceivers under normal conditions (cf. Prior et al. 1982, Jackson and Pargetter 1987, 
McLaughlin 2003). 
Granted, the phenomenal-externalist argument above for the impossibility of W 
only requires that the externalist “tracking” account of sensory experience apply to our 
shape experience; it does not require that such an account hold true for color experience. 
Perhaps, then, the inegalitarian can opt to retain just enough phenomenal externalism as 
is needed to deny the possibility of W, but not so much as to run her into the problems 
discussed above, perhaps by combining an externalist “tracking” account of shape 
 It’s worth noting that the circularity objection under consideration is importantly different from the more 13
familiar concerns about circularity that arise for color relationism, or at least for versions of color 
relationism whose analyses of color take something like the form “x is red =: x is disposed to look red,” 
where “red” occurs on both sides of the analysis. Many relationists have convincingly argued that the 
apparent circularity in such analyses needn’t be vicious. For example, Cohen (2009) rightly points out that 
the apparent circularity in question won’t be vicious if the ultimate analysis or real definition of what it is to 
look red to a subject does not consist in the subject’s bearing a relation to redness or otherwise mention 
redness. And there are, as Cohen points out, many respectable “non-relationist” theories of color experience 
to which the relationist can appeal to avoid objectionable circularity (p. 170). The circularity objection I 
raise above applies only to the combination of color relationism with a view of color experience according 
to which the subjective response-type involved in the relationist’s analysis of a color C is a relational 
property consisting in a relation to C itself.
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experience with an internalist account of color experience. But there are three serious 
problems with this response. First, it is extremely ad hoc. Second, and more significantly, 
it apparently precludes any unified answer to the question of what determines the 
phenomenal character of experience, one which would apply to experiences of different 
sensory modalities or even experiences of different sensible qualities within the visual 
modality. To abandon hope of such a unified account is a theoretical cost that most will be 
unwilling to pay.
Third, apart from these broadly theoretical considerations, in the present context 
there is a fatal problem with appealing to any view, such as the view under consideration, 
that combines an externalist account of shape phenomenology with an internalist account 
of color phenomenology. Imagine there is an isolated brain whose intrinsic physical state 
perfectly matches that of my own brain, but which, unlike my own brain, has never had 
any interesting causal commerce with shapes in its environment. Let us suppose further 
that it is not in a state that would be produced by an object with this or that shape if only 
such an object were to be placed before it, for, unlike my brain, it is not connected to the 
receptor cells needed to facilitate such world-to-brain exchanges. Nor, we may add, did it 
come about through any process, such as natural selection or intelligent design, that could 
have conferred on the brain’s present state the biological function of detecting this or that 
shape. Rather, we may suppose it came together in the manner of a Boltzmann brain, a 
result of random thermal fluctuations of particles in the void. Given any reasonable form 
of externalism about shape experience, this brain is not enjoying any shape 
phenomenology. But given internalism about color phenomenology, it must be enjoying 
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rich color phenomenology. After all, it is an intrinsic duplicate of my brain, and I am 
enjoying rich color phenomenology. 
So it is a consequence of the hybrid view that it’s possible for a subject to have 
color phenomenology without having shape phenomenology. Either this consequence is 
true or it’s false. If it is false (as seems plausible), it follows that the hybrid view is also 
false and so cannot be used to argue for the impossibility of W. If it is true, then this fact 
undermines the argument from phenomenal externalism to the impossibility of W. Recall 
that that argument derived the impossibility of W from two premises: (i) it is impossible 
to have shape phenomenology in an entirely non-spatial world; (ii) it is impossible to 
have color phenomenology without having shape phenomenology. Although the hybrid 
view, if true, could be used to support the first premise, it entails the falsity of the second 
premise and thereby undermines the argument from phenomenal externalism to the 
impossibility of W.
The third way in which the inegalitarian might attempt to deny the possibility of 
W is as follows: W is supposed to be an entirely non-spatial world, in which an entirely 
non-spatial subject undergoes color sensations. But on certain physicalist views, what it is 
to have a given color sensation is to have a certain neurophysiological property. Now, it’s 
plausible that an entirely non-spatial subject could not have any neurophysiological 
properties. For anything with neurophysiological properties must presumably have 
neurons among its parts. And an entirely non-spatial subject could no more have neurons 
as parts than it could have hands and feet as parts. So, if some such physicalist view 
about color sensations is correct, then W is impossible.
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Unfortunately, these considerations do not help the inegalitarian. For it was 
inessential to the argument that the subjects of the relevant experiences be non-spatial. 
What matters to the argument is that the objects of the relevant experiences, those things 
which produce color experiences of various kinds in the subjects, be non-spatial. We may 
therefore amend the description of W to avoid the response above by stipulating that the 
subjects have whatever spatiality is needed to possess the relevant neurophysiological 
properties while leaving the rest of the description intact. We might, for example, suppose 
that the subjects are intrinsically just like human brains and that the appropriate 
neurophysiological states are produced in them by immaterial objects under certain 
conditions, in accordance with fundamental laws governing the interaction of spatial and 
non-spatial objects.
I have considered three grounds for denying the possibility of W—that is, three 
propositions (subjective egalitarianism, phenomenal externalism, type-identity 
physicalism about color phenomenology) that a philosopher might reasonably endorse 
and which apparently have the consequence that W is impossible. But as we’ve seen, the 
first two are unavailable to the inegalitarian, and the third is unhelpful to the inegalitarian. 
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I am aware of no other grounds for denying the possibility of W.  On the assumption that 14
inegalitarianism is true, we should therefore conclude that there is a possible world—
either W or some variation on W—in which things have subjective color but lack shape. 
In other words, P, the key premise in the argument above, is true. But the inegalitarian 
holds that colors are subjective colors. So given inegalitarianism, we have not merely a 
possible world in which things have subjective color without shape, but a possible world 
in which things have color without shape. But it is not possible for something to have 
color without shape. So inegalitarianism is false.
2.3.3    From Egalitarianism to Non-relationism
The inegalitarian accepts the following two theses:
T1. Colors are response-dependent properties.
T2. Shapes are response-independent properties.
An anonymous referee suggests a way the inegalitarian might avoid (not the result that W is possible, but) 14
the result that objects in W are colored. I’ve described the color relationist as identifying colors with 
dispositions to produce color sensations of a certain kind (in normal perceivers under normal conditions). 
But some color relationists identify colors instead with dispositions of objects to look some way (to normal 
perceivers under normal conditions), where an object’s looking some way to a perceiver will then be 
understood (at least partially) in terms of the object’s producing sensations of the right kind. The crucial 
difference, the referee suggests, is that appealing to the looks relation may give the inegalitarian a way to 
deny that the objects in W are colored by maintaining that being spatially extended is a metaphysically 
necessary condition on something’s looking a certain way. (The referee suggests that this might be because 
x’s looking some way to S requires S to visually attend to x, where perhaps it is a metaphysically necessary 
condition on visually attending to x that x be spatially extended.) Without attempting an analysis of the 
looks relation (or the relation of visual attention) here, I think there is good reason to deny the suggestion 
that being spatially extended is a necessary condition on looking some way (or being the object of visual 
attention). Consider Chalmers’s (2006, 2012) view that shapes (more precisely, “Edenic” shapes—see fn. 
10) are not really instantiated in the world, but only appear to be instantiated. I do not think this view is 
true, but if it were true, it seems we would still want to say, as Chalmers does, that the objects that produce 
roundish experiences in us look round, and the objects that produce reddish experiences in us look red (and 
that we sometimes visually attend to such objects). One hardly wants to say that nothing looks round or red 
in such a scenario, but what else would look round or red if not the objects that produce the relevant visual 
experiences?
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If the argument above is successful, we must reject inegalitarianism in favor of some 
form of egalitarianism. We can embrace objective egalitarianism by accepting T2 and 
rejecting T1, or we can embrace subjective egalitarianism by accepting T1 and rejecting 
T2. It seems clear that the first option is by far the more reasonable option. There is a lot 
of controversy over T1. By contrast, T2 is about as close to uncontroversial as anything 
gets in philosophy. Sound methodology would therefore seem to recommend taking T2 as 
our fixed Archimedean point. From here we may dislodge T1, using egalitarianism as our 
lever.
If one needs any coaxing on this point, consider what follows if we accept a 
response-dependent view of shape in addition to a response-dependent view of color. A 
consequence of a response-dependent view of color is that our knowledge of the colors of 
things is not knowledge of how things in the external world are in themselves, but only 
knowledge of how things are in relation to us and our sensory experiences. Now, if we 
proceed to endorse a response-dependent view of shape, we must likewise concede that 
our knowledge of the shapes (and spatial features generally) of things is also not 
knowledge of how things are in themselves, but only knowledge of how things are in 
relation to us and our sensory experiences. But this seems to entail the radically skeptical 
conclusion that we are more-or-less entirely ignorant of how things in the extra-mental 
world are in themselves. Many—myself included—will find this result unacceptable.
A response-dependent view of shape—a view on which the instantiation of shape 
properties constitutively depends on the subjective responses of perceivers—would also 
seem to have the consequence that whatever properties constitutively depend on shape 
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also constitutively depend, at least indirectly, on the subjective responses of perceivers. 
But if we think of the range of properties that constitutively depend on an object’s shape, 
this consequence looks utterly implausible. For example, whether an object has such 
properties as being a leaf, being a star, being a mountain, or being a pine cone depends 
in part on the object’s spatial features, including its shape. But it’s outrageous to suppose 
that something’s being a leaf (or a star, or a mountain, or a pine cone) constitutively 
depends, directly or indirectly, on the subjective states of perceivers.
To summarize: I’ve argued that egalitarianism is true. That is, either shape and 
color are both response-independent, or shape and color are both response-dependent. 
Since shape is response-independent, I conclude that color is response-independent as 
well. So color relationism is false.
2.3.4    Privileged Status
Inegalitarianism, as I’ve characterized it, may be regarded as a specific version of 
a more general thesis, which we might call the Privileged Status Thesis (PST):
PST: Shapes have some philosophically interesting sort of privileged status vis-a-vis 
colors.
PST is very plausible, and the attraction some philosophers feel toward inegalitarianism 
or color relationism may derive from an attraction to PST. In light of the foregoing, it is 
important to note that PST is consistent with the rejection of inegalitarianism. I shall 
conclude by describing four ways (not all mutually exclusive) of upholding PST—four 
ways of according shapes a privileged metaphysical status relative to colors—which are 
untouched by the arguments above. First, one might uphold PST by observing that shapes 
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are common sensibles, understood as qualities that can be sensed through more than one 
sense modality (e.g. vision and touch), whereas colors are not. Second, one might uphold 
PST by maintaining that shapes, or spatial properties more generally, have a “wide 
cosmological role,” figuring in causal laws with sweeping generality, whereas colors have 
very limited causal relevance (perhaps none beyond the explanation of color perception 
or facts closely related to color perception, such as sorting behavior) (Campbell 1993, p. 
264). Third, one might uphold PST by maintaining that shapes are more natural than 
colors in the sense of Lewis (1983), or that colors, unlike shapes, are highly disjunctive or 
gerrymandered properties (cf. Byrne and Hilbert 2003a, Tye 2000, Smart 1975, Jackson 
and Pargetter 1987). Finally, one might accept a more radical form of PST according to 
which realism is true about shape but not about color.15
2.4    Perceptual Variation
It commonly happens that an object looks different in respect of color to different 
perceivers, or to the same perceiver under different viewing conditions, even when 
viewing conditions are normal and the perceivers in question qualify as normal according 
to standard tests for normal color vision. For example, in the same (normal) viewing 
conditions, a given color chip might look unique green (that is, green without any 
admixture of yellow or blue) to one normal perceiver, yellowish green to another, and 
blueish green to another. Cases like this jointly constitute what I’ll call the phenomenon 
of perceptual variation. The phenomenon of perceptual variation (especially normal 
 The last option will be criticized in chapter 4, and something in the neighborhood of the third option will 15
be criticized in §3.5, but nothing I’ve said so far rules them out.
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variation—variation among normal perceivers in normal viewing conditions) makes 
serious trouble for any relationist view of color, or so I shall argue. This claim might be 
surprising. Relationists typically take the phenomenon of perceptual variation to support 
relationism. Indeed, the facts of perceptual variation are often treated as the main support 
for relationism. For example, the phenomenon of perceptual variation is Locke’s 
(1689/1996) primary motivation for accepting relationism about colors and other so-
called secondary qualities. And Cohen (2009) calls the argument from perceptual 
variation “the core argument” (elsewhere “the most important argument”) for color 
relationism (p. 19). In §2.4.1, I’ll examine the argument from perceptual variation for 
relationism. At this stage I’ll focus on Cohen’s version of the argument in his (2009), 
which contains the most developed and sophisticated defense of the argument from 
perceptual variation to date. I shall argue that perceptual variation provides no support for 
relationism. More specifically, I shall argue that the phenomenon of perceptual variation 
turns out to play no essential role in the so-called “argument from perceptual variation.” I 
then proceed to argue that perceptual variation furnishes the materials for a powerful 
argument against relationism (§2.4.2).
2.4.1    The Argument from Perceptual Variation for Relationism
Consider a case like the one described above, in which a given color chip looks unique 
green to some normal perceivers, yellowish green to others, and blueish green to others. 
Call the visual experiences of these perceivers “variants.” There are three possibilities: 
ALL-RIGHT: All of the variants are veridical.
ONLY-SOME-RIGHT: Some of the variants are veridical and some are not.
 47
NONE-RIGHT: None of the variants is veridical.16
The first stage in Cohen’s argument from perceptual variation to relationism is to argue 
that we should accept ALL-RIGHT. In effect, his argument at this stage is an argument by 
elimination: we should accept ALL-RIGHT because there are problems with the other two 
alternatives. The problem with NONE-RIGHT is that it leads almost inexorably to the 
irrealist view that nothing in the external world is colored. This consequence “flies in the 
face of naive belief. Put bluntly, it is a notable part of the manifest image that colors are 
exemplified by actual, ordinary objects—fruits, lights, tables, chairs, etc., and that we 
learn something about the world when we visually perceive the colors of those objects. 
There is, then, Moorean pressure to reject irrealism about color that must be counted as a 
significant strike against the view” (p. 65). His objection to ONLY-SOME-RIGHT is a bit 
more involved. I shall postpone discussion of it until §2.4.2. For now, let it suffice to say 
that he finds ONLY-SOME-RIGHT objectionable, and so opts for the only remaining 
alternative: ALL-RIGHT.
It’s worth noting that ALL-RIGHT is fairly counterintuitive. If something looks 
unique green to John and yellowish green to Jane, we are tempted to ask, “who (if either) 
is getting the color of the chip right?,” where the underlying presupposition is that they 
can’t both be getting the color of the chip right. There is, in other words, an intuition of 
 I deviate from Cohen’s terminology here. Cohen uses “ecumenism,” “inegalitarianism,” and 16
“eliminativism.” I avoid this terminology for two reasons. First, since I used the term “inegalitarianism” in 
§2.3 to designate an unrelated thesis, it might produce confusion to use the term in Cohen’s sense here. 
Second, “eliminativism” usually designates the thesis that nothing is colored. But the claim that all the 
variants are non-veridical, though it strongly suggests that nothing is colored, does not quite entail that 
nothing is colored. (It might be that the chip is red. Or it might be that the chip has a coarse-grained color 
like green (or greenish) but no fine-grained color. More on the latter possibility in 2.4.2.)
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conflict, an intuition that they can’t both be veridically representing the chip. Following 
Pautz (2010b), we’ll call this the “Conflict Intuition.” We may ultimately want to reject 
this intuitive judgment on theoretical grounds, but it is a very natural assumption to make. 
This is why the “who’s getting it right?” question comes naturally here, where it seems 
clearly out of place in other cases, e.g. the case in which the chip feels hard to John and 
feels smooth to Jane. In the latter case, the “who’s getting it right?” question seems out of 
place because there’s no temptation to think they can’t both be getting it right.
I shall return to the Conflict Intuition later. For now, let us follow Cohen and 
assume the truth of ALL-RIGHT. It’s worth emphasizing that the whole point of Cohen’s 
extended discussion of actual, empirically verifiable cases of perceptual variation in his 
“argument from perceptual variation" for relationism is to get us to ALL-RIGHT.  But on 
the face of it, this looks like so much work for nothing. That’s because, on the face of it, 
ALL-RIGHT doesn’t get us any closer to color relationism than we were before learning 
about the phenomenon of perceptual variation. ALL-RIGHT obviously doesn’t entail 
relationism. Moreover, it seems that ALL-RIGHT can be combined with a non-relationist 
view of color just as easily as it can be combined with a relationist view of color. This is 
perhaps easiest to see if we consider a physicalist version of non-relationism, such as the 
reflectance physicalist view that color shades are identical with reflectance types, or 
disjunctions of reflectances (Byrne and Hilbert 2003a, Tye 2000, Lewis 1997, Matthen 
1988). Reflectance physicalism as such is entirely neutral on the question of whether 
certain pairs of determinate color shades, such as unique green and yellowish green, are 
incompatible. If the reflectance physicalist is convinced that ALL-RIGHT is the correct 
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response to cases of normal variation, perhaps on the basis of Cohen’s argument by 
elimination, she should maintain that unique green and yellowish green (for example) are 
compatible. A natural way of implementing this suggestion within a reflectance  
physicalist framework is to hold that unique green and yellowish green are disjunctions 
of reflectances with some disjuncts in common (Byrne and Hilbert 1997). To give a 
simplified model: suppose the chip has reflectance R2, and the chip looks unique green to 
John and slightly yellowish green to Jane. Then both of their experiences will be veridical 
if, say, unique green = R1 ∨ R2 and slightly yellowish green = R2 ∨ R3.)
The same goes for non-reductive versions of non-relationism. The non-
reductionist who is convinced that ALL-RIGHT is the correct response to cases of normal 
variation will simply maintain that unique green and yellowish green (for example) are 
irreducible qualities which happen to be compatible. Both of these pluralist forms of non-
relationism are versions of what Cohen calls “selectionism,” so-called because they 
portray different perceivers’ visual systems as “selecting” one of several different (non-
relational) colors the object actually has. The general idea is characterized nicely by 
Kalderon (2007), a defender of selectionism:
The relation between object, perceiver, and circumstance of perception does not 
determine the color of the object (in the way that it would if colors were relational) so 
much as it determines the perceptual availability of the color. Thus the relation 
between the chip, [John], and the circumstances of perception does not determine that 
the chip is unique green; rather it determines the perceptual availability of unique 
green for [John]. Moreover, the relation between the chip, [Jane], and the 
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circumstances of perception does not determine that the chip is yellowish green; 
rather, it determines the perceptual availability of yellowish green for [Jane]. On the 
[selectionist] pluralistic hypothesis, the chip is multiply colored—it is unique green 
all over and yellowish green all over at the same time; it is just that the perceptual 
availability of these sensible qualities is determined by different relations between the 
chip, perceivers, and circumstances of perception. According to the [selectionist], 
then, the [relationist] conflates the conditions of perception of a color for the 
perceived color. (p. 577)
In my view, the most serious problem with the selectionist combination of non-
relationism with ALL-RIGHT is that it runs afoul of the Conflict Intuition. But of course, 
this is not a problem specifically for the combination of non-relationism with ALL-RIGHT, 
but a problem with ALL-RIGHT. It therefore provides no reason to prefer the combination 
of relationism with ALL-RIGHT to the combination of non-relationism with ALL-RIGHT, as 
Cohen recognizes (p. 79). Indeed, if we must accept ALL-RIGHT, then a selectionist 
version of non-relationism is prima facie preferable to relationism, for the former isn’t 
threatened by the problems discussed in §§2.2-2.3. The selectionist can maintain that 
colors are intrinsic, categorical properties, just as they seem to be. The selectionist can 
also uphold the (objective) egalitarian thesis that color and shape are both response-
independent properties.
Cohen is aware that ALL-RIGHT is consistent with non-relationist “selectionist” 
views. To complete the argument from perceptual variation for relationism, he takes up 
the task of arguing that, given ALL-RIGHT, we ought to accept relationism over the 
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selectionist alternative, and he does so by giving an argument against selectionism. The 
argument appeals to a hypothetical scenario inspired by Pautz (2006a). The scenario 
involves two subjects, Maxwell and Twin Maxwell, who evolved in different 
environments and who both qualify as normal perceivers for their species. Maxwell’s and 
Twin Maxwell’s visual systems are identical at the receptoral level (e.g. they have the 
same kinds, proportions, number, and organization of photoreceptor cells in the retina), 
and their receptoral responses to color stimuli are therefore identical. But they differ 
significantly with respect to their post-receptoral processing of color stimuli. We might 
suppose that a given (non-relational) property P, though it produces the same receptoral 
response in both Maxwell and Twin Maxwell, puts Maxwell’s visual system into post-
receptoral state SM and puts Twin Maxwell’s visual system into a distinct post-receptoral 
state STM. Cohen imagines that SM is a state involving the activation of two opponent 
process channels in Maxwell’s visual system (the sort of processing thought to underly 
our experience of binary hues like purple), while STM involves the activation of just one 
opponent process channel in Twin Maxwell’s visual system (the sort of processing 
thought to underly our experience of unitary hues like (unique) green). These post-
receptoral differences will in turn result in behavioral differences, e.g. differences in 
sorting behavior and verbal reports about whether the color of the stimulus is unitary 
(uncomposed) or binary (composed). Cohen writes,
With this setup in hand, it is now easy to state the problem posed for the selectionist 
by the case of Maxwell and Twin Maxwell. On the one hand, the most plausible 
characterization is that Maxwell’s visual state SM and Twin Maxwell’s visual state 
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STM differ in representational content. However, on the other hand, it appears that, 
given any of a wide class of popular psychosemantic theories, the selectionist will be 
forced to say that SM and STM do not differ in the non-relational properties they select/
represent.
We can reconstruct Cohen’s argument against selectionism as follows:
C1. SM and STM differ with respect to the colors they represent.
C2. SM and STM do not differ with respect to the non-relational properties they 
represent.
C3. Therefore, the colors represented by SM and STM (and so presumably colors 
generally) are not non-relational properties—that is, they are relational properties.
Premise C1 seems very plausible. It is very plausible that SM and STM will differ 
phenomenally. And it’s also plausible that there can be no phenomenal difference 
between two color experiences without a difference in the properties represented by those 
experiences (Tye 1995, Dretske 1995, Byrne and Hilbert 1997, Chalmers 2006, Pautz 
2009),  and it’s plausible that in the case at hand the difference in properties represented 17
would have to be a difference specifically in the colors represented.18
In my view, we should reject C2. C2 is supposed to be supported by the fact that it 
follows from “any of a wide class of popular psychosemantic theories.” Here he takes as 
a representative example Tye’s (1995, 2000) view, according to which a state S represents 
a property F iff S causally covaries with F in optimal conditions—roughly, the sorts of 
 Though see, e.g., Block (1990) for a contrary position.17
 Though see Shoemaker (1994) for a contrary position.18
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conditions in which the the subject’s visual system was designed to operate. We might 
suppose that SM and STM both causally covary with, or “track,” the same external, non-
relational property P in optimal conditions. In that case, Tye’s psychosemantics seems to 
have the consequence that C2 is true: SM and STM represent the same non-relational 
property, namely P. Moreover, Cohen claims that this consequence is not unique to Tye’s 
psychosemantics. According to Cohen, a wide range of other psychosemantic theories 
have the same result, including those of Dretske (1995), Fodor (1990), Armstrong (1999), 
Davies (1993), Papineau (1993), and Millikan (1989).
There are a number of problems with his appeal to popular psychosemantics here. 
First, psychosemantics is one of those areas in philosophy where all the available theories 
are deeply unsatisfactory, at least if we try to take them as something more than 
programmatic and radically oversimplified sketches of what the correct theory might 
ultimately look like. So even if many extant psychosemantic theories entail C2, to 
conclude that C2 is true solely on this basis would evince an unwarranted level of 
confidence in current psychosemantic theories. A second problem is that, due to the 
highly schematic character of extant psychosemantic theories, it is difficult to judge 
whether all the theories mentioned really entail C2 (cf. Byrne and Tye 2006, p. 252). 
Third, it seems in any case that if the psychosemantic theories in question have the 
consequence that STM do not differ with respect to the non-relational properties they 
represent, this is only because they have the logically stronger consequence that they do 
not differ in any of the properties they represent. (As far as I can see, these theories would 
not predict that SM and STM differ in the relational properties they represent either.) It is 
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therefore strange that Cohen is appealing to these theories here, because if these theories 
succeed in establishing C2, it is only because they succeed in establishing something that 
entails the falsity of C1.
It’s also worth noting that some popular psychosemantic theories that Cohen does 
not mention, specifically those within the “interpretationist” tradition (Davidson 1973, 
Lewis 1974, Dennett 1987), would likely deliver the verdict that C2 is false. On an 
interpretationist psychosemantics, contents are assigned to states partly on the basis of 
what would rationalize the subject’s behavior. Since SM and STM produce different 
behavior, it’s likely that, for any non-relational property F such that assignment of F as 
content SM would rationalize Maxwell’s behavior, assignment of F to STM would not 
rationalize Twin Maxwell’s behavior, and vice versa. So on an interpretationist approach 
to psychosemantics, it’s plausible that SM and STM would differ in the non-relational 
properties they represent.
In any case, given that even our best psychosemantic theories have not matured 
past infancy, the way to proceed in the case at hand is not to take a top-down approach, 
starting with a worked-out psychosemantic theory and then deriving a verdict on the 
particular case. Rather, we ought to make our best intuitive judgment about the particular 
case given the details of the case. Taking the latter approach, it seems easy enough to 
sketch a plausible account of the case according to which SM and STM represent distinct 
non-relational properties. (The following is partly inspired by a suggestion made, but not 
endorsed, by Pautz (2006a).) SM is supposed to involve the activation of two opponent 
process channels, whereas STM is supposed to involve the activation of just one opponent 
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process channel. As a result, Maxwell judges the represented color of the stimulus to be 
binary (composed) and Twin Maxwell judges the represented color of the stimulus to be 
unitary (uncomposed). Let’s call the pair of opponent process channels in Maxwell’s 
visual system the “A-B channel” and the “C-D channel.” A generalization of the 
opponent-process theory of human color vision (Hurvich and Jameson 1957) suggests the 
following picture: Positive (> base-line) activation of the A-B channel represents the 
stimulus as having some determinable hue magnitude A, with higher activation levels 
representing larger determinate values of A, and negative (< base-line) activation levels 
represent the stimulus as having some determinable hue magnitude B, with lower (higher 
absolute value) activation levels representing larger determinate values of B. The 
determinable hue magnitudes A and B might be familiar hue magnitudes like reddishness 
and greenishness, or they might be hue magnitudes alien to human color space. In any 
case, for the non-relationist, these will be response-independent hue magnitudes. On a 
physicalist version of non-relationism, we might suppose that they are highly unnatural or 
“anthropocentric” physical magnitudes (such as the degree of difference between an 
object’s propensity to reflect long- and medium-wavelength light (cf. Bradley and Tye 
2001). On a non-reductive version of non-relationism, we might suppose they are 
relatively natural (perhaps primitive) magnitudes distinct from any magnitude of interest 
to the physical sciences. The same story will hold, mutatis mutandis, for Maxwell’s C-D 
channel. Similarly, Twin Maxwell’s visual system will also have a pair of opponent 
channels, which we’ll call the A*-B* channel and the C*-D* channel, which function in 
an analogous fashion. I’ll assume that A ≠ A*, B ≠ B*, C ≠ C*, and D ≠ D*.
 56
Now, we’re supposed to imagine that Maxwell’s state, SM, involves the activation 
of both opponent channels. We’ll suppose the activation levels on each are positive. In 
that case, the activation state of the A-B channel represents the stimulus as (say) A to 
degree x (x > 0), and the activation state of the C-D channel represents the stimulus as 
(say) C to degree y (y > 0). From here, it’s natural to suppose that the composite state SM 
semantically binds these contents together and represents the stimulus as having the 
conjunctive property A to degree x & C to degree y.
Turning to Twin Maxwell, we’re supposed to imagine that his state, STM, involves 
the activation of only one opponent process channel—let’s say the A*-B* channel—
together with baseline (zero-level) activity on the other channel. So Twin Maxwell’s state 
will presumably represent the object as (something like) A* to degree z (z > 0) & C* to 
degree 0. The conjunctive property represented by SM, i.e. A to degree x & C to degree y, 
may be coextensive with the conjunctive property represented by STM, i.e. A* to degree z 
& C* to degree 0. They may even be coextensive across nearby possible worlds, or even 
across all possible worlds. But given a sufficiently fine-grained conception of properties 
(e.g. that defended in §3.5.6), it’s plausible that they will nonetheless be distinct 
properties. They are, after all, constructed from distinct hue magnitudes. Since these 
conjunctive properties are response-independent (and so “non-relational” in the sense 
relevant to Cohen’s argument), we get the result that C2 is false. 
Apart from the question of whether Cohen’s argument against selectionism is 
ultimately successful, there are two features of his argument worth highlighting: first, the 
argument does not rely on the (actual) phenomenon of perceptual variation. Second, it is 
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not an argument against selectionism specifically; it is, rather, an argument against non-
relationist views generally. The argument, in other words, does not rely on the 
assumption that ALL-RIGHT is true. Now, either the argument succeeds or it doesn’t. If it 
doesn’t, then although we may follow Cohen in accepting ALL-RIGHT, we still have no 
reason to prefer relationism to non-relationism. If it does succeed, then it succeeds in 
establishing relationism all by itself, without the assistance of ALL-RIGHT. In that case, 
ALL-RIGHT turns out to be an idle wheel in the argument for relationism. Either way, ALL-
RIGHT is doing no work. But the whole point of Cohen’s extended discussion of the 
(actual) phenomenon of perceptual variation was to establish ALL-RIGHT. So it looks like 
the phenomenon of perceptual variation likewise is doing no work at all in Cohen’s 
“argument from perceptual variation” for relationism.
I conclude that the phenomenon of perceptual variation provides no support for 
relationism. Given that the phenomenon of perceptual variation is, for many relationists, 
the primary motivation for relationism, this is bad news for the relationist. But it gets 
worse. Not only does perceptual variation provide no support for relationism. It furnishes 
the materials for a powerful argument against relationism.
2.4.2    The Argument from Perceptual Variation Against Relationism
In broad strokes, the argument from perceptual variation against relationism proceeds as 
follows.
P1. NONE-RIGHT is false.
P2. ALL-RIGHT is false.
P3. If relationism is true, then either NONE-RIGHT is true or ALL-RIGHT is true.
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C. Therefore, relationism is false.
Let us consider the premises in turn. P1 is equivalent to
SOME-RIGHT: some variant is veridical.
The case for SOME-RIGHT is straightforward:19
SR1. The chip is green.
SR2. If the chip is green, then it is some determinate shade of green.
SR3. If the chip is some determinate shade of green, then some variant is veridical.
SR4. Therefore, some variant is veridical.
The justification for SR1 comes from the fact that the chip looks green; it visually 
seems or appears to be green. Presumably if the chip looks green to you, this fact 
provides at least prima facie justification to believe that it really is green. Here I am 
presupposing something like the Phenomenal Conservative principle mentioned in §2.2: 
if it seems to one that p, then one has at least prima facie justification to believe that p. In 
other words, if it seems to one that p, then absent sufficiently strong defeaters, one has 
justification to believe that p. The opponent of SOME-RIGHT may well have no problems 
with the Phenomenal Conservative principle. But she will maintain that there are 
defeaters. Most of these will be considered in §4 when I defend realism. For now, I want 
to point out that there at least aren’t any defeaters for SR1 stemming from the facts of 
 It might be thought that in the present dialectical context, I can take SOME-RIGHT for granted. After all, on 19
the face of it, denying SOME-RIGHT is more-or-less tantamount to accepting the irrealist view that the 
objects in our environment aren’t really colored, which the relationist denies. But as we’ll see below, it 
turns out that there are reasonable versions of relationism that reject SOME-RIGHT while avoiding the 
irrealist view that the objects in our environment aren’t colored at all. For this reason, it’s worth spending 
some time supporting SOME-RIGHT.
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perceptual variation themselves. The epistemic status of SR1, which attributes the 
coarse-grained color green to the chip, therefore differs significantly from that of a 
proposition attributing a fine-grained color to the chip, such as: 
U. the chip is unique green.
Suppose the chip looks unique green to you. Given the Phenomenal Conservative 
Principle, you have prima facie justification to believe that the chip is unique green. But 
then suppose you learn the relevant facts about perceptual variation. You learn, for 
example, that the chip looks yellowish green to other normal perceivers—perceivers who 
navigate their environment just as well as you, who do just as well on color 
discrimination tests as you do, and so on. Assuming the chip can’t be both unique green 
and yellowish green, it’s plausible that learning these facts undercuts your justification to 
believe U. But in a case like the one I’ve described, where the chip looks unique green to 
some normal perceivers, yellowish green to other normal perceivers, and blueish green to 
others, it will look green to all normal perceivers in normal conditions of illumination. (In 
any case, it will look greenish to all normal perceivers, and the argument will go through 
just as well if we substitute “greenish” for “green.”) So we have prima facie justification 
to believe the chip is green, and this time the facts of perceptual variation do not undercut 
our justification, for all the variants agree that it is green.
Consider an analogy, adapted from a familiar case in the peer disagreement 
literature (Kelly 2010). You and your friend, both normal perceivers in equally favorable 
viewing conditions, are watching the final seconds of a close horse race between horse A 
and horse B. As A and B cross the finish line, it looks to you as though A finishes at 
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approximately the same time as B, but more specifically it looks to you as though A 
finishes just barely before B. Put another way: A appears to you to have the coarse-
grained property of finishing at approximately the same time as B, and also appears to 
you to have the fine-grained property of finishing just barely before B. (Note that the 
property of finishing just barely before B stands in something like a determinate-
determinable relation with the property of finishing at approximately the same time as B. 
Finishing just barely before B is one of several ways of finishing at approximately the 
same time as B; other ways include finishing just barely after B and finishing at exactly 
the same time as B.) You then find out that it also looked to your friend as though A 
finished at approximately the same time as B, but more specifically it looked to him as 
though A finished just barely after B. Here, it’s fairly plausible that upon learning about 
how things seem to your friend, you should give up, or at least significantly reduce your 
confidence in, your initial fine-grained judgment. But there’s no pressure in this case to 
give up your coarse-grained judgment. You should continue to believe that A has the 
coarse-grained property of having finished at approximately the same time as B, even if 
you can’t reasonably take a stand on which fine-grained “determinate” of this property A 
has. Similarly, if other normal perceivers agree on the coarse-grained color of the chip, 
and disagree only on its fine-grained color, then at most we should give up our judgments 
about the fine-grained color, not our judgments about its coarse-grained color. So we 
ought to accept premise SR1.
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Turning to the other two premises: Premise SR2 is an instance of a very plausible 
general metaphysical principle about the relation between determinates and 
determinables, which I shall call the Principle of Determination:
Principle of Determination: For any object x and determinable property F, if x has 
F, then x has some determinate of F.
Finally, premise SR3 is justified by the setup of the case, which stipulates that 
there are enough variants to cover all the determinate shades of green (at least within a 
given sizable subregion of the green portion of color space).
P2, the second premise of our argument against relationism, asserts that ALL-
RIGHT is false. Our justification to accept P2 comes from the Conflict Intuition introduced 
in §2.4.1. If a chip looks unique green (all over) to John and yellowish green (all over) to 
Jane, there’s a strong intuitive that they can’t both be getting the color of the chip right; at 
least one of their experiences must be misrepresenting the chip. The Conflict Intuition 
that arises in cases like this straightforwardly yields the falsity of ALL-RIGHT.
Relationists typically deny what I’m calling the Conflict Intuition. Is the appeal to 
the Conflict Intuition in an argument against relationism therefore question-begging? No. 
Asserting P as a premise in an argument for C is question-begging only if the justification 
for accepting P depends on our having antecedently accepted C. So appeal to the Conflict 
Intuition in an argument for the denial of relationism is question-begging only if our 
justification to accept the Conflict Intuition depends on our having antecedently rejected 
relationism. But the claim that John and Jane can’t both be getting the color of the chip 
right in the above scenario is simply a pre-theoretic intuition. Our justification to accept it 
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does not depend on our having already rejected relationism, nor indeed does it depend on 
any prior substantive theoretical commitments.
I’ve argued that both NONE-RIGHT and ALL-RIGHT are false. If I’m correct, it 
follows that ONLY-SOME-RIGHT is true. We should only be prepared to deny NONE-RIGHT 
and ALL-RIGHT on the basis of my arguments if we’re satisfied that there are no 
objections of comparable (or greater) strength against ONLY-SOME-RIGHT. It’s therefore 
worth pausing to consider Cohen’s objections to ONLY-SOME-RIGHT. His objection to 
ONLY-SOME-RIGHT is that, although there is not “any inconsistency in the thought that one 
perceptual variant is veridical at the expense of the others, […] it’s hard to see what 
(besides ad hoc stipulation) could make this the case” (p. 25). Because ONLY-SOME-RIGHT 
requires ad hoc stipulation; we should therefore reject ONLY-SOME-RIGHT because “we 
should take measures to avoid ad hoc stipulation when possible” (p. 25).
I find this objection to ONLY-SOME-RIGHT deeply puzzling. To begin with, his 
claim that “it’s hard to see what (besides ad hoc stipulation)” could make it the case that 
one variant is veridical at the expense of the others seems to suggest that ad hoc 
stipulation could make it the case that one variant is veridical at the expense of the others. 
If that were so, Cohen would be fated to lose this debate. For in that case, I could win the 
debate simply by using my powers of ad hoc stipulation to make my position true.
More importantly, as many reviewers of Cohen’s book have pointed out (Pautz 
2010b, Tye 2012, cf. Byrne and Hilbert 2003a), it’s not at all clear why ONLY-SOME-
RIGHT is supposed to require ad hoc stipulation. Cohen’s justification for this claim seems 
to be that “there is no independent, well-motivated reason for singling out any single 
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variant as veridical (at the expense of the others)” (p. 24), so the only way to single out 
any particular variant as veridical would be through ad hoc stipulation. I agree with 
Cohen that in many cases of perceptual variation, there is no independent, well-motivated 
reason for singling out any particular variant as veridical. If a chip looks unique green to 
John and yellowish green to Jane, and both are normal perceivers viewing the chip in 
normal viewing conditions, there may well be no independent, well-motivated reason for 
singling out John’s experience as the veridical variant at the expense of Jane’s, and also 
no independent, well-motivated reason for singling out Jane’s experience as the veridical 
variant at the expense of John’s.  So if I were to single out a particular variant—say, 20
John’s experience—as veridical, then perhaps this would amount to “ad hoc 
stipulation.” (In any case, it would amount to something objectionable.) Fortunately, the 
proponent of ONLY-SOME-RIGHT needn’t single out any particular variant as veridical at 
the expense of the others. She needn’t say of any variant that it is veridical and the others 
aren’t. ONLY-SOME-RIGHT is just the existential claim that some variant is veridical and 
others aren’t. Asserting this existential proposition doesn’t require any stipulation, ad hoc 
or otherwise. Still less does the truth of this existential claim require ad hoc stipulation. 
Rather, it requires some variant to be veridical and others to be non-veridical. The 
veridicality or non-veridicality of an experience is a matter of whether the object of the 
 I’m assuming that Cohen means that there is no independent and well-motivated reason for asserting/20
believing of any variant that it is veridical at the expense of the others. If he intends the de dicto reading—
that there is no independent and well-motivated reason for asserting/believing the proposition that one of 
the variants is veridical and the others aren’t—then the use of the phrase “singling out any single variant as 
veridical” is singularly inapt. If I say to a room of people, “Exactly one of you stole my pencil,” but I don’t 
say of anyone in the room that he stole my pencil, then I clearly haven’t singled out any single person as the 
thief. More importantly, if he intends the de dicto reading, then his claim is false for reasons to be given in 
the next (main text) paragraph.
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experience has the property or properties the experience represents it as having, and 
neither the properties represented by experience nor the (relevant) properties of objects 
are a matter of stipulation.
While there may be no independent and well-motivated reasons to accept any 
particular instance of this existential claim, the same cannot be said of the existential 
claim itself. The premises in the arguments given in the last two sections—SR1-SR3 and 
the Conflict Intuition—jointly entail the existential claim, and I’ve shown that each of 
these premises is well-motivated. This much should be granted even if one thinks that we 
should ultimately reject one of these premises on the basis of further considerations.
Setting aside Cohen’s confusing remarks about “ad hoc stipulation,” the crux of 
the objection seems to be Cohen’s claim that it’s hard to see what could make it the case 
that one of the variants is veridical at the expense of the others. But I don’t understand 
what’s hard to see here. Consider again our case in which a color chip looks unique green 
to John and yellowish green to Jane. Consider the hypothesis—call it H—that one of their 
experiences is veridical and the other is non-veridical. What could make H the case? 
Well, either of the following would do the trick:
Case 1: John’s experience is veridical and Jane’s experience is not veridical.
Case 2: Jane’s experience is veridical and John’s experience is not veridical.
Of course, my opponent will press on: “But what could make it the case that (say) Case 1 
obtains?” Answer: the following four conditions would certainly do the trick (cf. Byrne 
and Hilbert 2007b, p. 88-9; Byrne 2006, p. 337): (The first pair would ground the first 
conjunct of Case 1, and the second pair would ground the second conjunct.)
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(i) The chip looks unique green to John.
(ii) The chip is unique green. 
(iii) The chip looks unique yellow to Jane.
(iv) The chip is not unique yellow. 
Likewise, mutatis mutandis, for Case 2. (Compare: suppose a certain rod looks straight to 
John but looks bent to Jane. What could make it the case that John’s experience is 
veridical while Jane’s is not veridical? Answer: the following four conditions would 
suffice: (i*) the rod looks straight to John, (ii*) the rod is straight, (iii*) the rod looks bent 
to Jane, (iv*) the rod is not bent.)
It’s difficult to deny that if facts (i)-(iv) obtained, they would make it the case that 
Case 1 obtains, and hence that “one variant is veridical at the expense of the others.” But 
Cohen might press the same question again for (i)-(iv). Although (i)-(iv) would obviously 
suffice to make ONLY-SOME-RIGHT true, he might say that we should not accept the 
conjunction of (i)-(iv) because it’s hard to see what could make (i)-(iv) obtain. Now, we 
needn’t bother with the question of what could make (i) and (iii) obtain, because there is 
no dispute about the truth of (i) and (iii). Cohen is not prepared to reject (i) or (iii) even if 
we are unable to explain what could make them the case. And since the “what could 
make it the case that P?” question is here being used to motivate the rejection of P, we 
needn’t consider this question for instances of P which are not in dispute. So the concern 
must be that it’s hard to see what could make (ii) and/or (iv) obtain—in other words, that 
it’s hard to see what could make it the case that
U. the chip is unique green.
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and/or what could make it the case that
NY. The chip is not yellowish green.
Now, there may be puzzles about what could make NY the case, but these are just 
instances of highly general puzzles about the grounds for negative facts. To take another 
instance of the same puzzle: the room is 74 degrees Fahrenheit. It is not 80 degrees 
Fahrenheit. What makes it the case that—what grounds the fact that— the room is not 80 
degrees? I’m not sure. One possibility is that negative facts like this are brute or 
explanatorily fundamental facts. Another possibility is that this negative fact is explained 
by the positive fact that the room is 74 degrees, perhaps together with the exclusion 
principle that being 74 degrees is incompatible with being 80 degrees. Another possibility 
is that the negative fact is explained by whatever positive facts ground the fact that the 
room is 74 degrees (e.g. that the molecules in the room are moving in such-and-such 
specific way), perhaps together with the exclusion principle that these facts are jointly 
incompatible with each collection of facts that would ground the room’s being 80 
degrees. Whatever we say about this case we can apply, mutatis mutandis, to NY. There is 
no special puzzle about what could make NY the case.
So if there if there is any difficulty in seeing what could make it the case that one 
of the variants is veridical at the expense of the others, it must be because there is some 
difficulty in seeing what could make it the case that the chip is unique green. But what’s 
supposed to be the problem here? If unique green is a certain reflectance type, then what 
makes it the case that the chip is unique green is the way the chip alters the incident light, 
which in turn is explained by the microphysical structure of the chip’s surface, the laws of 
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electromagnetism, and so forth. (But what could make it the case that unique green is that 
particular reflectance type? Bad question. Identity facts don’t admit of explanation (cf. 
Lewis 1986, pp. 192-3).) On the other hand, if unique green is an irreducible quality, then 
one possibility is that nothing makes it the case the chip is unique green; in other words, 
the fact that the chip is unique green is explanatorily basic. (Explanation has to end 
somewhere!) Another possibility is that the chip’s being unique green is grounded in the 
way its surface alters the incident light, even though being unique green is not identical to 
a way of altering incident light. (Compare: Whisker’s furriness is grounded in his 
microphysical properties, but the property of being furry is (probably) not identical to any 
microphysical property—i.e. any property definable in the vocabulary of microphysics.) 
Another possibility, which I’m inclined to accept (see chapter 5), is that the chip’s being 
unique green is grounded (not in its dispositions to alter incident light, but) in certain 
categorical microphysical features of the chip (which themselves ground its dispositions 
to alter the incident light).
Until we’re given some reason to think that such features of the chip could not 
make the chip unique green, I conclude there is no difficulty in seeing what could make it 
the case that one variant is veridical while there others aren’t, and hence no reason (as 
yet) to reject ONLY-SOME-RIGHT.
The third and final premise of the argument from perceptual variation against 
relationism is the conditional: if relationism is true, then either NONE-RIGHT is true or 
ALL-RIGHT is true. To support this, I shall consider a range of different versions of 
relationism and show that each of them either has the consequence that NONE-RIGHT is 
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true or the consequence that ALL-RIGHT is true. I shall then motivate the claim that the 
same holds not just of the versions of relationism I consider, but for all reasonable forms 
of relationism. As we’ll see, although it is possible to devise a version of relationism that 
does not entail ALL-RIGHT or NONE-RIGHT, such versions of relationism turn out to have 
deeply unattractive features.
On a simplistic form of relationism, when the chip looks green to John, John’s 
experience represents the chip as having the disposition to look green. Likewise, when 
the chip looks yellowish green to Jane, Jane’s experience represents the chip as having 
the disposition to look yellowish green. Does the chip have these properties? It depends 
on how we interpret “the disposition to look unique green” and “the disposition to look 
yellowish green.” Different interpretations yield different versions of relationism:
ALL: John’s experience (Jane’s experience) represents the chip as having the 
disposition to look unique green (yellowish green) to all perceivers under all 
conditions. 
SOME: John’s experience (Jane’s experience) represents the chip as having the 
disposition to look unique green (yellowish green) to some perceivers under some 
conditions.
Given the empirical facts of perceptual variation, ALL yields the result that NONE-
RIGHT is true, for there is no determinate color C such that the chip is disposed to look C 
to all perceivers under all conditions. On the other hand, SOME yields the result that ALL-
RIGHT is true.
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Other relationist views make restrictions to normal perceivers and normal 
conditions. On such views, when a chip looks unique green to John, the property his 
visual experience represents the object as having is the disposition to look unique green 
to normal perceivers in normal conditions. Likewise, when the chip looks yellowish 
green to Jane, the property her visual experience represents the chip as having is the 
disposition to look yellowish green to normal perceivers in normal conditions. Does the 
chip have these properties? Again, it depends on how we interpret “the disposition to look 
unique green [yellowish green] to normal perceivers under normal conditions.” Different 
versions of relationism result from different interpretations of such expressions. Here are 
two:
NORM-ALL: John’s experience (Jane’s experience) represents the chip as having the 
disposition to look unique green (yellowish green) to all normal perceivers under all 
normal conditions.
NORM-SOME: John’s experience (Jane’s experience) represents the chip as having the 
disposition to look unique green (yellowish green) to some normal perceivers under 
some normal conditions.
NORM-ALL, together with the empirical facts of normal variation, entail NONE-
RIGHT. The chip is not disposed to look unique green to all normal perceivers in all 
normal conditions; Jane is a counterexample. Nor is the chip disposed to look yellowish 
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green to all normal perceivers in all normal conditions; John is a counterexample.  On 21
the other hand, NORM-SOME, together with the empirical facts of normal variation, entails 
ALL-RIGHT. (I’m assuming here that all the variants at issue are experiences of normal 
perceivers in normal conditions.)22
Other relationist views hold that the color represented by a given color experience 
is relativized to particular perceivers (the subject of the experience) and particular 
viewing conditions (the fully specific condition of the subject’s current experience). If we 
let CJohn be the fully specific viewing condition in which John finds himself and we let 
CJane be the fully specific viewing condition in which Jane finds herself, then this form of 
relationism would hold that:
 It’s worth noting that although NORM-ALL entails NONE-RIGHT, it does not entail the irrealist thesis that 21
nothing is colored. Although the chip doesn’t present any particular fine-grained color appearance to all 
normal perceivers under all normal conditions, the chip does present a common coarse-grained color 
appearance to all normal perceivers in normal conditions. In particular, it looks green (or at least greenish) 
to all normal perceivers under all normal conditions. So NORM-ALL will have the result that the chip has a 
coarse-grained color but no fine-grained color. In my view, NORM-ALL is the most attractive form of 
relationism among those considered in this section. Unlike ALL, it allows us to accept realism about coarse-
grained colors like red, green, blue, and purple. Unlike SOME, NORM-SOME, and SPEC (introduced below), it 
does not violate the Conflict Intuition. And unlike SPEC, it can accommodate the fact that sometimes two 
perceivers, or a single perceiver in different viewing conditions, perceptually represent the same color. The 
main problem with NORM-ALL is that it seems to be inconsistent with the Principle of Determination 
mentioned in §2.4.2.
 There are other ways to interpret expressions like “the disposition to look unique green (yellowish green) 22
to normal perceivers under normal conditions,” e.g. as denoting the disposition to look unique green 
(yellowish green) to most normal perceivers under most normal conditions, or to some normal perceivers 
under all normal conditions, or to all normal perceivers under some normal conditions, or any of the other 
results of permuting the quantifiers all, some, and most. But each of the corresponding versions of 
relationism will entail either ALL-RIGHT or NONE-RIGHT for reasons similar to those just given for NORM-
ALL and NORM-SOME. (The same seems to hold if we work with other natural-language quantifiers, such as 
few, many, 6% of, the GEN quantifier, and any other non-gerrymandered quantifier that comes readily to 
mind.)
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SPEC: John’s (Jane’s) experience represents the chip as having the disposition to look 
unique green (yellowish green) to John (Jane) in CJohn (CJane).
SPEC, which happens to be the version of relationism endorsed by Cohen, yields the result 
that ALL-RIGHT is true. For the chip has the disposition to look unique green to John in 
John’s specific viewing condition, and it also has the disposition to look yellowish green 
to Jane is Jane’s specific viewing condition, so both experiences veridically represent the 
chip. The same will be true of all variants in such cases of perceptual variation.
Now, as I’ve formulated ALL, SOME, NORM-ALL, and SPEC, each of these is a form 
of what I earlier called dispositionalist relationism (§2.2). But nothing here hangs on the 
dispositionalist formulation. The non-dispositionalist counterparts of each of these views 
(i.e. the result of replacing “the disposition to look” with “occurrently looks” in the 
formulation of each version) will also entail the truth of either ALL-RIGHT or NONE-RIGHT. 
Nor does anything hang on formulating the views in terms of the way objects (are 
disposed to) look. We could also replace expressions like “look unique green” with 
expressions like “produce unique-green-ish sensations,” “produces an experience of a 
unique-green-prime region of the visual field” (Peacocke 1984), and the resulting forms 
of relationism would have the same result.
Each of the version of relationism we’ve considered—ALL, SOME, NORM-ALL, 
NORM-SOME, and SPEC—have the result that either ALL-RIGHT is true or NONE-RIGHT is 
true. It seems to me that these five versions of relationism (along with relevantly similar 
views such as those mentioned in the previous paragraph and in fn. 22) exhaust the 
reasonable relationist positions. Now, there are other possible relationist positions, and 
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some of these would even have the result that ONLY-SOME-RIGHT is true, and hence avoid 
the result that either NONE-RIGHT or ALL-RIGHT is true. For example, one could accept the 
following position:
SPEC-JOHN: John’s experience represents the chip as having the disposition to look 
unique green to John in CJohn. Jane’s experience represents the chip as having the 
disposition to look yellowish green to John in CJohn. 
Since the chip is disposed to look unique green to John in CJohn, and isn’t disposed to look 
yellowish green to John in CJohn, SPEC-JOHN yields the result that ONLY-SOME-RIGHT is 
true. But no one could take such a proposal seriously. It’s absurd to suppose that Jane’s 
experience represents color properties that are relativized specifically to John and his 
viewing conditions. And indeed, it seems that any version of relationism that has the 
result that ONLY-SOME-RIGHT is true will be deeply unattractive for much the same 
reasons. Since all reasonable forms of relationism have the result that either NONE-RIGHT 
or ALL-RIGHT is true, I conclude that premise P3 is true. Given P1 and P2 (defended 
above), it follows that relationism is false.
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Chapter 3: Against Physicalism
3.1    Introduction
Physicalist theories of a class of sensible qualities identify the qualities in that class with 
response-independent physical properties. “Physical property” here is intended in a fairly 
narrow sense to mean a property that admits of real definition in terms of the canonical 
vocabulary of the physical sciences. Properties that merely supervene on, but are not 
identical to, such properties do not qualify as “physical” in my sense. 
In objecting to physicalist theories of the secondary qualities, I focus once again 
on color, though as in the previous chapter, many of my criticisms are applicable to other 
secondary qualities as well. Moreover, as before, it is antecedently plausible that if 
physicalism is false about color, it is also false about the other secondary qualities. I’m 
not aware of anyone who accepts a non-physicalist theory of color together with a 
physicalist view of (say) flavor, scent, or timbre. So if we can show that physicalism 
about color is false, then it’s a fair bet that physicalist theories of other secondary 
qualities are false as well.
In this chapter, I discuss three objections (better, three kinds of objection) to 
physicalist theories of color: the structure-mismatch objection(s), the categoricity 
objection, and a class of objections that may be called disjunctive-property objections, 
with a special focus on one member of this class, which I call the similarity-grounding 
objection.
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3.2    The Structure-Mismatch Objection: 
The structure-mismatch objection is one of the most important objections to physicalist 
theories of color and other secondary qualities. However, my discussion of it will be 
extremely brief, as I have nothing of significance to add to the work of Hardin (1988), 
Maund (1995), Pautz (2006b), and others who have developed and defended the 
objection in great detail. In broad strokes, the structure-mismatch objection begins with 
the empirical premise that the colors in human color space jointly exhibit certain 
structural features which are not possessed by any collection of physical properties, or at 
least any collection of physical properties that could reasonably be identified with the 
colors in human color space. Now, if a collection C of properties exhibits a structural 
feature (or any other feature, for that matter) which is not possessed by any collection of 
X-properties, then by Leibniz’s law it follows that C is not identical to any collection of 
X-properties. It therefore follows from the empirical premise above that colors are not 
identical to any collection of physical properties.
One important aspect of the structure of human color space is its resemblance 
structure. There is a large class of apparent second-order truths about the colors, such as 
that red is more similar to orange than it is to green, or that scarlet is more similar to 
crimson than it is to canary yellow, that collectively embody the apparent resemblance 
structure of color space. This resemblance structure does not seem to match that of any 
collection of physical properties that could reasonably be identified with the colors. Other 
structural features of human color space, such as the distinction between unitary colors 
(red, green, blue, yellow) and binary colors (e.g. orange, purple), also seem not to be 
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present in any relevant collection of physical properties. As Hardin (1997) writes, “the 
unitary-binary structure of the colors as we experience them corresponds to no known 
physical structure lying outside nervous systems that is causally involved in the 
perception of color” (p. 300). Related difficulties arise for physicalist theories of other 
secondary qualities as well (Pautz 2006a, 2010a; Hartmann 1997, ch. 12).
As with other apparent second-order truths about the colors, it is possible to hold 
that the relevant appearances are illusory. But the fact that colors appear to stand in such-
and-such resemblance relations gives us prima facie grounds to think they really do stand 
in these resemblance relations, and therefore gives us prima facie grounds to reject color 
physicalism.
3.3    The Categoricity Objection
In §2.2 I objected to dispositionalist forms of relationism on the grounds that it 
contradicts an apparent second-order truth about color, namely:
Categoricity: Colors are categorical properties.
Just as there are dispositionalist forms of relationism, there are dispositionalist forms of 
physicalism, i.e. forms of physicalism according to which colors are identical to certain 
dispositional physical properties. The most popular form of dispositionalist physicalism 
(and probably the most popular form of physicalism) is what may be called “light-
dispositionalism” (Byrne and Hilbert 2003a, Tye 2000, Lewis 1997, Matthen 1988). 
According to light-dispositional theories of color, colors are dispositions to alter light in 
certain ways. For example, according to one straightforward version of light-
dispositionalism, colors are surface spectral reflectances— complex dispositions to reflect 
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a certain proportion of incident light at each wavelength within the visible spectrum. The 
apparent truth of Categoricity gives us prima facie grounds to reject light-
dispositionalism along with any other dispositionalist view of color, physicalist or 
otherwise.
3.4    Disjunctive Property Objections
In this section, I consider a class of objections, which I call disjunctive-property 
objections. A disjunctive-property objection is any instance of the following argument 
schema:
D1. If color physicalism is true, then color shades are disjunctive (physical) 
properties. 
D2. Color shades have feature F. 
D3. No disjunctive property has feature F.
D4. Therefore, color physicalism is false. 
(D1, which is common to all instances of the schema, is an empirical premise, the 
evidence for which will be reviewed in §3.5.1.) We get an instance of this schema by 
plugging in some specific property for F in D2 and D3. I begin by discussing very briefly 
a handful of instances of this schema, each of which is, I think, somewhat promising 
(though I am not prepared to endorse any of them outright). Then in §3.5, I develop and 
defend at length one further instance of this schema. 
F = Being Causally Efficacious: It’s plausible that, typically, scarlet things look 
scarlet because they are scarlet. If so, it seems to follow that colors are causally 
efficacious, at least with respect to our color experiences. But it’s sometimes said that 
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disjunctive properties are never causally efficacious (Watkins 2005, pp. 37-9; cf. Johnston 
1992, pp. 235-6). Given D1, it then follows that color physicalism is false. 
F = Being an Object of Acquaintance: We are acquainted with colors if we are 
acquainted with any properties at all. But arguably, one cannot be directly acquainted 
with disjunctive properties. More cautiously, it can be argued that color experience of any 
determinate color shade C does not involve acquaintance with any disjunctive property, 
on the following grounds: just as (arguably) one can only be acquainted with a 
conjunctive property if one is acquainted with each of its conjuncts (e.g. one can only be 
acquainted with the conjunctive property being red and round if one is acquainted with 
redness and also acquainted with roundness), one can only be acquainted with a 
disjunctive property if one is acquainted with each of its disjuncts. From this it follows 
that if some determinate color shade C is a disjunctive property, then in being acquainted 
with C, one is acquainted with some properties which are more specific than C, namely 
C’s disjuncts. But C is a determinate color shade. In experiencing C, we are not 
experiencing any color shade which is more fine-grained or more specific than C. So it 
seems implausible that, in experiencing C, there is any more specific property with which 
we are acquainted.  23
F = Existence: Proponents of sparse properties will want to deny the very 
existence of disjunctive properties (Armstrong 1978). But a proponent of sparse 
 I am ignoring conjunctions of C with other sensible properties that one’s experience predicates of the 23
same object, such as shapes. Such properties will, of course, be more specific than C, and may also be 
objects of our acquaintance, but they will not be disjuncts involved in any credible physicalist reduction of 
C. 
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properties might still have reason to accept the existence of sensible qualities like colors. 
When one has a hallucination as of something red17, while there is no concrete physical 
object of which one is aware, many have found it plausible that we are nonetheless aware 
of or acquainted with something (Johnston 2004, Hawthorne & Kovakovich 2006). 
Unless we are prepared to embrace the ontological extravagancies of sense data theory, 
the most plausible candidate for this something is the property red17. And if one is aware 
of or acquainted with red17, it seems to follow that red17 exists. If disjunctive properties 
don’t exist, then given D1, it follows that color physicalism is false.
F = Being wholly present in its instances: When one visually experiences some 
object as having a specific color, it is somewhat natural to describe one’s phenomenology 
by saying that the color itself seems to be wholly present in the object of one’s 
experience. One might be tempted to say that this is a category mistake, that colored 
objects have locations, but colors (like all properties) are not located anywhere. I share 
this temptation. But don’t we experience colors as having locations? When the surface of 
a tomato looks red, doesn’t the redness (and not just the tomato’s surface) appear to be 
located out there, present in the object’s surface?)
If indeed we experience colors as being wholly present in the objects of visual 
experience, then in cases of veridical color perception, the color really is wholly present 
in the object of one’s experience. If this is correct, then the colors we visually experience 
must be properties of a sort which can be wholly present in their instances. But in general 
it is not plausible that disjunctive properties are wholly present in their instances. 
Suppose o has P and lacks Q. Then o has the disjunctive property P ∨ Q. Assuming that a 
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complex property is wholly present in an object only if its constituent properties are, and 
that an object instantiates any property which is wholly present in it, it follows that P ∨ Q 
is not wholly present in o. So if colors are wholly present in their instances, then given 
D1, we ought to conclude that color physicalism is false.
3.5    The Similarity-Grounding Argument
In this section, I consider—and defend at length—one further instance of the argument 
schema above, which I call the similarity-grounding argument: 
SG1. If color physicalism is true, then color shades (i.e. the fine-grained colors we 
visually experience) are disjunctive (physical) properties. 
SG2. Color shades are similarity-grounding properties—roughly, properties the 
sharing of which makes for genuine similarity. 
SG3. No disjunctive property is a similarity-grounding property. 
SG4. Therefore, color physicalism is false.
Most of what follows will consist of a clarification and defense of SG1-SG3. In §3.5.1, I 
review familiar empirical considerations which suggest that any tenable form of color 
physicalism will have to identify color shades with disjunctive physical properties. In 
§§3.5.2-3.5.4, I offer a much more precise characterization of the notion of a similarity-
grounding property in terms of the notions of metaphysical grounding and what I call 
“weak similarity,” contrasting it with some related notions, including Lewisian 
“naturalness” (Lewis 1983). In §3.5.5, I defend the claim that it is evident in our ordinary 
experience of colors that they are similarity-grounding properties. In §§3.5.6-3.5.9, I 
clarify the notion of a “disjunctive property” and argue that disjunctive properties are 
 80
(probably) never similarity-grounding properties. Moreover, I argue that even if there are 
some exceptions to this principle, the kinds of physical disjunctive properties which 
might reasonably be identified with color shades are plausibly not among them.
3.5.1    Color Physicalism Leads to Color Disjunctivism
Color physicalism comes in two main varieties: light-dispositional physicalism (Byrne 
and Hilbert 2003a, Tye 2000, Lewis 1997, Armstrong 1999, Matthen 1988) and 
categorical physicalism (Jackson and Pargetter 1987, Armstrong 1968a, Smart 1975). 
According to the former, colors are dispositions to alter light in certain ways. According 
to the latter, colors are categorical (micro-)physical properties of objects, perhaps those 
chemical-structural properties which serve as the categorical physical bases of objects’ 
dispositions to alter light in the way they do and influence our perceptual systems in the 
way they do. In this section, I briefly review familiar empirical reasons for thinking that 
each of these forms of physicalism leads to “disjunctivism”—the view that color shades 
are disjunctive properties. 
A simplistic version of light-dispositionalism would identify color shades with 
surface spectral reflectances (SSRs). The SSR of a surface is given by the proportion of 
incident light that it is disposed to reflect at each wavelength within the visible spectrum. 
It is widely agreed by both proponents and opponents of light-dispositionalism that this 
simplistic version of light-dispositionalism is untenable due to the phenomenon of 
metamerism. Let us say that two objects are a metameric pair just in case they have very 
different SSRs, but normal perceivers experience them to be identical in respect of color 
relative to some normal illuminant. The existence of metameric pairs creates difficulties 
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for the identification of color shades with specific SSRs. Suppose o1 and o2 are a 
metameric pair which, in some normal condition of illumination, you experience as 
having a determinate color C. Provided we reject irrealism—and physicalism, like other 
reductive theories of color, is largely motivated by the desire to avoid irrealism—then it 
seems we have no reason to think that your experience of either member of the 
metameric pair is non-veridical. But if your experiences of both o1 and o2 are veridical, 
then both o1 and o2 have the color shade C that they appear to have. Since o1 and o2 have 
drastically different SSRs, it follows that C cannot be identical to any specific SSR. 
Moreover, as Byrne and Hilbert (2003a) note, 
The various reflectances that are perceptually equivalent (with respect to a given 
illuminant) are not just minor variants of each other. Surfaces with grossly 
different reflectances can perceptually match even under fairly normal 
illuminants. (p. 11) 
Because there is no specific SSR or natural type of SSR that can plausibly be identified 
with any given color shade, the light-dispositional physicalist is apparently forced to 
identify color shades with long disjunctions of specific SSRs. Light-dispositional 
physicalists tend to embrace this conclusion: “colors are reflectance types, or disjunctions 
of reflectances [...] In the terminology of Lewis (1983) they are not very ‘natural”’ (Byrne 
and Hilbert 2007a, p. 75). 
As in the above passage, light-dispositional physicalists sometimes call the 
relevant disjunctions of reflectances “reflectance types.” But this label is potentially 
misleading. Calling these disjunctions of reflectances “reflectance types” is rather like 
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talking about the “length type” that something has just in case it is either 3.2 cm long, 
79.672 cm long, or 122.38 cm long, or the “shape type” that something has just in case it 
is either an isosceles trapezoid, a regular chiliagon, or a concave hexagon. In other words, 
the disjuncts of the relevant disjunctions of reflectances do not form anything resembling 
a natural class; they do not jointly exhibit the kind of unity we normally expect of a 
collection that is said to constitute a “type.”
Metamerism is not the only phenomenon that pushes the light-dispositionalist 
toward disjunctivism. Another comes from objects whose perceived color is determined 
not (only) by the way they reflect light but by the way they transmit or emit light, such as 
filters, volumes, and colored lights. Unless the physicalist is prepared to convict ordinary 
color experience of light transmitters and emitters of systematic error, the physicalist will 
have to account for the apparent fact that a non-reflective object can exemplify the same 
color shade as a reflective object. This will require identifying color shades with physical 
properties which are shared by reflective and non-reflective objects alike, such as the 
“productance types” of Byrne and Hilbert (2003a). Doing so will almost certainly commit 
the light-dispositionalist to an even more radically disjunctive view of color than is 
required just to accommodate the phenomenon of metamerism.
The route to disjunctivism from categorical physicalism is even more straight-
forward. The class of categorical physical properties which produce color experiences as 
of a given color shade will, in general, be even more diverse and dis-unified than the class 
of reflectances associated with such experiences. Indeed, the bewildering diversity in the 
categorical physical causes of color experiences as of a given color shade is what 
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motivates many physicalists to identify colors with higher-level dispositions to alter light 
in certain ways, which are multiply realized by a range of categorical physical properties. 
After surveying the wide variety of categorical physical properties that standardly cause 
an object to look blue, Hardin (1988) writes,
That variety suggests it would be vain to suppose that objects sharing a common color 
resemble one another in physical structure [...] It should thus be clear that, if blue 
things have any physical feature in common at all, it will reside not in the physical 
microstructure of those things, but rather in their dispositions to radiate light of a 
particular character from their surfaces. (pp. 4, 6)
For both categorical and light-dispositional forms of physicalism, then, there are strong 
empirical grounds to accept disjunctivism. Since these are the only two serious 
physicalist options, I conclude that SG1 is true: if color physicalism is true, then color 
shades are disjunctive (physical) properties.
3.5.2    Grounding
Premise SG2 asserts that color shades are similarity-grounding properties, properties the 
sharing of which makes for genuine similarity. Before defending this premise, it will be 
necessary to get clear on what it is saying, which in turn will require getting clear on what 
“making for” and “similarity” mean in this context. Let us take these expressions in turn. 
To say of some shareable property F that it is a property the sharing of which 
makes for similarity is not merely to say that, necessarily, any two things which share F 
are similar. It is rather to say that, necessarily, any two things which share F are ipso facto 
similar—that they are similar in virtue of the fact that each has F. Here and throughout 
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this chapter, “in virtue of” is meant to express the converse of the relation of 
metaphysical grounding (Fine 2001, Schaffer 2009, Rosen 2010). To say that a fact A 
metaphysically grounds a fact B (or, alternatively, that B holds in virtue of A) is to say, 
roughly, that A (non-causally) makes it the case that B obtains. Like causation, grounding 
is an explanatory relation. If A grounds B, then A serves as the explanans in some 
complete metaphysical explanation for why B obtains. However, metaphysical grounding 
is importantly different from causation in at least two respects. First, whereas causation is 
paradigmatically diachronic, relating events or facts which obtain at different times, 
grounding is paradigmatically synchronic, relating events or facts which obtain at the 
same time. Second, as Hume is supposed to have taught us, causes do not metaphysically 
necessitate their effects. By contrast, grounds do metaphysically necessitate the facts they 
ground. In other words, if A grounds B, then it is metaphysically necessary that if A 
obtains, then B obtains. Nonetheless, it is important not to confuse metaphysical 
grounding with mere metaphysical necessitation. The latter differs from the former in at 
least two important respects. First, unlike metaphysical grounding, metaphysical 
necessitation is not an explanatory relation. If A metaphysically necessitates B, it does not 
follow that A explains why it is that B obtains. For example, it is metaphysically 
necessary that if Socrates’s singleton exists, then Socrates exists, and it is metaphysically 
necessary that if the proposition that grass is green is true, then grass is green. But 
Socrates’s existence is not explained by the existence of Socrates’s singleton, nor is the 
truth of the proposition that grass is green what makes it the case that grass is green. In 
fact, in these cases the order of explanation plausibly runs in the other direction. 
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Socrates’s singleton exists because Socrates does, and the proposition that grass is green 
is true because grass is green. The second important difference between metaphysical 
grounding and metaphysical necessitation is that the former is hyperintensional, whereas 
the latter is merely intensional. Consider the following two claims: 
S1. (Socrates is a philosopher or Socrates is a prime number) in virtue of the fact that 
Socrates is a philosopher. 
S2. Socrates is a philosopher in virtue of the fact that Socrates is a philosopher. 
Intuitively, S1 is true, but S2 is false. (The truth of S1 and the falsity of S2 follow 
respectively from two plausible and widely accepted principles in the theory of 
grounding– that disjunctive facts are grounded in their true disjuncts (Fine 2001, pp. 
21-2; Rosen 2010, p. 117), and that grounding is irreflexive (Schaffer 2009, Rosen 2010, 
Fine 2010, Correia 2010)). However, S1 only differs from S2 in the substitution (on the 
left) of co-intensional sentences—sentences which agree in truth value at every possible 
world. 
Using our notion of metaphysical grounding, we can draw a distinction between 
those facts that are grounded in other facts and those facts that are ungrounded (brute, 
fundamental). For our purposes, it is important to observe that there are some kinds of 
facts which must be grounded if they are to obtain at all. For example, facts about the 
wrongness of particular actions plausibly fall within this category. If a particular action is 
wrong, there will always be some non-moral features of the action which make it wrong 
(e.g. that it was done with the sole intention of causing suffering). The fact that an action 
is wrong is never a brute fact. Importantly, the same holds for facts about similarity. If 
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two things are similar, it will always be the case that they are similar in virtue of sharing 
some property or properties. Suppose that Joe’s car is similar to Fred’s car. The fact that 
they are similar is surely not a brute fact about them. If they are similar, then there will be 
facts about these cars that make them similar. For instance, they might be similar because
—similar in virtue of the fact that—each is a mid-sized sedan, each is charcoal gray, each 
has a manual transmission, and so forth.
3.5.3    Similarity
As mentioned above, a sharable property F is a similarity-grounding property just in case, 
necessarily, if any two things share F, they are similar in virtue of the fact that each has F. 
I assume that “in virtue of” is reasonably clear in light of the above discussion. But how 
should we understand that notoriously slippery word “similar” in this context? It will not 
do to simply take the “ordinary sense” of the word, because the word has no context-
invariant and precise sense within ordinary usage. Within ordinary usage, whether the 
predicate applies to a pair of objects in a given context often depends on which respects 
of similarity are of interest to the conversational participants. The predicate might apply 
to the pair <George Bush, Will Ferrell> in a context in which we are primarily concerned 
with physical appearance, but not in a context in which we are primarily concerned with 
personality. Moreover, even if we fix on a definite respect of similarity, “similar” will still 
exhibit the sort of vagueness which is characteristic of other gradable adjectives. Just as it 
is a vague (and contextually variable) matter how tall something must be in order to fall 
within the extension of “tall,” or how sharp something must be to fall within the 
extension of “sharp,” it is a vague (and contextually variable) matter how similar a pair of 
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things must be (in the relevant respect of similarity) in order to fall within the extension 
of “similar.” If we are to use the predicate “similar” for serious theoretical purposes, it 
will have to be semantically sanitized. This will require assigning the predicate a more 
stable and precise meaning, which, in turn, will require making a decision about which 
respects of similarity matter, and how similar things must be in the relevant respects in 
order to fall within the predicate’s extension. Moreover, if the resulting precisification of 
“similar” is to be theoretically interesting, it should not be an arbitrary or unprincipled 
precisification. 
Two natural ways of satisfying these desiderata suggest themselves. The first is to 
give “similar” an extremely strong interpretation; the second is to give it an extremely 
weak interpretation. On the strong interpretation, “similar” expresses what we might call 
strong similarity, where two things are strongly similar just in case they are perfectly 
similar in every respect, i.e. perfect qualitative duplicates. On the weak interpretation, 
“similar” expresses what we will call weak similarity, where two things are weakly 
similar just in case they are at all similar in any respect. Intuitively, strong similarity and 
weak similarity are, respectively, the logically strongest and logically weakest relations 
which have a claim to be called similarity relations. The strong interpretation is clearly 
ill-suited for our purposes, for two things can share a color shade while failing to be 
perfect qualitative duplicates. Let us, then, adopt the weak interpretation. Hence, our 
official definition of “similarity-grounding property” is this: 
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F is a similarity-grounding property =df F is a shareable property such that, 
necessarily, if any two things share F, they are weakly similar in virtue of the fact 
that each has F. 
Hereafter, unqualified uses of “similar” are to be understood as expressing weak 
similarity. 
It is worth pausing to address a worry about this interpretation of similarity that 
has doubtless occurred to the reader. It might be thought that this weak notion of 
similarity, though principled and reasonably precise, is theoretically useless, since every 
pair of things will be similar in this sense. Take two things as intuitively dissimilar as you 
like—say, an ant and a nebula. They will nonetheless be similar in the sense at issue, in 
virtue of their sharing such properties as being a physical object, being spatially 
extended, and so forth. But this is not a problem for our purposes, for we are not 
primarily concerned with the question of which pairs of things are similar. Rather, given 
two things which are similar, we are concerned with the question of which of their shared 
properties make them similar. It may be true—even necessarily true—that everything is 
similar to everything else, perhaps because some (necessarily) universally instantiated 
property such as existence is a similarity-grounding property. But it does not follow that 
every property shared by a given pair of objects is such that those objects are similar in 
virtue of sharing that property. Here it is important to recall the difference between 
metaphysical grounding and mere metaphysical necessitation. Supposing that it is a 
necessary truth that everything is similar to everything else, then it will follow that, for 
any property F, the sharing of F by x and y metaphysically necessitates the similarity of x 
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and y. But as we saw in §3.5.2, this does not entail that x and y are similar in virtue of 
sharing F. 
3.5.4    An Aside on Naturalness
David Lewis’s characterization of natural properties in some ways closely resembles my 
characterization of similarity-grounding properties. Natural properties, Lewis tells us, are 
those whose “sharing makes for resemblance” (1983, p. 347). But while the two notions 
are related, it will be helpful to point out some differences between them in order to better 
understand the notion of a similarity-grounding property, as well as to explain why I have 
so far avoided talk of naturalness. 
The first difference lies in the breadth of their associated theoretical roles. The 
theoretical role of naturalness has connections to laws of nature, causation, 
metasemantics, duplication, and much else besides. I suspect that similarity-grounding 
properties have some of the features that Lewis ascribes to natural properties. They may 
be more eligible to figure in the contents of our utterances and mental states, for example, 
and they may be more eligible to figure in the laws of nature. But because I have no need 
of such strong and controversial assumptions for my purposes, it is useful to introduce a 
new concept which does not carry the theoretical baggage carried by the concept of 
naturalness. Secondly, Lewis and I mean different things when we say of a property that 
sharing it makes for similarity or resemblance. In particular, Lewis does not understand 
“makes for,” as I do, in terms of metaphysical grounding. (The preference for claims of 
metaphysical necessitation and supervenience over claims of metaphysical grounding is 
one of the hallmarks of Lewisian metaphysics (Lewis 1983, p. 58; 2001, p. 384).) A third 
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difference is that Lewis typically treats naturalness as a gradable notion. But similarity-
grounding is meant to be an all-or-nothing affair. Lewis does have a non-gradable notion 
in the vicinity: perfect naturalness. But the perfectly natural properties are generally taken 
to be a very sparse lot, perhaps comprising only fundamental microphysical properties (in 
addition to some alien properties). But it seems plausible that the similarity-grounding 
properties are fairly abundant. Personhood is, plausibly, a similarity-grounding property, 
though it will certainly not figure in the physicist’s final catalogue of basic properties. 
Lewisian naturalness is therefore not an adequate surrogate for similarity-grounding, 
because there is no notion in the vicinity of naturalness in Lewis’ philosophy which is 
both non-gradable and reasonably abundant. 
3.5.5    Color Shades are Similarity-Grounding Properties
I hope that the notion of a similarity-grounding property is now tolerably clear. Let us 
now proceed to consider premise SG2, according to which color shades are similarity-
grounding properties. Imagine you are looking at a uniformly colored red chip in good 
lighting conditions. You visually experience the chip as having a certain determinate 
shade of red—call it R. Focusing on R, it is conceivable that the object before you which 
appears to have R does not really have this quality. It is perhaps even conceivable that 
nothing actually has R. But what seems utterly inconceivable is that two things could 
share R without being similar thereby, without being similar in virtue of that very fact. It 
is plainly evident to us in an ordinary experience of R that, whatever else is true about R, 
any pair of things which have R are made similar by the sharing of R. That is, R is a 
similarity-grounding property. And the same can be said of other color shades as well.
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3.5.6    Disjunctive Properties do not Ground Similarity
I have claimed that color shades are similarity-grounding properties. To this it might be 
replied: “So what? Every property is a similarity-grounding property. After all, what does 
similarity consist in if not the sharing of properties? And so long as we are concerned 
with weak similarity, shouldn’t the sharing of any property be sufficient to ground 
similarity?” However, it is not plausible to suppose that every property is a similarity-
grounding property, even when weak similarity is at issue. In particular, it seems that 
disjunctive properties fail to ground similarity. As Armstrong (1978) writes, 
Suppose a has a property P but lacks Q, while b has Q but lacks P. It seems 
laughable to conclude from these premises that a and b are identical in some 
respect. Yet both have the “property” P or Q.  (p. 20) 24
Suppose A is a aardvark and B is a bread-box. It would be odd—indeed, laughable—to 
say that A and B are similar in virtue of the fact that each is either an aardvark or a bread-
box. Of course, I do not deny that A and B are similar. They are. They are similar in 
virtue of many of their shared features, e.g. in virtue of the fact that each is spatially 
extended, that each is made of matter, that each is a denizen of Earth, and so forth. Nor 
do I deny that it is a necessary truth that any two things which share the property of being 
either an aardvark or a bread-box are similar. (Recall the distinction between 
 In this passage, Armstrong is giving an argument against the existence of disjunctive properties or 24
universals. The argument rests on the assumption that bona fide properties are, in my terminology, 
similarity-grounding properties. Contra Armstrong, I am assuming that disjunctive properties exist, though 
I deny that they have a certain important feature which Armstrong takes to be a condition on property 
existence. But the assumption that disjunctive properties exist is merely a convenience. See fn. 26 below 
for a brief indication of how to reformulate the present argument in terms which are friendly to proponents 
of a sparse or ultra-sparse (nominalist) theory of properties. 
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metaphysical grounding and mere metaphysical necessitation.) But it is evident that 
things which share this property are not similar because each is an aardvark or a bread-
box. The reason why things which share the disjunctive property are similar is that it’s 
impossible to be either an aardvark or a bread-box without having some other properties, 
such as spatial extension, which themselves are similarity-grounding properties. 
From this example we ought to conclude that at least some disjunctive properties 
fail to ground similarity. But of course, there was nothing very special about the example 
chosen. The same points could be made about just about any disjunctive property which 
springs to mind, e.g. being angry or a chandelier, being whimsical or poisonous, or being 
a student or a trash bin. More to present purposes: the same points could be made about 
those disjunctive physical properties with which the physicalist might identify color 
shades. Suppose o1 and o2 are a metameric pair, each of which appears to you to have a 
determinate color shade R, but which have, respectively, drastically different surface 
spectral reflectances P1 and P2. Suppose for simplicity that the color physicalist identifies 
R with the disjunctive property P1 ∨ P2. Just as it is not plausible to say that A and B are 
similar in virtue of the fact that each is either an aardvark or a bread box, it is equally 
implausible to say that o1 and o2 are similar in virtue of the fact that each has either P1 or 
P2.  Once again, this is not to deny that o1 and o2 are similar. They are. They are similar 25
in virtue of the fact that each reflects light, each produces experiences of such-and-such 
 Similar points could of course be made about the kinds of disjunctive properties with which a categorical 25
physicalist might identify the colors.
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type in normal humans, each is a physical object, and so forth. But the fact that each has 
either P1 or P2 is no part of what makes them similar. 
The above considerations strongly suggest the following generalization, ex- 
pressed in premise SG3 of the argument above: No disjunctive property is a similarity-
grounding property. In what follows, I address some objections to SG3 and attempt to 
clarify what is meant by a “disjunctive property.”26
3.5.7    Structured Properties and Disjunctive Properties
In order to clarify what is meant by a “disjunctive property,” it will be helpful to begin by 
considering an objection which contends that every property is trivially a disjunctive 
property. (Why is this an objection? Because together with SG3, this would entail that no 
property is a similarity-grounding property, which contradicts SG2.) The objection begins 
by assuming a coarse-grained conception of properties, according to which necessarily 
coextensive properties are identical. Now consider an arbitrary property H. Take any 
other property F, and form the disjunction of the conjunction of F and H with the 
conjunction of F’s complement and H. So, if H is the property of being a horse and F is 
the property of being fast, this yields the property of being a fast horse or a non-fast 
 In speaking of “disjunctive properties,” I am presupposing a view of properties as both real and 26
abundant– abundant enough that most English predicates, including complex disjunctive predicates, 
correspond to properties. This background assumption, though a significant convenience, is ultimately 
inessential. We could alternatively elucidate SG3 in terms friendlier to a sparse or ultra-sparse (nominalist) 
view of properties. In these terms, SG3 could be recast as a claim about disjunctive predicates, namely: For 
any disjunctive predicate φ, there are no true metaphysical explanations of the form “ ︎α and β are similar in 
virtue of the fact that φ(α) and φ(β) ︎.” If SG3 is reformulated in this way, then we would need to 
reformulate premises SG1 and SG2 in a corresponding fashion to preserve the validity of the argument. 
This in turn would require giving nominalist-friendly redefinitions of color physicalism, color 
disjunctivism, and similarity-grounding properties, each of which was earlier defined in abundant realist 
terms. I will leave it as an exercise for those readers who have a taste for the tedious business of nominalist 
paraphrasing to convince themselves that such reformulations can indeed be given.
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horse. The resulting property is a disjunctive property, in that it is the disjunction of some 
properties (i.e. λx(Hx∧Fx) and λx(Hx∧¬Fx)). Moreover, the resulting property is 
necessarily coextensive with H, and therefore identical with H given the coarse-grained 
conception of properties. So H is a disjunctive property. As H was arbitrary, it follows 
that every property is a disjunctive property. 
My response to this objection is that we must reject the coarse-grained conception 
of properties. The coarse-grained conception of properties may be well suited for some 
theoretical purposes. But it is not suited to play the theoretical role associated with at 
least one good sense of “property.” Though there are many aspects of this role which 
coarse-grained properties are ill-suited to play, I will focus on the one most relevant for 
our purposes: namely, coarse-grained properties are ill-suited to play the theoretical role 
of properties vis-à-vis explanation. Explanations are hyperintensional in a way that 
requires a hyperintensional conception of properties. In typical explanations, we explain 
why things are the way the are by citing the properties of things. As has been observed by 
others, there seem to be cases in which necessarily coextensive properties differ in their 
explanatory significance. Elliot Sober (1982), for example, convincingly argues that there 
are cases in which we can truly explain why something happened by citing the 
trilaterality of an object but not by citing its triangularity, even though trilaterality and 
triangularity are necessarily coextensive. To give a somewhat simpler and more mundane 
example: in explaining why Joe left the party, we might cite a certain property of Joe, 
such as his tiredness. But given the truth of 
E1: Joe left the party because he was tired, 
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it does not follow that we can explain why Joe left the part by citing his being tired-and-
metallic-or-tired-and-non-metallic, or by citing his being tired-or-non-self-identical. For, 
barring some inconceivably bizarre circumstance, it will simply not be true that 
E2: Joe left the party because he was tired-and-metallic-or-tired-and-non-metallic, 
or that
E3: Joe left the party because he was tired-or-non-self-identical. 
But the properties cited in the explanans of E2 and E3 are necessarily coextensive with 
the property attributed to Joe in the explanans of the true explanation E1. The point is not 
limited to causal explanations like E1-E3. The same holds for non-causal explanations, 
such as metaphysical explanations of similarity. It may be true that Dasher and Splasher 
are similar because—similar in virtue of the fact that—each is a horse. But it does not 
follow that—and it is not true that—they are similar because each is either a fast horse or 
a non-fast horse. (Recall the discussion in §3.5.2 about the hyperintensionality of 
metaphysical grounding.) So on any conception of properties which enable properties to 
play their intended theoretical role vis-à-vis explanation, it will turn out that being a horse 
is not identical to the disjunctive property being a fast horse or a non-fast horse. 
The most obvious conception of properties fit to play this theoretical role is  
a conception of properties as structured entities. The relation between coarse-grained 
properties and structured properties is very much analogous to the relation between 
possible-worlds propositions—sets of worlds or their characteristic functions—and 
structured propositions (Salmon 1986, Soames 1987). On a structured view of 
propositions, propositions have a quasi-sentential structure, with propositional 
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constituents occupying nodes in this structure. Likewise, structured properties can be 
thought of as having quasi-predicational structure; that is, their structure is analogous to 
the syntactic structure of complex predicates.  This structured conception properties has 27
two important consequences. First, it allows us to individuate properties more finely than 
does the coarse-grained conception of properties—i.e. more finely than sets of possibilia. 
Vagueness aside, any structured property will determine a unique set of possibilia,  i.e. 28
the set of possible objects which instantiate the property, just as any structured 
proposition will, vagueness aside, determine a unique set of worlds, i.e. the set of worlds 
at which the proposition is true. But sets of possibilia do not determine a unique 
structured property, just as sets of worlds do not determine a unique structured 
proposition. More precisely, if some structured property F is instantiated by exactly the 
possibilia in S, then there will be (infinitely many) other structured properties instantiated 
by exactly the possibilia in S (e.g. λx(F x ∧ Exists(x)), λx((F x ∧ Exists(x)) ∧ 
Exists(x)), ...). The second important consequence of the structured conception of 
properties is that it allows us to make a meaningful distinction between disjunctive and 
non-disjunctive properties. Recall that structured properties are supposed to be 
structurally analogous to complex predicates. The question of whether a complex 
predicate is disjunctive is straightforwardly settled by whether or not it has a disjunctive 
 I will leave unsettled the question of just how tight the analogy is. We probably ought to say that 27
structured properties are somewhat less finely structured than complex predicates. For example, while 
“λx(Dog(x) ∨ Brown(x))” is a different predicate from “λx(Brown(x) ∨ Dog(x)),” it would be somewhat 
odd to maintain that they express distinct properties.
 To handle complications that arise if we allow for transworld identity, I really ought to say “a unique 28
function from worlds (or perhaps world-time pairs) to sets of individuals in those worlds (or at those world-
time pairs). But I will ignore these complications in what follows.
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structure (i.e. whether or not the main connective of the largest formula within the scope 
of the λ-operator is a disjunction symbol). Likewise, the question of whether a structured 
proposition or property is disjunctive is straightforwardly settled by whether or not it has 
a disjunctive structure, where having a disjunctive structure will be a matter of whether 
an appropriate constituent (perhaps the disjunction truth function?) occupies the relevant 
position within the structure of the property. Given this independently motivated 
structured conception properties, the objection above fails. Not every property is a 
disjunctive property, even if every property is necessarily coextensive with some 
disjunctive property.
3.5.8    Extrinsic Similarity Grounding?
The next objection I would like to consider suggests that a disjunctive property can 
ground similarity in cases where its disjuncts have some common extrinsic causal 
influence, e.g. on human perceptual systems. Suppose that the color physicalist identifies 
some color shade C with the disjunctive physical property D = P1 ∨ P2 ∨... Let us 
furthermore assume that the Pi out of which D is constructed are all and only the physical 
properties which cause such-and-such state in normal human perceivers under normal 
conditions. Everything that has D will therefore have a similar influence on human 
perceivers. It might be suggested that, due to this contingent and extrinsic similarity 
among the things which share D, we ought to say that D is a similarity-grounding 
property, albeit contingently so. 
But this suggestion is confused. Any pair of things which share D will also share 
the property of normally causing perceptual states of such-and-such kind. The latter 
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property may well be a similarity-grounding property. (Not all similarity-grounding 
properties are intrinsic.) It follows from this that any pair of things which share D will be 
similar. But from the fact that D is coextensive with a similarity-grounding property, we 
cannot conclude that it is itself a similarity-grounding property. In a world where the only 
spatially extended things are aardvarks and bread boxes, being an aardvark or a bread box 
will be coextensive with the similarity-grounding property of being spatially extended, 
but that will not make the former a similarity-grounding property. 
Moreover, it follows from the definition of a similarity-grounding property that 
there cannot be properties which only contingently ground similarity. To say of some 
shareable property F that it is a similarity grounding property is to say that: 
SG. Necessarily, if any two things share F then they are similar in virtue of the fact 
that each has F. 
To claim that this is a contingent fact about F, one must hold that SG is not necessary, and 
this is to deny the validity of the inference from ▢︎φ to ▢▢φ. But this inference is valid 
in S5,  which is standardly taken to be the correct logic for metaphysical modality. 29
3.5.9    Potential Counterexamples to SG3
The next objection I want to consider maintains that while disjunctive properties are 
typically not similarity-grounding properties, in special cases they can be. The strongest 
reason to think this comes from determinable properties. Determinable properties like 
having mass or being red seem to be similarity-grounding properties. Any two things 
 More generally, it is valid in any modal logic which can be modeled using a transitive accessibility 29
relation.
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which have mass are similar in virtue of the fact that each has mass, even if they differ in 
their determinate mass. Likewise, any two red things are similar in virtue of the fact that 
each is red, even if they differ in their determinate shade of red. But arguably, 
determinable properties are disjunctive properties—specifically, disjunctions of all their 
absolute determinates. If so, then SG3 is false; at least some disjunctive properties are 
similarity-grounding properties. And if some disjunctive properties are similarity-
grounding properties, this at least opens up the possibility that the disjunctive physical 
properties with which color physicalists identify color shades are among them. 
There are three points to make in response to this suggestion: first, much of the 
motivation for identifying determinables with disjunctions of their absolute determinates 
evaporates once we reject the coarse-grained conception of properties. For, while it may 
be that determinable properties are necessarily coextensive with disjunctions of their 
absolute determinates, this does not entail that determinables are identical with such 
disjunctions unless we assume a coarse-grained view of properties. Second, there is at 
least one good positive reason to think that determinable properties are not identical to 
disjunctions of their absolute determinates (besides the dialectically unacceptable reason 
that determinables, unlike disjunctive properties, are similarity-grounding properties). In 
particular, it seems that many determinable properties are not even necessarily 
coextensive with the disjunction of their absolute determinates. (Necessary 
coextensiveness may not be a sufficient condition for property identity, but it follows 
from Leibniz’s Law that it is a necessary condition.) Consider a dappled red cloth which 
is composed of a collection of small-ish patches, each of which has a determinate shade 
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of red, with no two patches sharing the same shade of red (cf. Liebesman 2011, p. 435). 
The cloth itself has the determinable property redness. But while we can attribute 
determinate shades of red to many of its small-ish parts, there seems to be no determinate 
shade of red we can correctly attribute to the cloth itself.30
The third and most important point to make in response to this objection is this: 
let us grant for the sake of argument that determinable properties are identical to 
disjunctions of their absolute determinates and that, therefore, some disjunctive properties 
ground similarity. Even so, this concession does not help the color physicalist. That’s 
because even if determinable properties are a special kind of disjunctive property, we 
obviously cannot construct a genuine determinable by disjoining just any collection of 
properties. Bona fide determinables like having mass or being colored are importantly 
different from the result of disjoining just any motley assortment of properties, e.g. the 
result of disjoining red17, having a mass of 2.531 kg, and being 15.52 inches long. 
Disjunctive properties of the latter kind, like the property of being an aardvark or a bread 
box, do not ground similarity. So if one identifies determinables with disjunctions of their 
absolute determinates, and therefore accepts that some disjunctive properties ground 
similarity, one must answer the question: what distinguishes similarity-grounding 
disjunctive properties from other disjunctive properties—those which are merely 
disjunctive? It seems to me that any plausible answer to the above question must say 
something in the ballpark of the following: 
 This would be a counterexample to the Principle of Determination mentioned in §2.4.2. But it is clearly 30
not the sort of counterexample that could help my opponent in that context.
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Those disjunctive properties which ground similarity are precisely those which are 
formed by disjoining some collection of properties that exhibit (what we may call) 
“internal unity.” A collection of properties is internally unified in the relevant sense 
just in case, very roughly, they jointly constitute a topologically connected sub- 
region of some natural quality space. (In the case of very general determinables, such 
as mass or color, the relevant region may be an improper subregion of the quality 
space.) A quality space consists of a large number of determinate properties (the 
points of the space), which can be naturally ordered along one or more dimension(s) 
of similarity so as to induce something akin to metrical structure on the space, a 
structure which then allows for an intelligible distinction between connected and non-
connected regions of the space. This proposal delivers the intuitively correct result on 
the cases. It delivers the intuitively correct result that the determinable height 
property being 7 to 9 feet tall (which is formed by disjoining the properties in a 
certain connected region of “height space,” i.e. the set of determinate height-
properties in the 7’-9’ range), as well as the determinable red (which is formed by 
disjoining the properties in a certain connected region of color space, i.e. the set of 
determinate shades of red), will count as similarity-grounding. It also delivers the 
intuitively correct result that the disjunctive property being 5’3” or 6’2” or 
7’4” (which is formed by disjoining the properties in a non-connected region of 
height space), as well as the disjunctive property being red17 or yellow21 or green11 
(which is formed by disjoining the properties in a non-connected region of color 
space), will not count as similarity-grounding properties. 
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Let us say that a disjunctive property is an “internally unified disjunction” just in 
case it is formed by disjoining the properties in some internally unified collection, in the 
sense defined above. And let us say that a disjunctive property is a “motley disjunction” 
just in case it is not internally unified. I agree with the above proposal that the only 
disjunctive properties which could plausibly ground similarity are internally unified 
disjunctions. It is not plausible that motley disjunctions ground similarity. The problem 
for the color physicalist is that the only physical properties which could reasonably be 
identified with the color shades are motley disjunctions. This is very clear in the case of 
categorical physicalism. For any given color shade C, there seems to be no natural 
internal unity at all to the collection of categorical properties which are causally involved 
in the production, in normal circumstances, of C-experiences. And it is also true for the 
light-dispositionalist. The reflectance curves which are metamers for a given color shade 
(relative to some normal illuminant) are a motley assortment. As light-dispositional 
physicalists are wont to admit, the disjunctive reflectance properties which are identified 
with color shades are anthropocentric properties (Hilbert 1987, Byrne and Hilbert 2007a, 
Tye 2000): If we set aside their common influence on human perceivers, there is nothing 
about the disjuncts involved in these properties which recommends classing them 
together. The only disjunctive physical properties which could reasonably be identified 
with the color shades are motley disjunctions. Therefore, none of the disjunctive physical 
properties which could reasonably be identified with color shades are similarity-
grounding properties. But color shades are similarity-grounding properties. So we ought 
to conclude that color physicalism is false.  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Chapter 4: Realism
4.1    Introduction
In the previous two chapters, I addressed the question of reductionism: are the sensible 
qualities reducible to physical or response-dependent properties? I argued for the non-
reductionist conclusion that at least many of the sensible qualities, including many of the 
so-called “secondary qualities,” are not reducible to physical or response-dependent 
properties of external objects. This raises the question: do they belong to external objects 
at all? This is the question of realism. Let realism about a class of sensible qualities be the 
thesis that qualities in that class are instantiated by ordinary physical things. “Ordinary 
things” include things like roses, ice cubes, strawberries, pressure waves, and odor clouds
—roughly, those things that scientifically informed common sense takes to belong to the 
extra-mental world. Realism about a given class of sensible qualities therefore rules out 
eliminativist views (Hardin 1988, Maund 1995, Chalmers 2006, Pautz 2011, ms.), 
according to which nothing at all has the relevant qualities, as well as projectivist views, 
according to which the only things that possess the relevant qualities are non-ordinary 
things like sense-data, sensory experiences, or patches of the visual field (Boghossian & 
Velleman 1989, Jackson 1977). I shall use the more general term “irrealism” to designate 
the negation of realism. 
In this chapter, I offer two positive reasons to accept realism about every major 
class of sensible qualities. The first is that the various sensible qualities seem to be 
instantiated in our environment (and in our bodies). Here I rely on (a weakened version 
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of) what Michael Huemer (2001) calls the “Phenomenal Conservative” principle: if it 
perceptually seems to one that p, then one has at least prima facie justification to believe 
that p. The second positive reason to accept realism comes from the independently 
motivated thesis of phenomenal relationism. Roughly speaking, phenomenal relationism 
holds that what it is to undergo a (sensory) experience with a given phenomenal character 
is to stand in a certain relation, which might variously be called “sensory awareness,” 
“sensory acquaintance,” or “sensory representation,” to a certain sensible quality or 
complex of sensible qualities. In §4.9, I shall argue that, given phenomenal relationism, 
the assumption of realism about the sensible qualities makes the “hard problem” of 
consciousness much more tractable. Realism is therefore supported on abductive grounds.
Many philosophers have held that the rejection of reductionism leads—or should 
lead—to irrealism. I disagree. We have strong reasons to accept realism, and these 
reasons aren’t much vitiated by the failure of reductionism.  But the possibility of a non-
reductive realism has often been ignored or dismissed by philosophers at the outset. 
Many philosophers just take it as given that the scientific image, perhaps supplemented 
with primitive experiential facts, constitutes an exhaustive characterization of reality. So 
if the secondary qualities can’t be found in the scientific image (augmented with 
phenomenology), they must have no place in the world at all. The following remarks 
from Boghossian and Velleman (1991) are typical:
The dispute between realists about color and [ir]realists is actually a dispute about 
the nature of color properties. The disputants do not disagree over what material 
objects are like. Rather, they disagree over whether any of the uncontroversial 
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facts about material objects—their powers to cause visual experiences, their 
dispositions to reflect incident light, their atomic makeup, and so on—amount to 
their having colors. The disagreement is thus about which properties colors are 
and, in particular, whether colors are any of the properties in a particular set that is 
acknowledged on both sides to exhaust the properties of material objects (p. 67).
This may be an accurate characterization of the dispute between irrealists and 
reductionist realists about color. There is surely an intuitive sense in which the 
reductionist realist, whether physicalist or relationist, agrees with the irrealist about what 
material objects are like. But however accurate the above remarks are concerning the 
dispute between irrealists and reductionist realists, they certainly do not apply to my 
dispute with the irrealist. It’s often hard to say exactly when we have a first-order 
disagreement about “what material objects are like” as opposed to just a second-order 
disagreement about the nature of a certain class of properties. But my dispute with the 
irrealist is a clear case of the former. We may well agree on all relevant second-order 
claims about the natures of such qualities as color, flavor, pitch, and so on. And we agree 
that none of “the uncontroversial facts about material objects—their powers to cause 
visual experiences, their dispositions to reflect incident light, their atomic makeup, and so 
on—amount to their having colors.” But we do not agree about whether such properties 
exhaust the properties of material objects. (Such properties therefore do not constitute “a 
particular set that is acknowledged on both sides to exhaust the properties of material 
objects,” because there is no such set.) We emphatically do not agree about what material 
objects are like.
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4.2    The Empirical Justification for Realism
Since the early 17th century, it has been widely held that scientific or empirical 
investigation has shown that the so-called secondary qualities are not instantiated in the 
material world. Galileo writes,
Hence I think that these tastes, odors, colors, etc., on the side of the object in which 
they seem to exist, are nothing else than mere names, but hold their residence solely 
in the sensitive body; so that if the animal were removed, every such quality would be 
abolished and annihilated (Galilei 1623/1954).
The Galilean view is alive and well among philosophers today, even if somewhat less 
popular than it was in the early modern period. And among scientists, the view that 
empirical investigation supports irrealism is as popular as ever.
However common this view has been over the past few centuries among scientists 
and philosophers, on its face it looks entirely backwards. Everyday observation provides 
abundant prima facie empirical justification to believe, for example, that grass is green, 
that female opera singers sometimes produce loud, high-pitched sounds, that ripe 
strawberries are sweet, and a great many other propositions that straightforwardly entail 
realism about the major classes of secondary qualities. While it may be that scientific 
investigation, understood as a kind of controlled, systematic, and rigorous form of 
empirical investigation, has not provided further support for realism about, say, color or 
flavor, this is only to be expected, given the nature of realist claims. Claims of realism 
concerning color, flavor, scent, pitch, loudness, and other secondary qualities are what I’ll 
call mundane propositions. A mundane proposition is any proposition that is abundantly 
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supported by empirical observations of the sort that ordinary humans are likely to make 
in their day-to-day lives. That is, they are propositions whose empirical support comes 
from mundane or casual observation, as opposed to the careful and painstaking 
observational methods employed in scientific inquiry. Examples of mundane propositions 
include: that there are cups; that dogs bark; that it sometimes rains. Anyone who leads a 
reasonably normal life will have had ample exposure to cups, barking dogs, and rainy 
weather, and so will have amassed plenty of empirical justification to believe each of 
these propositions. But while these claims are overwhelmingly supported by empirical 
observation, scientific investigation has not significantly added to our empirical 
justification for accepting these claims, nor could it. This is because controlled, 
systematic, and rigorous observation can add little support to what is already 
overwhelmingly confirmed by casual everyday observation.
One characteristic feature of mundane propositions is that, while it is easy to 
verify them by observation, it is difficult to argue for their truth in any direct way. 
Consider how you might try to convince a skeptic about cups of the mundane truth that 
there are cups. One possibility is that your interlocutor has led a very abnormal life, and 
has simply never encountered a cup. In this case, the way to proceed is not to argue the 
point; rather, you ought to simply present your interlocutor with a cup; if her perceptual 
faculties are in working order and she is competent with the relevant concepts, that ought 
to settle the matter. Another possibility is that, despite having had, like you, ample 
exposure to cups, your interlocutor denies the existence of cups anyway, perhaps because 
she has been convinced by the writings of mereological nihilists that there are no 
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mereologically complex entities (Dorr 2002; Sider 2013). How can we respond to this 
sort of interlocutor? Within debates about mereological nihilism, we find a common 
maneuver. The anti-nihilist, unable to provide a direct defense of the mundane truths 
denied by the nihilist, gives something like the following speech:
Common sense tells us that there are cups. We ought to believe the dictates of 
common sense unless there are very strong reasons to believe otherwise, and the 
nihilist has not provided such reasons. So, we ought to believe that there are cups.
In giving this speech, the anti-nihilist resorts to a kind of “epistemic ascent.” Finding 
herself at a loss about how to argue directly for the mundane proposition that there are 
cups, she instead motivates an epistemic principle from which she can argue that the 
proposition in question has some favorable epistemic status—in this case, the status of 
being such that we ought to believe it. I find myself in a similar situation with respect to 
realism about the sensible qualities. There isn’t much  I can say to argue directly for the 31
mundane proposition that some things in the external world have color or flavor or 
loudness or pitch. So I will defend realism the best way I know how—indirectly, by way 
of epistemic ascent. 
4.3    The Perceptual Argument
Let us first lay out a general argument template, beginning with the following epistemic 
principle:
 But there is something; see §4.9.31
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T1: If it perceptually seems to one that p, then one has at least prima facie 
justification to believe that p.
In chapter 2, I appealed to the Phenomenal Conservative principle: if it seems to one 
that p, then one has at least prima facie justification to believe that p. T1 is a weaker 
version of the Phenomenal Conservative principle, one restricted to perceptual seemings. 
(It is therefore noncommittal about the epistemic significance of other kinds of seemings, 
such as intellectual or intuitive seemings.) From here, the argument template proceeds as 
follows:
T2: It perceptually seems to us that ____.
T3: There are no (sufficiently strong) defeaters for the belief that ____. 
T4: So, we are justified in believing that ____.
For each sensible quality class Q, we can plug in a suitable formulation of realism about 
Q for “____,” yielding an argument to the conclusion that we are justified in believing 
(the relevant formulation of) realism about Q. In the case of color, for example, we might 
fill in the template in the following way:
PA1: If it perceptually seems to one that p, then one has at least prima facie 
justification to believe that p.
PA2: It perceptually seems to us that there are colored things.  
PA3: There are no (sufficiently strong) defeaters for the belief that there are
colored things.
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PA4: So, we are justified in believing that there are colored things.32
For the sake of concreteness, I devote much of what follows (§§4.4-4.6) to defending this 
particular instance of the perceptual argument template, rather than trying to defend all 
instances of it at once. But as I shall argue in §§4.7-4.8, the defense generalizes with only 
a few minor complications to other instances of the template. I do not expect the second 
premise to meet resistance from anyone. It is clear, for example, that lemons, tomatoes, 
and grass at least appear to be colored. Similar claims hold for the other secondary 
qualities as well: we experience ice cubes (or perhaps the body parts that make contact 
with them) as cold, honey as sweet, the chirps of blue jays as high pitched, and so on. For 
this reason, I focus exclusively on the first and third premises.
4.4    Premise PA1
Premise PA1 is intended to articulate a fairly weak anti-skeptical principle in the 
epistemology of perception. It is important to distinguish PA1 from another anti-skeptical 
principle which is more commonly invoked in defense of realism, a principle we might 
call Mooreanism:
Mooreanism: If it belongs to common sense that p, then one has prima facie 
justification to believe that p.
If we replace PA1 above with Mooreanism and replace PA2 above with “it belongs to 
common sense that there are colored things,” the result is what I’ll call the Moorean 
argument. While most realists invoke something like the Moorean argument in defense of 
 “Us” in PA2 and “we” in PA4 should be understood to refer to humans with normally functioning visual 32
systems. The quantifier in PA2 and PA4 should be understood as restricted to ordinary material things in the 
external world.
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their view,  the Moorean argument is significantly weaker than the perceptual argument, 33
for at least two reasons. First, Mooreanism enjoys considerably less prima facie 
plausibility than PA1. The point is made forcefully by Sider (2013): “On the face of it, 
Mooreanism is utterly implausible. Why should the inherited prejudices of our forebears 
count for anything?” (p. 10). As Sider notes, even those philosophers who think that our 
philosophical theorizing ought to respect common sense feel the initial force of this 
challenge. By contrast, one cannot raise an analogous challenge to PA1 without thereby 
calling into question the whole of empirical science. Second, even if we set aside staunch 
anti-Moorean positions like Sider’s, there is a more moderate (and perhaps more 
reasonable) attitude toward the epistemic status of common sense which makes trouble 
for the appeal to Mooreanism in this context. According to this view—expressed in 
various forms by Lycan (2001b, p. 41), Gupta (2006, p. 178), and Kelly (2008)—that a 
proposition belongs to common sense may make a significant epistemic difference when 
doing armchair philosophy; but history shows us that science is much less limited in its 
capacity to overturn common sense. Witness, for example, the discovery that simultaneity 
is relative to an inertial frame, that my cat and I are distant cousins, or that the earth is 
currently spinning on its axis at about 1000 miles per hour and hurtling through space 
around the sun at a rate of 18.5 miles per second. So in the context of scientific inquiry or 
scientifically informed philosophy, common sense counts for significantly less than it 
does in armchair philosophy. But irrealists typically take their position to be supported by 
empirical science, not armchair philosophical arguments. So the appeal to common sense 
 See, e.g., Tye (2000; ch. 7), Lewis (1997, p. 325), Cohen (2009, p. 65).33
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in this context carries significantly less weight than it does in other philosophical contexts 
which are further removed from scientific inquiry.
The appeal to PA1 is dialectically more effective against the irrealist than the 
appeal to Mooreanism. The irrealist may reasonably be skeptical about the deliverances 
of common sense. But she cannot be radically skeptical about the deliverances of 
perception without undermining all of empirical science, and with it the standard 
arguments against realism. So we can safely assume in this context that any theory in the 
epistemology of perception which will be acceptable to my opponent must be compatible 
with empirical anti-skepticism—the thesis that we are justified in accepting many of the 
deliverances of empirical science. (Here I understand a “theory” in the epistemology of 
perception as any collection of general claims characterizing the epistemic significance of 
perceptual experience.) In what follows, I argue that any acceptable theory in the 
epistemology of perception that is compatible with empirical anti-skepticism will endorse 
PA1, or at least something near enough to PA1 to serve my argumentative purposes. In 
particular, I shall argue that, given reasonable assumptions, PA1 (or something near 
enough) follows from the dominant internalist and externalist approaches to the 
epistemology of perception (§§4.4.1-4.4.2); I then consider and respond to an objection to 
PA1 (§4.4.3).
4.4.1    Internalist Theories of Justification: Dogmatism and Rationalism
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Among broadly “internalist” theories in the epistemology of perception, the two most 
popular theories are Dogmatism and Rationalism.  Roughly speaking, I take internalism 34
to be the thesis that facts about what one has justification to believe supervene on one’s 
(past and present) non-factive mental states. Externalism can then be understood as the 
denial of internalism. PA1 follows more-or-less straightforwardly from both Dogmatism 
and Rationalism. Dogmatists and Rationalists will both agree that, if it perceptually 
seems to one that p, then one has prima facie justification to believe that p. Dogmatists 
add to PA1 the claim that this justification does not rest on any antecedent justification to 
believe anything else. In particular, it does not rest on any antecedent justification to 
believe that our perceptual faculties are reliable. Rationalists, by contrast, add to PA1 the 
claim that one’s (prima facie) justification to believe that p (when it perceptually seems to 
one that p) rests on one’s antecedent justification to believe that one’s perceptual faculties 
are reliable, but also add that one has the latter justification “by default” or a priori. My 
own sympathies lie with Rationalist theories in the epistemology of perception, but the 
appeal of PA1 is not restricted to those with Rationalist sympathies.
Note that because PA1 is logically weaker than both Dogmatism and Rationalism, 
an objection to one of the latter may not be an objection to PA1. For example, the most 
famous objections to Dogmatism, the well known bootstrapping and Bayesian objections 
(White 2006), are best construed not as objections to (1) but rather as objections to what 
Dogmatism adds to (1). There are other theories in the epistemology of perception 
 For a classic defense of Dogmatism, see Pryor (2000). For defenses of Rationalism, see Wright (2004) 34
and White (2006).
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(including Rationalism) to which these objections don’t apply, despite their endorsement 
of PA1.
4.4.2    Externalist Theories of Perceptual Justification: Process Reliabilism
Among broadly “externalist” theories of justification, perhaps the dominant approach is 
that of Process Reliabilism (hereafter just “Reliabilism”) (Goldman 1979). The basic 
thesis of Reliabilism may be formulated as follows:
Reliabilism: One’s belief that p is prima facie justified if and only if it is produced by 
a reliable belief-forming process.35
How does PA1 fare on a Reliabilist theory of epistemic justification? Two complications 
arise in trying to answer the question. First, Reliabilism is a thesis about doxastic 
justification, i.e. a thesis about the conditions under which a belief is (prima facie) 
justified, whereas PA1 is a claim about propositional justification, i.e. the conditions 
under which one has (prima facie) justification to believe a proposition, which one might 
have even if one does not in fact believe the proposition. This is not a major 
complication, however. It’s plausible that positive facts about doxastic justification entail 
corresponding positive facts about propositional justification. That is, if one’s belief that p 
is doxastically justified, it follows that one has propositional justification to believe that p. 
On the other hand, negative facts about doxastic justification do not entail corresponding 
 Some formulations of the Reliabilist thesis omit the “prima facie” qualification. I include it here in part 35
to simplify matters: PA1 is itself a claim about prima facie justification, and it is easier to assess 
Reliabilism’s relevance to PA1 if we add this qualification. But the main reason for the addition is that the 
view is utterly implausible without it. For without the qualification, the thesis predicts that a belief which is 
formed by a reliable process is justified even if one possesses overwhelming defeating evidence against the 
belief.
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negative facts about propositional justification. That is, if one’s belief that p is not 
doxastically justified, it does not follow that one lacks propositional justification to 
believe that p. However, the absence of doxastic justification is often a good indicator of 
the absence of propositional justification. For our purposes, it is fair to assume (since it is 
dialectically to my disadvantage) that if the common belief that there are colored things 
lacks doxastic justification, then we also lack proposition justification to believe that there 
are colored things.
The second complication that arises in assessing the relevance of Reliabilism to 
PA1 is that, if Reliabilism is true, then the justificatory status of our perceptual beliefs 
depends to a great extent on how the external world actually is. If it turns out that we are 
in a skeptical scenario, then given Reliablism, it will turn out that our perceptual beliefs 
are not prima facie justified. Because of this, it’s tempting to think that there will be no 
non-question-begging route from Reliabilism to the truth of PA1. The temptation is 
motivated by the following line of thought: suppose that color realism is false. Then our 
perceptual beliefs about the colors of things in our environment, including the general 
belief that there are colored things, are uniformly false. It would seem, therefore, that 
each of them is the result of an unreliable process. So given Reliabilism together with the 
falsity of color realism, it follows our perceptual beliefs about the colors of things are not 
prima facie justified. It’s then reasonable to infer that we lack propositional justification 
to believe their contents, from which it follows that PA1 is false. Hence any route from 
Reliabilism to PA1 will have to assume the truth of color realism. But this would clearly 
be question-begging in the current context. More generally, the basic problem is that 
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Reliabilism entails a tight connection between the justificatory status of our beliefs and 
the truth of our beliefs, and this makes it difficult to answer questions about the 
justificatory status of our perceptual beliefs without making assumptions about their truth. 
Thus, if a Reliabilist approach to justification is correct, then it would seem that my 
strategy of indirectly defending color realism by way of epistemic ascent is problematic. 
The whole reason for resorting to epistemic ascent was that there seems to be no more 
direct way of defending color realism. But if I cannot defend the claim that we are 
justified in believing color realism without assuming color realism, then it would seem 
that the indirect defense of color realism can’t get off the ground.
Despite appearances, I believe that we can make the inference from Reliabilism to 
PA1 plausible without begging any questions against the irrealist. Recall that in the 
present dialectical context, any admissible view must meet the empirical anti-skeptical 
constraint. This plausibly entails that our perceptual beliefs about spatiotemporal matters 
are, in large part, justified. After all, if our perceptual beliefs about spatiotemporal matters 
are not justified, then it is hard to see how we could be justified in accepting the results of 
empirical science, much of which characterizes the world in terms of its spatiotemporal 
structure. Given Reliabilism, this means that the belief-forming process responsible for 
our perceptual beliefs about spatiotemporal matters is reliable. From this it follows, given 
Reliabilism, that any belief, whether it concerns spatiotemporal matters or not, produced 
by the belief-forming process responsible for our perceptual beliefs about spatiotemporal 
matters is itself (prima facie) justified.
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Now consider some perceptual belief on whose truth value the realist and the 
irrealist disagree, e.g. my perceptual belief that my socks are blue. Without assuming the 
truth of color realism, it is plausible, given the weak anti-skeptical assumptions at play in 
the current context, that this belief is the product of a reliable belief-forming process. 
Note that when we assess whether a belief was the outcome of a reliable process, we need 
to make some choices about how to individuate the relevant processes. The token series 
of events leading to the formation of a given belief is a token of indefinitely many process 
types, some very general, some very specific. For any belief, there will be some way of 
individuating processes such that the belief in question counts as the outcome of a very 
reliable process, and there will be other ways of individuating processes such that the 
belief in question counts as the outcome of a very unreliable process. One of the most 
pressing challenges for Reliabilist theories of justification is the “generality problem”: 
which way of individuating process types is the one which is relevant to determining the 
justificatory status of our beliefs. If Reliabilism is true, then the generality problem has an 
answer. In other words, there is some privileged way of individuating process types—
perhaps one which is maximally “natural” in the sense of Lewis (1983)—such that the 
reliability of those processes is what matters for justification. It’s plausible that on the 
privileged natural way of individuating belief-forming processes, my belief that my socks 
are blue is a result of the same process that produces my perceptual beliefs about 
spatiotemporal matters. Perhaps the relevant belief-formation process type is just the 
perceptual belief-formation process: the process which involves a kind of (non-deviant) 
causal transition from a perceptual state to a belief state with a suitably related content. 
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Or perhaps the relevant process type is something narrower, perhaps the visual belief 
formation process (or the close-up-in-good-lighting visual belief formation process): the 
process which involves a kind of (non-deviant) transition from a perceptual state of the 
visual system (of a nearby object in good lighting) to a belief state with a suitably related 
content. In either case, it will turn out that our beliefs about the colors of things, including 
our belief that there are colored things, are products of the same belief-forming process as 
most of our perceptual beliefs about spatiotemporal matters. It then follows from 
Reliabilism, given our anti-skeptical assumptions, that my belief that my socks are blue is 
prima facie justified as well.
Suppose, however, that given some well motivated answer to the generality 
problem, we cannot show that Reliabilism yields the truth of PA1 without assuming the 
truth of color realism. (This would be the case if, for example, we held that the relevant 
process type responsible for my belief that my socks are blue is the process that involves 
a (non-deviant) transition from a color-representing state of the visual system to a belief 
about the colors of things in my environment.) In other words, suppose that, given this 
version of Reliabilism together with the assumption of color irrealism, it turns out that 
PA1 is false. Even if this is so, there is good reason to think that this would stem from a 
defect in Reliabilism rather than a defect in PA1. Perhaps the best known problem with 
Reliabilism is that it seems to deliver the wrong results about justification in skeptical 
scenarios (Cohen 1984; Pollock 1984). Intuitively, my brain-in-vat twin, who has all the 
same experiences as me and forms all the same beliefs on the basis of experience, though 
systematically mistaken in his beliefs about the external world, is no less justified in 
 119
holding those beliefs than I am. But Reliabilism seems to entail that the beliefs of my 
envatted twin are not just systematically mistaken, but systematically unjustified. If 
Reliabilism, when combined with the assumption that color realism is false, delivers the 
falsity of PA1, we should suspect that this is due to a defect in Reliabilism, not a defect in 
PA1. For to suppose that color realism is false is to suppose that we are in a kind of 
skeptical scenario, a scenario in which perceptual experience is systematically mistaken 
about how the world is, and Reliabilism gives notoriously problematic results when 
applied to such skeptical scenarios.
4.4.3    Abductivism/Classical Foundationalism
To conclude my defense of PA1, I would like to consider an approach to the epistemology 
of perception that often seems to be tacitly presupposed by opponents of realism and 
which appears to present a challenge for PA1.
In objecting to realism about color (more precisely, “Edenic” color, understood as 
the primitive color qualities phenomenally presented in color experience), Chalmers 
(2006) remarks that “the hypothesis that objects have [Edenic colors] seems quite 
unnecessary in order to explain color perception” (p. 67). Remarks like this are 
commonly made by color irrealists, with the implicit suggestion that, because the 
supposition that objects are colored is unnecessary to explain our color experiences, 
perceptual experience therefore does not provide us with justification to believe that 
objects are colored. It is natural to suppose that behind this thought lies something like 
the following view, closely related to classical foundationalism, about our justification for 
holding beliefs about the external world:
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Abductivism: If p is a proposition concerning the external world (i.e. a proposition 
whose truth requires the existence of an external world with a certain character), then 
one has justification to believe p only if p figures in the best explanation for one’s 
perceptual experiences.
Abductivism appears to present a challenge for PA1. Assuming that our color experiences 
can be fully explained without the hypothesis that there are colored things, then one can 
appeal to Abductivism to argue that we lack (perhaps even prima facie) justification to 
believe that there are colored things. More generally, there may be many propositions p—
including but not limited to the proposition that there are colored things—such that p 
perceptually seems to us to be the case, yet p does not figure in the best explanation for 
our sensory experiences. If this is correct, then given the truth of Abductivism, there will 
likely be many counterexamples to PA1.36
I do not think that the Abductivist threat to PA1 is very serious, for two reasons. 
First, Abductivism itself is a highly suspect approach to the epistemology of perception. 
Second, the assumption of explanatory irrelevance– i.e. the assumption that the 
hypothesis that colors are instantiated in the external world does not figure in the best 
explanation of our sensory experiences—is doubtful. Let us take these in turn:
Against Abductivism: Abductivism, like its close cousin, classical 
foundationalism, presents a picture of epistemic justification on which our basic stock of 
evidence, from which all of our (a posteriori) beliefs derive their justification, consists in 
 Why only “likely”? Because, as stated, Abductivism is a claim about (ultima facie) justification while 36
PA1 is a claim about prima facie justification. Lack of (ultima facie) justification does not straightforwardly 
entail lack of prima facie justification.
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facts about our occurrent phenomenology. Nowadays this phenomenal conception of 
evidence is largely repudiated by epistemologists, including contemporary 
foundationalists, who typically deny the classical foundationalist assumption that beliefs 
about the external world are absent from our stock of foundational beliefs.  Our basic 37
evidence should be taken to include facts about the external world, including facts about 
the gross features of our immediate environment.
Abductivism, like classical foundationalism, is presumably motivated by the 
following, loosely Cartesian, line of thought:
Our ordinary beliefs about the external world are dubitable and corrigible. By 
contrast, our beliefs about our occurrent phenomenology are especially epistemically 
secure, perhaps even indubitable or incorrigible. So whatever justification attaches to 
our ordinary beliefs about the external world must derive from our beliefs about our 
occurrent phenomenology.
But there are two major problems with this line of thought. First, in general our beliefs 
about our occurrent phenomenology are not especially epistemically secure. I may have 
some very general beliefs about my occurrent phenomenology which are more certain 
than any of my beliefs about the external world, e.g. my belief that I am currently 
undergoing a conscious experience. But my beliefs about more specific features of my 
occurrent phenomenology, which is the only kind of phenomenological belief from which 
I could hope to derive anything interesting about the external world, are not especially 
secure. We are far more reliable in discerning the gross features of objects in our 
 For an influential attack on the phenomenal conception of evidence, see Williamson (2000, ch. 4, 8).37
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immediate environment than we are in discerning the phenomenal features of our 
occurrent experiences. To illustrate: hold a quarter out in front of you and tilt the quarter 
so that it is at an angle with respect to your line of sight. Does the coin now look oval-
shaped? Now stretch your arm out as far as you can, so as to move the coin further away 
from you. Does it look smaller now than it did before? The answer is not obvious. My 
own inclination is to say that there is no sense in which the coin looks oval-shaped when 
it is tilted or looks smaller when it is further away, but other philosophers disagree (Hume 
1739/1978; Noë 2004). Now consider the corresponding non-phenomenological 
questions about the coin itself: when you tilt the coin, does the coin itself become oval-
shaped, or does it remain circular? When you move the coin away from you, does the 
coin itself get smaller, or does it remain the same size? While it is difficult to settle 
phenomenological questions about the shape and size the coin looks to have, we have no 
trouble at all answering non-phenomenological questions about the shape and size of the 
coin itself on the basis of perception. We are rightly much more confident in our external-
world beliefs about the coin itself than in our phenomenological beliefs about our 
experience of the coin (cf. Schwitzgebel 2006).
The second problem with the above motivation for Abductivism is that it confuses 
epistemic security with epistemic priority. Even if beliefs about our occurrent 
phenomenology were especially secure relative to our beliefs about the external world, 
the inference from this to the claim that they play a foundational role in justifying our 
beliefs about the external world is a non-sequitur. Epistemic security and epistemic 
priority come apart about as often as they go together. They will, for example, nearly 
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always come apart in cases where one belief is derived from another by way of deductive 
inference. Suppose I come to believe that Harry plays the harp. On the basis of this belief, 
I form the belief that someone plays the harp. The belief that Harry play the harp is 
epistemically prior to the belief that someone plays the harp, but the former is logically 
stronger than, and therefore less epistemically secure than, the latter.
Against explanatory irrelevance: The assumption of explanatory irrelevance 
involved the the Abductivist challenge to PA1 is also doubtful. A full explanation of our 
perceptual experiences must involve an explanation of why they have the content that 
they have. And it is doubtful that we can adequately explain the color content of our 
experiences without positing colored things in the world. Color experiences represent 
color properties. If we assume that color properties are instantiated in the world, we can 
begin to give an explanation for how we manage to perceptually represent these color 
properties. We might, for example, explain the color content of our perceptions by appeal 
to causal covariation between certain internal states of ours and instantiations of color 
properties (Dretske 1988; Tye 1995). To be sure, even with the hypothesis that colors are 
instantiated in the world, no one has managed to give a fully worked out explanation for 
how our color experiences represent the colors they do; all we have are programmatic 
sketches of explanations. But without the hypothesis that colors are instantiated in the 
world, no one has managed to offer even so much as a programmatic sketch of how our 
color experiences represent the colors they do. This gives us reason to think that the best 
explanation for some aspects of our color experiences, namely their content, will involve 
the hypothesis that color properties are instantiated in the external world. Similar 
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considerations suggest that the same holds for other sensible qualities as well. (These 
points are closely related to the abductive argument for realism in §4.9.)
This claim is further supported by the assumption of empirical anti-skepticism. If 
one holds that the correct explanation of the color content of our experiences makes no 
use of the hypothesis that color properties are instantiated in the external world, then it’s 
hard to see what principled reason there could be to hold that the correct explanation of 
our spatiotemporal experiences will require the hypothesis that spatiotemporal properties 
are instantiated. But for the reasons given in §4.4.2, any view according to which we are 
not justified in believing things to have even the approximate spatiotemporal features 
they seem to have is plausibly a view that fails to satisfy the empirical anti-skeptical 
constraint. So such a view is not available to my opponent. Given empirical anti-
skepticism, then, it is doubtful that Abductivism presents a serious threat to our 
justification to believe realism about the sensible qualities.38
The above remarks rely on the assumption (which I will continue to make 
throughout this paper) that perceptual experiences have content; that is, perceptual 
experiences have accuracy conditions in accordance with which they can be assessed as 
veridical or falsidical. Indeed, this seems to be a truism. Nonetheless, this assumption is 
occasionally denied by some (though certainly not all) “direct realist” philosophers of 
mind (Travis 2004). The above way of responding to the challenge from Abductivism 
will therefore not be convincing to direct realists of this persuasion. But this is no cause 
for concern. The considerations which incline one toward direct realist views in the 
 I discuss related issues in more detail in §4.5.1.38
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metaphysics of perception will typically incline one away from Abductivist views in the 
epistemology of perception. More importantly, direct realists deny the assumption of 
explanatory irrelevance involved in the Abductivist challenge to PA1. According to direct 
realism, the phenomenal character of a normal perceptual experience of a ripe tomato is 
partly constituted by the redness of the tomato. For direct realists, then, the instantiation 
of color properties therefore figures in the explanation of (the phenomenal character of) 
our color experiences. So given direct realism, the challenge from Abductivism will not 
get off the ground.
4.5    Objections to (Non-Reductive) Realism: Skeptical Challenges 
In light of the testimony of our senses, color realism carries the status of a default 
presumption. Irrealists may well agree that perception provides us with prima facie 
justification to believe that there are colored things. But such irrealists will hold that there 
are considerations that defeat this justification. In §§4.5-4.7, I consider what I take to be 
the most powerful objections to color realism. Many objections to realism in some way 
rely on the assumption that reductionism is false. For if some form of reductionism is 
correct, there can be no serious doubt about realism. No one doubts that material objects 
really have the sorts of physical properties and response-dependent properties with which 
reductionists identify colors. But of course, given the non-reductionist position defended 
in chapters 2-3, my defense of realism cannot take refuge in reductionism. In what 
follows, I therefore take for granted the falsity of reductionism, in agreement with my 
irrealist opponent. 
One common objection to realism, at least in its non-reductive forms, is that (non-
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reductive) realism leads to skepticism about the colors of things; in other words, (non-
reductive) realism has the result that we do not know the colors of things in our 
environment.
It’s worth pausing to ask why this conclusion would be a problem for realism. 
Compare: suppose you’re a realist about moral desert; you believe that properties like 
deserving to be punished and deserving to be rewarded (as well as their determinates, 
such as deserving to be punished severely and deserving to be rewarded lavishly) are 
really instantiated by individuals. Suppose I then persuade you of the following 
conditional: if realism about moral desert is true, then we do not know what individuals 
in our community deserve; that is, we do not know the extent to which any given person 
deserves to be punished or rewarded, or indeed whether any given person deserves to be 
punished or rewarded at all. Should this lead you to reject realism about moral desert? It’s 
not clear that it should. Similarly, if it could be shown that color realism has the result 
that we don’t know the colors of things in our environment, it’s not entirely clear why 
this should lead one to reject color realism.
It might be thought that if we don’t know the colors of things in our environment, 
then we don’t know the more general proposition that things in our environment are 
colored. And perhaps it is irrational to believe something if we’re convinced that we don’t 
know it. (Why would this be irrational? Well, an application of conjunction-introduction 
would then yield a Moore-paradoxical belief of the form: p and I don’t know that p. And 
perhaps it’s irrational to hold such Moore-paradoxical beliefs.) The problem is that it’s 
not clear why we should accept that we don’t know the general proposition that things in 
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our environment are colored, even if it’s granted that we don’t know propositions 
attributing specific colors to things. (Recall the argument in §2.4.2 that it’s possible to 
know that a given object is green, and even that it (therefore) has some determinate shade 
of green, even though we can’t know which shade of green it has.)
In any case, most realists (myself included) hold not only that things are colored, 
but that we can know (at least approximately) the colors of things in our environment. I 
shall therefore grant to my objector the assumption that realism stands or falls with the 
latter claim.
Skeptical challenges to realism typically begin by arguing that there are possible 
communities whose members perceive things as having different colors than we do. 
There is, for example, a possible community of color perceivers whose color experiences 
are red-green inverted with respect to ours—i.e. a community whose members experience 
ripe tomatoes and firetrucks as green and unripe tomatoes and fresh grass as red. 
Plausibly, it cannot be the case the members of both communities are having veridical 
color experiences, since it’s plausible that nothing can be both red (all over) and green 
(all over) at the same time. But now there is a skeptical worry. What reason do we have to 
think that our community is the one whose members perceive colors veridically? 
As stated, the argument isn’t especially compelling. The mere possibility of 
individuals whose perceptual representations of objects are systematically inconsistent 
with ours is not sufficient to raise serious doubt about the reliability of our perceptual 
faculties. Presumably there is a possible community whose visual experiences are left-
right inverted relative to our own (whose visual experiences of the a lowercase “d” would 
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be like our experiences of a lowercase “b,” and vice versa), or who visually experience 
objects as uniformly stretched in a certain direction relative to the way we experience 
things (cf. Thompson 2010; Chalmers 2012, ch. 7; forthcoming-a). (One might deny the 
possibility of such a community on broadly “externalist” grounds (cf. §2.3), but the same 
considerations should then lead one to deny the possibility of red-green inverted 
communities.) But surely the mere possibility of such a community should not drive us to 
skepticism about the reliability of our spatial perception. Why should the possibility of 
communities whose color perceptions conflict with ours be any different? 
Typically those who raise skeptical challenges for non-reductive realism will try 
to bolster the argument given above by invoking the claim that communities whose color 
perceptions are inconsistent with ours could easily have arisen through natural selection 
(Pautz ms., Chalmers 2006). As Chalmers writes, 
Evolutionary processes will be indifferent among perceivers in which apples produce 
phenomenally red experiences, perceivers in which apples produce phenomenally 
green experiences, and perceivers in which apples produce phenomenally blue 
experiences. Any such perceiver could easily come to exist through minor differences 
in environmental conditions or brain wiring. If we accept the reasoning above, only a 
very small subset of the class of such possible perceivers will normally have veridical 
experiences, and there is no particular reason to think that we are among them (p. 69). 
How is skepticism about the colors of things supposed to result from these 
considerations? The last sentence above might be taken to suggest that, unless we can 
provide some positive reason to think that our perceptual experiences are veridical, we 
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aren’t justified in believing things to be the way they seem to be. But this claim is 
doubtful. It’s plausible that we have a (defeasible) default entitlement to believe our 
senses to be reliable (Wright 2004, White 2006). More charitably, we can interpret 
Chalmers as claiming that the above evolutionary considerations defeat any justification 
we might have had to believe our color experiences to be veridical. On one interpretation, 
Chalmers is arguing roughly as follows:  Let V be the proposition that our color 39
perceptions are generally veridical. Chalmers relies on the following two claims: 
S1. Our visual system arose through evolutionary processes which could easily have 
produced creatures whose visual systems represent colors in a manner that is 
inconsistent with our actual color representations.40
S2. The probability of V given S1 is very low.
If we are to derive a skeptical conclusion from S1 and S2, we’ll have to rely on 
something like the following “epistemic” premises: 
S3. Anyone who accepts S1 and S2 possesses a defeater for V. 
S4. Anyone who possesses a defeater for V possesses a defeater for the beliefs formed 
on the basis of color experience, including beliefs about the colors of things in her 
environment. 
 The following reconstruction is modeled very loosely on Plantinga’s (1993, ch. 12) famous 39
evolutionary argument against naturalism.
 In light of the facts of variation in the perception of fine-grained color shades among normal perceivers 40
discussed in §2.4, it would perhaps be better to say “in a manner that is grossly inconsistent without our 
actual color representations.” The question of whether an inconsistency is gross is a matter of the distance 
between the corresponding points in color space. For example, an experience of an object x as scarlet is 
grossly inconsistent with an experience of x as sky blue, but not grossly inconsistent with an experience of 
x as crimson. For simplicity, I ignore these complication in what follows.
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Given natural assumptions about the relation between knowledge and epistemic defeat, it 
then follows that anyone who accepts S1 and S2 does not know the colors of things in her 
environment. The realist who is persuaded of S1 and S2 is then saddled with skepticism.
It appears that this argument is valid, or at least it could be made valid by adding 
some fairly uncontroversial premises. Moreover, S2 and S4 seem to be plausible. 
However, as I shall argue, S1 is very likely false, and S3 is questionable as well. Let us 
take these in turn: 
4.5.1    Against S1
Is there any reason to suppose that evolutionary processes could easily have produced 
creatures whose visual systems represent colors in a manner that is inconsistent with our 
color representations? It is of course plausible that evolutionary processes could easily 
have produced creatures whose visual systems represent a different range of colors than 
do our visual systems. Indeed, we have more-or-less conclusive empirical grounds for 
thinking that evolutionary processes have produced many such creatures; we know (about 
as well as we know any truths about other minds) that goldfish, pigeons, mantis shrimp, 
and many other animals experience a different range of colors than humans do. Of 
course, that the color representations of other animals are often different from ours does 
not entail that their color representations are inconsistent with ours. But my opponent 
might offer the following argument from difference to inconsistency (cf. Pautz ms, p. 
16-7): Suppose that when I look at a certain flower petal, I have an experience as of 
determinate color c1, and when a pigeon looks at the flower petal, it has a visual 
experience as of a different determinate color c2, perhaps one that falls outside of human 
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color space. In general, determinates under a common determinable exclude one another. 
Just as having mass 4.26 kg and having mass 28.9 kg (two determinates under the 
determinable mass) exclude one another, and being a 5”×6” rectangle and being a circle 
of radius 3” (two determinates under the determinable shape) exclude one another, it is 
plausible that c1 and c2 (two determinates under the determinable color) exclude one 
another. 
The argument is unconvincing. There are at least three ways the realist might 
respond to this line of reasoning. The first (and to my mind, weakest) line of response is 
to deny that there is any genuine determinable common to c1 and c2. One way to 
implement this response is to hold that, strictly speaking, c2 and other qualities outside of 
human color space visible to non-human perceivers are not colors. Another way of 
implementing this response is to allow that c2 and other such qualities are colors, but to 
deny that color is a genuine determinable, holding that the only genuine determinables in 
the vicinity are human color, pigeon color, and so forth.
Second, she might argue that determinates under highly general determinables 
such as color do not always exclude one another. This view is not entirely unmotivated: 
one might hold that all determinate properties, e.g. red17 or being a 5”×6” rectangle, are 
determinates of being (or existence), where the latter is understood as something like a 
maximally general determinable. But determinates (even absolute determinates—those 
without any determinates “under” them) under the determinable being do not exclude one 
another, for it is possible for something to be both red17 and a 5”×6” rectangle. Arguably 
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the determinable color, when understood as covering properties outside of human color 
space, is sufficiently general that its determinates don’t always exclude one another.
The third (and to my mind, strongest) line of response runs as follows: first, note 
that it is certainly not the case that determinates of a common determinable always 
exclude one another. Red and scarlet are both determinates of the determinable color, but 
they do not exclude one another. (In this case, the latter entails the former.) Being a 
rhombus and being a rectangle are determinates of the determinable shape, but they do 
not exclude one another. (In this case, neither entails the other, but they can be co-
instantiated, in particular by squares.) We can draw the following lesson: in modeling 
determinate/determinable relations, we can associate properties with regions of a quality 
space whose points correspond to absolute determinates. Determinates d1 and d2 under a 
common determinable will not exclude one another if the intersection of the regions 
associated with d1 and d2 is non-empty. Hence the relevant exclusion principle, if it is to 
be at all plausible, will have to be reformulated in something like the following way: 
Determinate Exclusion (DE): If d1 and d2 are determinates under a common 
determinable D and are associated with non-overlapping regions of the quality space 
associated with D, then d1 and d2 exclude one another. 
Let us assume that DE is true, setting aside the worry raised above that it may fail for 
highly general determinables. The question we must ask is whether (the sets of absolute 
determinates associated with) c1 and c2 overlap. They will not if c1 and c2 are themselves 
absolute determinates, for in that case their associated sets will be distinct and (therefore) 
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disjoint singleton sets. But the realist can reasonably hold that the color properties we 
visually represent are never absolutely determinate. It is widely accepted that the colors 
we visually represent sometimes fail to be absolutely determinate, as when we represent 
the colors of things in the periphery of our visual field. It is not unreasonable to hold that 
the colors we visually attribute to objects in the foveal region of our visual field, though 
surely far more determinate, are still not absolutely determinate. By analogy, consider the 
case of length representation. When I look at an iron bar, my visual experience represents 
the bar as having a certain length. But the length attributed to the bar by my experience is 
not surely not an absolutely determinate length. For this would have the deeply 
implausible consequence that there is some real number r such that the experience is 
veridical iff the bar is exactly r inches long—not a trillionth of an inch shorter or longer. 
Visual representation is simply not that exacting. And what holds for length 
representation plausibly holds for our perceptual representations of color as well. The 
realist ought to say that c1 and c2 are not absolute determinates, but rather are fairly 
determinate properties whose associated sets of absolute determinates partially overlap, 
and hence that c1 and c2 do not exclude one another.41
I conclude that there is no easy transition from actual variation in color perception 
across the animal kingdom to S1. Furthermore, there are good philosophical reasons to 
 Are the shared determinates colors? Well, they fall under the determinable color, at least on the 41
assumption that c1 and c2 do and the determinate-determinable relation is transitive. Whether we call them 
colors or not, they are presumably not properties experienced by any actual creature. One possibility is that 
the relevant absolutely determinate properties are just highly specific physical properties (Yablo 1995). It is 
consistent with non-reductionism about the color properties we experience that these color properties are 
determinables of physical properties, so long as the relevant color properties are not reductively analyzable 
in terms of physical properties. 
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reject S1. Note that S1 entails that evolutionary processes could easily have brought 
about creatures whose visual systems systematically misrepresent the colors of things. 
But this goes against the dominant philosophical tradition concerning the nature of 
representation and the determinants of content. According to the dominant tradition—
represented by such disparate theories of intentionality as interpretationism (Lewis 1974, 
Davidson 1973, Williamson 2008, ch. 8, Dennett 1987), causal covariation theories 
(Dretske 1988, Tye 1995, Stalnaker 1984), teleosemantic theories (Millikan 1984), and 
Fodor’s (1987) theory of asymmetric dependence—veridical representation is in some 
sense the default. Each such theory comes with what I’ll call a “presumption of 
veridicality,” in the sense that, on each such theory, normal representation is veridical 
representation; misrepresentation constitutes a sort of aberration from normality. To 
illustrate, consider a simplistic causal-covariation theory of perceptual representation. 
According to this theory, an organism o perceptually represents F just in case o tokens a 
state type S such that, under normal conditions, S is tokened iff F is instantiated and 
because F instantiated (cf. Cutter and Tye 2011, p. 91). The simple causal-covariation 
theory entails that it would be difficult for there to arise a species whose members 
normally had radically inaccurate color representations. In my view, while the simple 
tracking theory is surely overly simplistic, the correct view of perceptual intentionality is 
likely somewhere in the vicinity. And if anything in the vicinity of the simple causal 
covariation theory is true, then S1 is probably false. More generally, if any theory which 
carries a presumption of veridicality is correct—which will be the case if any of the 
theories listed above is even roughly on the right track—then S1 is probably false.
 135
To my knowledge there has been no serious attempt to offer even a rough sketch, 
in reductive or non-reductive terms, of the conditions under which we represent a 
property or content which does not come with a presumption of veridicality. Furthermore, 
even my opponent has strong reason to believe that the correct theory of perceptual 
intentionality will come with a presumption of veridicality. Recall that, in the present 
dialectical context, we are assuming that all parties to the dispute accept empirical anti-
skepticism—the claim that we are justified in accepting many of the deliverances of 
empirical science. Anyone who accepts empirical anti-skepticism ought to allow that our 
perceptual representations of spatiotemporal properties are typically at least 
approximately veridical. For, as was mentioned in §4.4.2, if we think that perception gets 
things radically wrong even with respect to spatiotemporal matters, then it is hard to see 
how empirical science, much of which characterizes the world in spatiotemporal terms—
could come out unscathed.  But if our perceptual representations of spatiotemporal 42
properties are typically veridical, then there must be some explanation for this remarkable 
correspondence between our spatiotemporal representations and the spatiotemporal facts. 
And it is difficult to see how this remarkable correspondence could be explained unless 
the correct theory of perceptual intentionality, the principles of which will figure in the 
 Even setting aside the justification of empirical science, the costs of irrealism about spatiotemporal 42
properties are utterly exorbitant. It’s a priori that whatever is (say) a table, or a house, or a butter knife, or 
(insert almost any English noun that comes to mind) is spatially extended. So if nothing is spatially 
extended, it follows that there are no tables, houses, butterknives, … Indeed, there wouldn’t even be 
simples arranged table-wise, house-wise, or butter-knife-wise, for it’s a priori that the xs are arranged table-
wise (or …) only if the xs are spatially related. Fodor (1990) writes that if mental states aren’t literally 
causally efficacious, “then practically everything I believe about anything is false and it’s the end of the 
world” (p. 156). But rejecting realism about spatiotemporal properties would require an even more drastic 
revision to our web of beliefs than would rejecting the causal efficacy of the mental.
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complete explanation of this correspondence, carries a presumption of veridicality. So 
anyone who accepts empirical anti-skepticism has good reason to think that the correct 
theory of perceptual intentionality, whatever it is, will be such as to make veridical 
representation the default. From this it follows that all parties to the debate have good 
reason to think that S1 is probably false. 
It’s worth noting that objections to S1 apply to an alternative objection to realism 
which also makes use of S1 (or some similar premise). The envisaged alternative 
argument goes as follows: realism (let’s assume) is committed to V. It follows from V that 
there is a systematic and widespread correlation between the colors things appear to have 
and the colors they actually have. Such a systematic and widespread correlation calls out 
for explanation. If S1 is true, then it would appear that such an explanation will be hard to 
come by. S1 entails that evolutionary processes could easily have brought about creatures 
whose visual systems usually misrepresent the colors of things, and if we are sympathetic 
to S1, we will likely think that evolutionary processes are far more likely to bring about 
such creatures. Suppose this is correct. Then if realism (and hence V) is also correct, 
there would appear to be no explanation for why we evolved a visual system that 
accurately represents the colors of things, rather than one of the vast range of possible 
visual systems that typically do not accurately represent the colors of things. So given S1, 
it appears that realism, with its commitment to a systematic and widespread correlation 
between the colors of things and their apparent colors, is committed to a kind of pre-
established harmony or vast cosmic coincidence—surely an unpalatable consequence.43
 For related arguments, see Pautz (2011) and Byrne and Hilbert (2007a, pp. 96-8).43
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In my view, this is a somewhat more promising line of objection to realism than 
skeptical challenges of the sort raised by Chalmers. However, due to its reliance on S1, it 
nonetheless inherits the problems with S1 discussed above. I agree that there must be 
some explanation of the correlation implicit in V. But in light of the remarks made above, 
it is very likely that such an explanation exists. The full explanation for the correlation 
will make reference to the general principles involved in the correct theory of perceptual 
representation—the principles involved in the metaphysical explanation for why it is that 
representational states have the content they do. If these principles come with a 
presumption of veridicality, then there will be an explanation for the correlation implicit 
in V. And as I have argued, all parties to the debate have strong reason to think that they 
do. 
4.5.2    A Challenge to S3
In my view, S1 is by far the weakest link in the above argument. However, S3 may also 
be challenged. Why should we think that if I accept S1 and I accept that the probability of 
V given S1 is very low, then I possess a defeater for V? It is obviously not true in general 
that if I accept p and I accept that the probability of p given q is very low, that I have a 
defeater for q. Suppose I pull a card at random from a well shuffled deck. I look at the 
card and see that it is the ace of spades. The probability that I pulled an ace given one of 
my beliefs—namely, that I just pulled a card at random from a well-shuffled deck—is 
low. But I do not thereby have a defeater for my belief that I pulled an ace, since the 
probability that I pulled an ace given all my evidence—which includes the proposition 
that I just pulled the ace of spades—is very high. Plausibly, what matters epistemically is 
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what is likely conditional upon all my evidence. In order to establish that V is unlikely 
given all my evidence, my opponent would have to assume that facts about the colors of 
things in my environment don’t belong to my total evidence. For suppose they do. My 
evidence also presumably includes various facts about the colors things look to have. So 
my total body of evidence includes many pairs of propositions of the form: o has color c; 
o looks to have color c. If that’s the case, then it would seem that the probability of V 
conditional upon my total body of evidence should be very high. But it would be 
question-begging in this context for my opponent to assume that facts about the colors of 
things do not belong to my evidence. Assuming that my evidence includes what I know 
(Williamson 2000, ch. 9), this would amount to the assumption that I don’t know the 
colors of things in my environment. But this is precisely the skeptical conclusion my 
opponent is trying to establish! 
I conclude that S1 is very likely false and S3 may not survive critical 
scrutiny. The above interpretation of Chalmers’s evolutionary skeptical challenge fails. 
4.5.3    Evolution, Safety, and Luck
Byrne and Hilbert (2007a) offer an alternative interpretation of Chalmers’s evolutionary 
skeptical challenge: “[Non-reductive realism] leads to skepticism, according to Chalmers, 
for the straightforward reason that if [non-reductive realism] is true, our beliefs about the 
colors of things could easily have been false, and hence do not amount to knowledge” (p. 
88). On this interpretation, the relevant facts about the evolution of our visual systems are 
supposed to lead us to the conclusion that our beliefs about the colors of things fail the 
safety condition on knowledge, and hence, even if true, do not constitute knowledge. The 
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safety condition on knowledge is typically formulated in something like the following 
way: 
Safety: One knows p only if one could not easily have believed p falsely—i.e. only if 
there are no nearby possibilities in which one falsely believes p (Cf. Williamson 
2000, p. 128).44
This version of Chalmers’s evolutionary skeptical challenge is even more 
problematic than the previous interpretation. First of all, in order to establish that our 
color beliefs could easily have been false, the argument from safety must rely on S1 or 
some similar premise, so it inherits the most serious problems with the previous 
argument. Second, even if we accept S1, and so we accept that alternative color 
perceivers could easily have arisen in evolutionary history, it is not plausible that our 
beliefs about the colors of things, if true, could easily have been false—at least not in any 
sense which would render them unsafe. Worlds in which evolution goes very differently, 
in which instead of humans there arises a species of hominids whose color 
representations diverge drastically from our own, are not relevant to considerations of 
safety. This is so for three reasons: first, in assessing whether my belief that grass is green 
is safe from error, we consider other nearby worlds in which I believe that grass is green 
and ask whether what I believe is true in those worlds. But the worlds with alternate 
evolutionary histories are almost certainly worlds in which I don’t exist, and so a fortiori 
 A fully adequate formulation of the safety condition will likely have to add qualifications which 44
restrict the relevant set of nearby possibilities to those in which one forms the believe that p using 
the same method one uses in the actual world to form the belief that p. But such niceties needn’t 
concern us here. 
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are not worlds in which I have the belief that grass is green. Secondly, suppose I do exist 
in some of these worlds, despite having a very different evolutionary history, and suppose 
that in some of these worlds I have non-veridical color experiences and so form mostly 
false beliefs about the colors of things. None of this gives us the slightest reason to 
suppose that any of my actual color beliefs could easily have been false. Consider again 
my belief that grass is green. Since I have very different color experiences in these 
worlds, I presumably won’t form the belief that grass is green in these worlds. And if my 
actual belief that grass is green is true, I certainly don’t believe falsely that grass is green 
in these other worlds. (Grass presumably doesn’t change color across these nearby 
possibilities.) So these nearby possibilities are irrelevant to the question of whether my 
actual belief that grass is green is safe from error. Formally, the problem arises from a 
scope confusion in the claim that: 
E: My beliefs about the colors of things could easily have been false. 
There are (at least) two syntactic disambiguations of E (read “♢φ” as “it could easily 
have been the case that φ ︎,” and read “Gen” as the binary quantifier involved in the logical 
form of generic sentences (cf. Leslie 2008; Asher and Morreau 1995): 
E1: ♢(Gen x [x is one of my beliefs about the colors of things][x is false]). 
E2: Gen x (x is one of my beliefs about the colors of things) ♢(x is false) 
To the extent that considerations of alternative evolutionary histories support E at all, 
they support E1, not E2. But it is E2, not E1, which is relevant to the question of whether 
my actual beliefs are safe from error.
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Third, and most importantly, these worlds are simply not nearby possible worlds 
by any metric which could be relevant for applying the safety criterion. Granted, it’s not 
always clear which worlds we should count as “nearby possibilities” in assessing the 
safety of a belief. Suppose that unbeknownst to me, I am driving through a county with 
mostly fake barns, but I also happen to be in a local district which has only real barns. 
Upon looking at one of these barns, I form the belief that there is a barn before me. In 
assessing the safety of this belief, should we consider worlds in which I am looking at a 
different barn in the same district? Worlds in which I am looking at a fake barn in a 
different district within the same county? It is not easy to say exactly which worlds are 
relevant. But one things is clear: worlds in which evolution went very differently, in 
which there are hominids around with very different neural wiring from that of actual 
humans, are certainly not relevant to assessing the safety of my belief. This is true 
whether we are assessing the safety of my belief that there is a barn before me or my 
belief that there is a red thing before me. 
Pautz (ms.) offers a similar argument that non-reductive realism results in 
skepticism by appeal to the following principle: 
Independence: If objects have primitive colors, what color vision system evolves in a 
given lineage is completely independent of what primitive colors objects possessed 
prior to the evolution of color vision (p. 12). 
From Independence, Pautz argues that it is extremely unlikely that humans’ visual 
systems evolved so as to represent the actual colors of things. So even if, by chance, we 
happened to have evolved a visual system which typically represents the actual colors of 
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things, our beliefs about the colors of things will only be true “by blind luck,” and 
therefore do not constitute knowledge (p. 17). 
The most serious problems with this argument, in my view, are those it shares 
with the first interpretation of Chalmers’s argument above. In particular, the objections to 
S1 in §4.5.1 apply to Independence as well. Independence will fail on just about any 
theory of perceptual representation that carries a presumption of veridicality. On causal-
covariation theories of perceptual representation, for example, what color vision system 
evolves in a given lineage will be partly dependent on which color properties are causally 
related to internal states of members of that lineage, and therefore will be dependent on 
which color properties things actually have. (I am assuming that color vision systems 
here are to be individuated partly in terms of the range of colors they represent, and not 
merely in terms of their internal physical structure.)
But let us focus on the second part of Pautz’s argument—namely, the inference 
from Independence to the claim that our beliefs about the colors of things, if true, are 
only true by “blind luck” and so do not amount to knowledge. It is widely agreed that 
luck can undermine knowledge. This is one of the lessons we’re supposed to have learned 
from Gettier’s (1963) counterexamples to the analysis of knowledge as justified true 
belief. But not all forms of luck undermine knowledge. Consider the case of Theodore. 
When Theodore’s mother was pregnant with him, she participated in a drug study with 
ninety-nine other pregnant women. Ninety-five of the participants were selected at 
random to take the drug, and the other five were given a sugar pill. Unfortunately, the 
drug caused a peculiar cognitive defect in the children of women in the first group, with 
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the result that, when the children came of age, their arithmetic beliefs were mostly false. 
Fortunately for Theodore, his mother, by “blind luck,” was one of the five women who 
were given the sugar pill rather than the harmful drug. Theodore is now a normal, 
reasonably intelligent adult with arithmetical abilities comparable to those of other 
normal adults. In some sense, Theodore’s beliefs about simple arithmetic are true by luck. 
He is lucky to have reliable arithmetic belief-forming faculties. But there is no temptation 
at all to say that, on that account, Theodore’s arithmetic beliefs do not amount to 
knowledge. The kind of luck involved here is not knowledge-undermining luck. If 
Independence is true, our case is analogous to that of Theodore. If indeed our visual 
system accurately represents the colors of things, we are in some sense lucky to have true 
beliefs about the colors of things; we are lucky to have reliable chromatic belief-forming 
faculties in just the way that Theodore is lucky to have reliable arithmetic belief-forming 
faculties. But this is not knowledge-undermining luck. If Independence is true, our 
situation is more like that of Theodore and less like that of Gettier’s Smith. 
4.6    Objections to (Non-Reductive) Realism: Causation and Simplicity
The next objection to non-reductive realism realism is the causal-exclusion objection. 
The causal-exclusion objection, which is roughly analogous to the more familiar causal-
exclusion objection to dualism and non-reductive physicalism about mental properties 
(Kim 1993), may be formulated as follows: science tells us that the properties of objects 
on which our sensory experiences causally depend are complex physical properties. For 
example, our color experiences are causally dependent on physical properties of objects, 
such as their dispositions to reflect, transmit, and emit light, and the micro-structural 
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properties that ground these dispositions. Our auditory experiences of pitch, loudness, 
and timbre are causally dependent on physical features of pressure waves, such as their 
fundamental frequency, amplitude, and wave shape. Our thermoceptive experiences of 
heat and cold are causally dependent on the temperature and conductivity of their objects. 
And so on. If the secondary qualities are distinct from any physical property, as the non-
reductive realist supposes, then (barring overdetermination) it would appear that they do 
not have any causal relevance with respect to our experiences. This would be a troubling 
result. If our experiences do not causally depend on the secondary qualities of things, 
then it would appear that we do not really perceive the secondary qualities of things. And 
this conclusion would seem to undercut our justification for believing that the objects of 
experience have the secondary qualities they appear to have. 
To this objection we may add a related but distinct objection, which we may call 
the “simplicity objection” (Chalmers 2006, p. 67; Pautz ms.). If non-reductive realism is 
true, then physical objects have secondary qualities that are distinct from any of the 
properties attributed to them by the physical sciences. Hence the non-reductive realist 
seems to be committed to a more metaphysically complex world than one who identifies 
secondary qualities with certain physical properties or denies that they are instantiated. 
As Pautz (ms.) writes,
[Non-reductive realism] is ontologically inflationary. It requires a kind of Dualism at 
the surfaces of objects. [Irrealism] avoids such a Dualism. It has the virtue of 
simplicity. This provides a strong reason to accept [Irrealism] over [Non-reductive 
realism] (p. 48).
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A non-reductive realist might be tempted to respond to the simplicity objection as 
follows: 
Considerations of simplicity are to be used to decide among theories that equally well 
explain, or at least accommodate, our evidence or data. Our data minimally include 
our direct observational data, which in turn minimally include propositions 
concerning the distribution of sensible qualities in our environment. The simplicity 
objection uses considerations of simplicity not to decide among theories that equally 
well explain (or accommodate) our observational data, but rather to deny our 
observational data. And this is an illegitimate use of Ockham’s razor.
However, we cannot dismiss the simplicity objection so easily. Considerations of 
simplicity properly play a much larger role in rational inquiry than the above reply 
suggests. Consider an early astronomer observing the motions of celestial bodies across 
the sky. Perhaps he takes his direct observational data to include a large collection of 
propositions like “Altair (absolutely) moves in such-and-such pattern” and “Venus 
(absolutely) moves in so-and-so pattern.” Initially he accepts a fairly inelegant geocentric 
theory, rife with epicycles and equant points, to account for the retrograde motion of the 
planets. But eventually it dawns on him that there is a much simpler and more elegant 
heliocentric alternative on which the planets revolve around the sun along elliptical orbits 
with the sun at one of the foci. This alternative is, strictly speaking, inconsistent with 
what he took to be his data, but he notes that if he systematically revises his putative data, 
replacing attributions of absolute motion with corresponding attributions of apparent 
(observer-relative) motion, the resulting body of propositions will be consistent with, and 
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elegantly explained by, the heliocentric theory. It would be rational for our astronomer to 
revise his beliefs on matters of (putative) observational data in light of such theoretical 
considerations. Likewise, it might be rational for us to systematically revise our direct 
observational beliefs about the distribution of sensible qualities in our environment, 
retaining merely our beliefs about the apparent distribution of sensible qualities, if doing 
so would result in a significantly simpler and more elegant picture of the world.
It will not be possible to respond adequately to the causal exclusion and simplicity 
objections without saying more about how the secondary qualities are related to physical 
reality. That is the task of chapter 5. I shall therefore postpone my response to these 
objections until then.
4.7    Beyond Color
I have defended in detail the specific instance of the perceptual argument template which 
pertains to realism about color. In this section, I argue that this defense generalizes to the 
other sensible quality classes as well, with only a few minor complications.
For each major sensible quality class, we can fill in the perceptual argument 
template in the appropriate way to yield an argument in support the conclusion that we 
are justified in believing realism about that class. The issues that arise in defending the 
other instances of the perceptual argument template closely parallel the issues discussed 
in detail in §§4.5-4.6 that arise for the case of color. For example, in each case we can 
note that the qualities in question appear to be instantiated in our environment (or in our 
bodies) and that this fact gives us prima facie justification to believe they really are 
instantiated in our environment (or bodies). And in each case, there will be concerns 
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about causal exclusion and simplicity that arise at least for non-reductionist forms of 
realism about the relevant class of qualities. In many cases, there will also be skeptical 
concerns analogous to those discussed in §4.5. My responses to these worries will exactly 
parallel my responses in §§4.5.1-4.5.3 and (for causal exclusion and simplicity) in §5.3.
Are there any relevant disanalogies? In particular, are there objections to realism 
about pitch, loudness, timbre, flavor, scent, heat, cold, or other sensible qualities which 
do not have analogues in the case of color? In what follows, I consider and respond to 
three objections that might be raised to realism about other sensible qualities which do 
not have analogues in the case of color. In §4.7.1, I consider objections to realism about 
allegedly non-spatial qualities. In §4.7.2, I consider objections to realism about 
“sensational qualities,” the qualities we experience when we undergo bodily sensations. 
In §4.8, I consider an objection that alleges that modern physics undermines (something 
like) realism about shape.
4.7.1    Non-Spatial Qualities
Hume held that impressions derived from sensory modalities other than vision and touch 
are entirely non-spatial. Many contemporary philosophers agree that, at least in some 
sensory modalities, perception is non-spatial. This view is perhaps most natural for 
olfactory perception (Lycan 2000). But it is also often suggested that auditory perception 
is non-spatial as well. O’Shaughnessy (2002) writes, “We absolutely never immediately 
perceive sounds to be at any place. (Inference from auditory data being another 
thing)” (p. 446). If these claims are correct, then this suggests a potential objection to 
realism about the qualities experienced in olfactory and auditory perception. Suppose it is 
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correct that when I experience a smoky scent or a low pitch, these qualities aren’t 
experienced as instantiated at any location in my environment. It might be inferred from 
this that the relevant qualities are therefore not objective or public, perhaps on the 
Kantian grounds that spatiality is a necessary condition for objectivity (Kant 1781/1999), 
or perhaps on the grounds that it would require a significant modification of the scientific 
view of the objective world to countenance properties which are instantiated without 
being instantiated at any spatial location. And if these qualities are not instantiated in the 
objective (public) world, then realism about these qualities is false.
There are two problems with this line of argument. First, the suggestion that 
olfactory and auditory experience are non-spatial is questionable. This is especially clear 
in the case of audition. Intuitively, we hear sounds as being located in certain positions 
relative to us (O’Callaghan 2007; Pasnau 1999). If you hold your left hand out at your 
side and snap your fingers, you will distinctly experience the sound as being on your left. 
It does not seem as though we merely infer or “work out” the location of a sound event 
on the basis of the raw auditory data. Rather, we simply experience sounds as having 
certain locations, just as we visually experience objects as having certain locations—
though plausibly the locative features ascribed by auditory experience are far less 
determinate than those ascribed by visual experience. It is admittedly less 
phenomenologically obvious that olfactory experience has locative content. Nonetheless, 
there is good reason to think that olfactory experience does represent (highly non-specific 
or determinable) locative properties. Consider an ordinary experience as of a smoky odor. 
Plausibly, this olfactory experience represents a certain quality– call it “smokiness”– as 
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being instantiated “here-ish” (Batty 2010). The view can be motivated by appeal to our 
judgments about veridicality. Suppose I have an olfactory experience of exactly this sort, 
but it turns out that the relevant smoky quality is not instantiated anywhere in my vicinity, 
but is instantiated somewhere else—say, on the other side of the world. If queried, we 
would intuitively judge my olfactory experience to be non-veridical. (Admittedly, it is 
somewhat less natural to assess olfactory experiences for veridicality than it is to assess, 
say, visual or auditory experiences for veridicality. But on reflection, we can make sense 
of the notion of olfactory illusions or hallucinations, which suggests that we have a grip 
on the notion of the veridicality conditions for olfactory experiences.) But if all there is to 
the content of my olfactory experience is the information that smokiness is instantiated, 
then, since by hypothesis smokiness is instantiated (on the other side of the world), my 
experience should be veridical. Since my experience is not veridical, it follows that there 
is more information built into the content of my experience. And what could this be other 
than locative information?
The second problem with the above objection to realism concerning auditory and 
olfactory qualities is more serious: even if we grant the assumption that audition and 
olfaction are non-spatial modes of perception, realism about auditory and olfactory 
sensible qualities would not commit us to properties which are instantiated without being 
instantiated at any spatial location. It does not follow from the claim that we do not 
experience pitch or scent as being instantiated at a location that these qualities, if 
instantiated, are not instantiated at a location. Nor would their instantiation at a location 
imply that the relevant perceptual experiences are guilty of error. It is one thing for an 
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experience to lack locative content—to fail to represent a quality as having a location; it 
is another for the experience to have negative locative content—to represent a quality as 
not having a location. Even if we accept the claim that the qualities experienced in 
olfactory and auditory experience are not experienced as having a location, it is entirely 
implausible to suppose that we experience them as having no location. I see no objection 
to saying that the relevant qualities are instantiated at spatial locations in our 
environment, even if the content of our experience is entirely noncommittal about their 
locations.
4.7.2    Bodily Sensations
Consider the class of sensory experiences that might be called “bodily sensations.” 
Bodily sensations include the experience of an orgasm, the experience of a pain in your 
leg, the experience of an itch on your elbow, the experience of a tickle on your toe, and so 
forth. It is sometimes said that such experiences are “raw sensations,” experiences devoid 
of representational content, and that they therefore differ importantly from typical visual, 
auditory, and tactile experiences. Of course, everyone should allow that when we undergo 
a bodily sensation, we are aware of certain qualities, which we might call sensational 
qualities, including painful, pleasant, and itchy qualities. But according to the view in 
question, because our experiences of these qualities lack representational content, we do 
not sensorily represent these qualities as instantiated in our environment or in our bodies; 
they do not seem to us to be—we do not experience them as—instantiated in the 
objective world. If this view is correct, then sensory experience does not give us 
justification to believe that they are instantiated in the objective world.
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But the view of these experiences as “raw sensations” is highly dubious. Consider 
the itchy quality you experience when, as we say, you feel an itch in your elbow. Whether 
or not this quality is really exemplified in the region of your elbow, don’t you experience 
it as exemplified there? As you undergo the experience, doesn’t this quality seem to you 
to belong to a certain localized region in the vicinity of your elbow? And if you 
experience this quality as belonging to a certain bodily region—if it seems to you to 
belong to that bodily region—then you have prima facie justification to believe that it 
really does belong to that region. So you have prima facie justification to accept realism 
about such itchy qualities.
More generally, it seems clear that whenever we experience a sensational quality, 
we experience it as belonging to a certain bodily region or location. When a feather 
tickles my foot, the ticklish quality I experience is a quality my experience locates in my 
foot. The same holds for the pain quality I experience when a needle pricks my foot (cf. 
Cutter and Tye 2011, Hill 2009, ch. 6; Chalmers 2006, Pautz 2010a). On such occasions, 
we therefore have prima facie justification to believe that such sensational qualities are 
really instantiated in the relevant bodily regions.
Are there any reasons to reject realism about the sensational qualities beyond 
those that apply to realism about color and other secondary qualities? Here I examine one 
interesting challenge to realism about the sensational qualities from Chalmers (2006, pp. 
114-5).  I will consider the objections as it applies to pain, though analogous objections 45
are available for other sensational qualities.
 For a closely related argument with a slightly different target, see Pautz (2010a, pp. 348-9).45
 152
I invite you to pinch your arm until you feel a mild twinge of pain. Now focus on 
the painful quality—we’ll call it q—which seems to be instantiated at the location of the 
pinch. Upon reflecting on the nature of q, Chalmers claims, two facts become evident:
Q1. It is not possible for q to be instantiated without being experienced.
Q2. q is (nonetheless) intrinsic.
From Q2 it follows that q is not a response-dependent property; it cannot be identified 
with anything like the disposition to produce experiences of a certain kind. Q1 and Q2 are 
somewhat in tension with one another. Putting them together, we get the result that Q is 
“an intrinsic property that stands in a necessary connection to distinct intrinsic properties 
of experience” (p. 114). From here it can be argued that q is necessarily uninstantiated. 
Chalmers writes,
If this property could be instantiated, problems would follow. It is not clear that there 
can be necessary connections between distinct existences of this sort. It seems 
plausible that for any conceivable or possible situation in which an intrinsic property 
is instantiated in one’s ankle, it should be conceivable or possible that the property is 
instantiated in an arbitrarily different context. But it is not conceivable or possible 
that there is perfect pain without pain experience. The natural conclusion is that 
perfect pain cannot be instantiated: there is no possible world in which there is perfect 
pain, and on reflection it is not even conceivable that there is perfect pain. In effect, 
the instantiation of perfect pain places incoherent requirements on the world (p. 114).
If we understand “perfect pain” as referring to q, then we can interpret Chalmers as 
arguing for the following claim:
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Q3. If it is possible for q to be instantiated, then [since q is intrinsic] it is possible for 
q to be instantiated without being experienced.
It follows from Q1-Q3 that q is necessarily uninstantiated. Hence realism about q is false. 
The above considerations plausibly generalize to all sensational qualities, including the 
pleasant qualities experienced during orgasm or while eating a delicious strawberry, and 
the itchy quality one experiences when one’s elbow itches.
One option at this point is to simply accept the conclusion that realism about the 
sensational qualities is false. This might not be a major concession; we would not thereby 
be forced to abandon realism about most of the major sensible quality classes. However, 
this would be overly hasty. There are many possible lines of response to the above 
argument. I will limit my discussion to the option of denying Q1, though other options 
are worthy of exploration.46
Q1 admittedly enjoys some intuitive support. For rejecting it seems to commit one 
to the bizarre claim that there could be a pain that was experienced by no one at all. But 
Q1—which is equivalent to the claim that, necessarily, if q is instantiated, then q is 
experienced—is just one half of an intuition which is not friendly to irrealism, namely:
Esse est percipi (EEP): Necessarily, q is instantiated if and only if q is experienced.
EEP is supported by the intuitive thought that, (necessarily) if one seems to be in pain, 
then one is in pain; and if one is in pain, then one seems to be in pain (cf. Hill 2009, ch. 
 Incidentally, the theist has an easy response to the argument. The argument relies on the assumption that 46
if F is an intrinsic property and F is possibly instantiated, then possibly F is instantiated without being 
experienced. But this assumption will fail if there is some necessary being x such that it lies in the nature of 
x that for any property F (intrinsic or extrinsic), if F is instantiated, then x consciously experiences F as 
instantiated. It’s natural for the theist to hold that God satisfies this condition.
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6). But it’s not clear that the irrealist about sensational qualities can accept EEP. For EEP 
seems to entail that realism about q is true, assuming, what the irrealist accepts, that q is 
experienced. It is somewhat ad hoc for the irrealist to reject the EEP intuition while 
retaining the half of the intuition which is congenial to her view.
In my view, we ought to reject Q1, and with it EEP. I propose that the attraction to 
Q1 arises not from reflection on the quality we experience upon pinching ourselves. 
Rather, the attraction to Q1 arises from the intuitive thought that there cannot be a pain 
which is not experienced by anyone (just as there could not be an itch or a tickle which 
was not experienced by anyone). This thought is certainly correct in some sense, so long 
as “pain” (“itch,” “tickle”) here picks out—as it often does—a kind of experience, rather 
than the quality which our pain (itch, tickle) experiences are experiences of. For in this 
case, the claim just requires that every experience (of a certain sort) is experienced by 
someone. As Tye (1995, ch. 3) points out, taken in the right way, this is a triviality, just as 
it is a triviality that every laugh is laughed by someone and every smile is smiled by 
someone. But this triviality does not support Q1, for “q” in Q1 is stipulated to refer not to 
our pain experience, but rather to the quality that our pain experience is an experience of.
4.8    Shape and Special Relativity
Thus far I’ve focused on defending realism about the secondary qualities. Although there 
are very few irrealists about so-called primary qualities like shape, some have thought 
that modern physics casts doubt on realism the primary qualities. For example, in recent 
work, Chalmers (2006, 2012, forthcoming-a) has argued that what he calls “Edenic 
shapes”—roughly, those shape properties phenomenally presented in spatial experience, 
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and others under the same determinable—are not instantiated in our world. His argument 
is based largely on considerations of Special Relativity (SR). Edenic shapes, he 
maintains,
[…] might have been instantiated in the garden of Eden, and perhaps in a classical 
Newtonian world. But I think that there is little reason to think that they are 
instantiated in our world. Certainly, it is not easy to see how there could be Edenic 
squareness in a relativistic world. (2012, p. 333)
In this section, I defend realism about Edenic shape against Chalmers’s challenge from 
SR.
4.8.1    Edenic Content and Edenic Shape
To a first approximation, what Chalmers calls “Edenic properties” are the properties 
directly presented in the phenomenology of perceptual experience. For example, Edenic 
colors and Edenic shapes are, respectively, the colors and shapes directly presented in the 
phenomenology of color and shape experience.47
We can define the notion of an Edenic shape somewhat more precisely in terms of 
Chalmers’s notion of the “Edenic content” of experience. Edenic content has two defining 
characteristics: first, the Edenic content of an experience is a phenomenal content. The 
 Chalmers uses the “Edenic” qualifier to distinguish these properties from what he calls “ordinary” or 47
“imperfect” colors and shapes. Ordinary colors and shapes are picked out as whatever physical properties 
serve as the normal causal basis for color and shape experience. On Chalmers’s view, the properties that 
play this role in actuality are radically different from the Edenic properties presented in experience. Edenic 
properties are so-called because, according to Chalmers’s fable, they were instantiated and played 
something like this role in the Garden of Eden. (As should be clear, the non-reductive realism defended in 
this chapter and the previous two chapters concerns Edenic properties. On my view, things in the actual 
world are like things in Chalmers’s Eden.) Chalmers is a (reductive, and specifically physicalist) realist 
about ordinary shape and color and a (non-reductive) irrealist about Edenic shape and color.
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notion of phenomenal content can be defined in terms of the more familiar notions of 
phenomenal character and representational content as follows: C is a phenomenal 
content of an experience E iff necessarily, any experience with the same phenomenal 
character as E has representational content C (Chalmers 2006, pp. 50-1). The second 
defining characteristic of Edenic content is that it is Russellian, in that it has properties 
among its “constituents.” In this way, Edenic content differs from Fregean content, which 
contains senses or modes of presentation that may pick out different properties for 
different perceivers or in different environmental contexts.  The notion of a property’s 48
being a “constituent” of a content is, of course, highly theoretical. For our purposes, the 
cash value of the claim that a property F is a constituent of (“belongs to,” “figures in,”) a 
content C is this: necessarily, any experience with content C attributes F to its object. 
From here, we may define an Edenic shape as a shape property that figures in the Edenic 
content of some experience.
Chalmers rejects realism about Edenic shape (RES). We turn now to his reasons 
for doing so.
 More precisely, Chalmers suggests that Edenic content is only partially Russellian. Russellian contents, 48
as traditionally understood, are built up out of properties and concrete individuals. Chalmers suggests that 
the Edenic content of an experience is Russellian in its “predicative” components, but includes a 
demonstrative mode of presentation in place of the concrete object of the experience. The exclusion of 
concrete objects from Edenic content reflects the possibility of phenomenally identical experiences of 
different concrete objects. Plausibly, Edenic contents will also need to include indexical modes of 
presentation to pick out the subject and time of the experience as well. More on this in §4.8.3.
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4.8.2    Chalmers’s Case Against RES
Chalmers’s reasons for rejecting RES are perhaps best presented against the 
backdrop of his Lorentz-Earth thought experiment, a physically possible scenario that 
relies on the phenomenon of Lorentz contraction:49
According to the special theory of relativity, if an object is at about 0.87 times the 
speed of light relative to us, its length will contract by a factor of 2 in the direction 
of travel. [...] We can now imagine Lorentz Earth, which is a physical duplicate of 
Earth, except that it is traveling at 0.87 the speed of light relative to Earth, say, on 
the plane of its equator. Then according to special relativity, where Earth is 
roughly spherical, Lorentz Earth is compressed so that it is roughly ellipsoidal. 
(forthcoming-a, p. 19)
From here, we are to suppose that Albert is standing on the north pole of Earth looking at 
an object, O1, which we would call a “square.” Similarly, Twin Albert is standing at the 
north pole of Twin Earth looking at an object, O2, which he would call a “square,” but 
which is a 2:1 rectangle as measured from Earth’s frame of reference.
When looking at O1, Albert has a “square-ish” experience, which represents O1 as 
having a certain Edenic shape: Edenic squareness. Does O1 really have this property? 
Chalmers answers “no,” suggesting that none of the SR-friendly properties of O1 can 
plausibly be identified with Edenic squareness. His reasoning seems to run as follows. 
Given the phenomenon of Lorentz contraction, all the SR-friendly shape properties we 
 This thought experiment is originally introduced to argue that our “ordinary” (non-Edenic) shape 49
concepts are Twin-Earthable, though he also makes reference to it when arguing against RES.
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can ascribe to an object like O1 will involve relations to frames of reference. Some of 
these are properties common to O1 and O2, such as what Chalmers calls “rest-
squareness,” where something has rest-squareness just in case it is a square in the frame 
of reference in which it is at rest. Others are peculiar to O1, such as “F1-squareness”—the 
property of being a square in F1 (where F1 is Earth’s frame of reference)—which O1 has 
and O2 lacks. But, Chalmers claims, “neither seems a good match for what is directly 
presented in our categorical shape experience” (forthcoming-a, p. 22).
This is clear enough in the case of F1-squareness. Given the physical symmetry of 
Albert’s and Twin Albert’s circumstances, we may reasonably suppose that their 
experiences are phenomenally identical. Assuming that shape experience has Edenic 
content, it follows that their experiences attribute the same Edenic shape, Edenic 
squareness, to their objects. Supposing that Edenic squareness is F1-squareness therefore 
leads to the conclusion that Twin Albert’s experience attributes F1-squareness to its 
object. But that is absurd. It is incredible to suppose that Twin Albert’s experience would 
represent a property involving a relation to a reference frame to which neither he nor the 
object of his experience belongs, and relative to which he is traveling at 0.87 the speed of 
light.
Another reason to think that Edenic squareness could not be F1-squareness or 
anything like it comes from the intuition that Edenic squareness might have been 
instantiated in a classical Newtonian world, where the notion of a frame-relative shape 
has no meaningful application (2012, p. 333). This is also a reason to think that Edenic 
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squareness could not be rest-squareness or any other shape property that involves 
relations to reference frames. It appears, then, that there are no SR-friendly properties of 
O1 with which we could reasonably identify Edenic squareness. Of course, analogous 
considerations apply beyond the specific case at hand, suggesting the general conclusion 
that Edenic shapes cannot be identified with any SR-friendly shape properties.
We might reconstruct Chalmers’s case against RES in summary form as follows:
P1. The only shape properties instantiated in a relativistic world like our own involve 
relations to frames of reference (e.g. F1-squareness, rest-squareness).
P2. Edenic shapes do not involve relations to frames of reference.
C. Therefore, Edenic shapes are not instantiated in our world.
In the following section, I argue that SR, properly understood, provides no grounds for 
accepting P1.
4.8.3    A Defense of RES
Special Relativity is “first and foremost [...] a theory of the geometry of space-
time” (Maudlin 2012, p. xii). I shall argue in this section that analysis of this geometry 
reveals that that there is no more tension between RES and SR than there is between RES 
and the classical Newtonian picture of the world. Given the assumption that there is no 
tension between RES and the classical Newtonian picture—an assumption Chalmers 
concedes (2012, p. 333)—I shall conclude that there is no tension between RES and SR.
Setting aside SR, what would we intuitively what to say about the Edenic content 
of Albert’s experience? To a first approximation, we might say that Albert’s experience 
represents its object as square—not square relative to this or that frame of reference, but 
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absolutely square, where “absolute-squareness” is the sort of property an object could 
have in a Newtonian world. But there is more to the content of his experience than this. 
Even setting aside the representation of color and location, visual experience does not 
merely represent its object as having a shape; it represents its object as having a shape at 
a given time, presumably the time of experience. If at noon I have an experience of a 
lump of clay as spherical, it does not suffice for the veridicality of my experience if the 
lump is spherical at some other time. It must be spherical at noon—at the time of the 
experience. This intuitive truth about the content of shape experience reflects a truism 
about shapes themselves: shapes are properties that belong to persisting material objects 
only at or relative to a time.50
Intuitively, then, Albert’s experience (in its Edenic content) represents its object as 
being (absolutely) square at t1, where t1 is the time of experience.  In assessing whether 51
Albert’s experience could be veridical in a relativistic setting, three questions arise: (i) 
How should we understand the notion of a (moment of) time? (ii) How are we to 
understand “the time of Albert’s experience?” (iii) What is involved in a persisting 
object’s having a shape at a time? Before answering these questions within a relativistic 
setting, though, it will be instructive to consider how we would answer these questions 
 This does not mean that nothing has a shape simpliciter. It might be that momentary stages of persisting 50
things or certain three-dimensional regions of space-time have shapes simpliciter (cf. Lewis 2002). More 
on this below.
 It is probably best to think of the Edenic content of Albert’s experience as involving an indexical mode 51
of presentation (“NOW”), which functions much like a Kaplanian character (Kaplan 1989), picking out 
different times when evaluated at different contexts of experience. Given that phenomenally identical 
experiences may occur at different times, an indexical mode of presentation is needed in place of an 
individual time to ensure that Edenic content is phenomenal content (cf. footnote 48).
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within a Newtonian setting—or, rather, a neo-Newtonian setting with a Galilean space-
time.
There are two features of the intrinsic geometry of Galilean space-time of special 
significance for our purposes. The first is that it hosts a relation of absolute simultaneity 
between events or space-time points. This relation allows for a privileged foliation of 
space-time into “simultaneity hyperplanes,” understood as equivalence classes under this 
relation—or, better, mereological fusions of the members of such classes. Within Galilean 
space-time, simultaneity hyperplanes are the obvious choice for a physical structure with 
which to identify moments of time. If we make the harmless idealizing assumption that 
Albert’s experience is an instantaneous occurrence (perhaps a momentary neural event), 
we can then answer question (ii) by identifying the time of experience with the 
simultaneity hyperplane on which Albert’s experience falls.
The second important fact about Galilean space-time is that each simultaneity 
hyperplane has the topological, affine, and metrical structure of three-dimensional 
Euclidean space. An important consequence of this fact is that the geometric structure of 
a given simultaneity hyperplane licenses the description of certain of its subregions as 
spherical, others as square, others as 2:1 rectangles, and so forth. To give the flavor of 
how this will go: if we let D be a metric function that adequately represents the objective 
metrical structure of a simultaneity hyperplane h, then a three-dimensional subregion R 
of h is a (closed) sphere iff there is there is a point p on h and a constant k such that for all 
q on h, q belongs to R iff D(p, q) ≤ k.
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Persisting objects in Galilean space-time can be associated with a four-
dimensional region representing the object’s path through space-time, which we’ll call its 
“world path.”  Let us call the region that results from intersecting the world path of a 52
persisting object x with a given time (simultaneity hyperplane) t “the region x occupies at 
t.” Turning to question (iii)—what is involved in a persisting object’s having a shape at a 
time—the foregoing suggests the following principle:
Correspondence : The shape a persisting object x has at a time t is the shape of the 
region that x occupies at t.
Correspondence has a great deal of intuitive support. Intuitively, a persisting lump of clay 
is spherical at a given time if and only if the region occupied by the lump at that time is 
spherical. It seems incoherent, for example, to suppose that a lump of clay is spherical at 
a time t but the region it occupies at t is cubical.
One might object to Correspondence on the grounds that shapes as they apply to 
persisting objects seem to be dyadic properties—in particular, dyadic relations to times—
whereas shapes as they apply to subregions of simultaneity hyperplanes seem to be 
monadic. One response to this objection is to deny that shapes as they apply to regions 
are monadic. Perhaps a spherical region is best described as spherical at the time of which 
it is a subregion. Another response is to deny that shapes as they apply to persisting 
objects are dyadic. Perhaps persisting objects and spatial regions can have the same 
 I use “world path” in place of the more familiar term “world line” because the latter carries the 52
suggestion that the relevant paths are without spatial thickness. Note that the association of objects with 
world paths is officially neutral between endurantist and perdurantist views on the persistence of objects. 
An endurantist will say that a persisting object is exactly and wholly present at each time slice of the 
object’s world path, whereas a perdurandist will say that an object is exactly and wholly present only at the 
world path itself, and only partially present at each time slice.
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monadic property, but in different ways: where a region simply has sphericality (say), a 
persisting object has-at-t sphericality (cf. Johnston 1987). A third response (which I 
somewhat prefer) is to deny the objection’s implicit assumption that a single property 
cannot be both monadic and dyadic. A sufficient condition on F’s being a monadic 
property is that something has F simpliciter. A sufficient condition on F’s being a dyadic 
property is that something has F relative to something. Why suppose that nothing could 
satisfy both these conditions? (I suspect that the assumption that no property could be 
both monadic and dyadic is an artifact of taking too seriously the “slot” picture of adicity, 
on which an n-place property is pictured as having exactly n “slots” to be filled by 
objects. Since it would be a contradiction for something to have both exactly one and 
exactly two slots, we are tempted to think that no property could be both monadic and 
dyadic. But we should not take the “slot” picture of acidity so seriously.)
Let us now consider questions (i)-(iii) from the standpoint of SR. Question (i) is 
somewhat more complicated within a relativistic setting. As is well known, Minkowski 
space-time (the space-time for SR) does not feature a relation of absolute simultaneity 
with which we might construct simultaneity hyperplanes. But the intrinsic geometry of 
Minkowski space-time does allow us to pick out a special class of hyper-surfaces known 
as “space-like hyperplanes.”  A space-like hyperplane is equivalent to a maximal 53
collection of events or space-time points that are simultaneous in some inertial frame. 
 The situation is somewhat more complicated in the context of General Relativity, where there is no 53
guarantee that a given event falls on any space-like hyperplanes. For the purposes of this essay I restrict my 
attention to Special Relativity.
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Within Minkowski space-time, space-like hyperplanes are the most natural physical 
structure with which to identify moments of time.54
Question (ii) is also more complicated within a relativistic setting. Even under the 
idealizing assumption that Albert’s experience corresponds to a single “event” or space-
time point, the task of specifying the time of Albert’s experience is complicated by the 
fact that every event within Minkowski space-time falls along infinitely many mutually 
intersecting space-like hyperplanes. Despite these complications, a natural answer to (ii) 
suggests itself: the time of Albert’s experience is that space-like hyperplane the events on 
which are all simultaneous with respect to Albert’s own frame of reference.55
When we turn to question (iii), however, the transition to Minkowski space-time 
from Galilean space-time does not affect matters at all. This is because the intrinsic 
geometrical structure of a time (space-like hyperplane) in Minkowski space-time is 
exactly the same as that of a time (simultaneity hyperplane) in Galilean space-time. Both 
have the geometrical structure of a three-dimensional Euclidean space. The metrical 
structure of a space-like hyperplane is described by what is called the Invariant 
Relativistic Interval, so-called because its magnitude between any pair of points is frame-
 Times understood as space-like hyperplanes will have some strange features. Because distinct space-like 54
hyperplanes can intersect one another, any given event or space-time point will fall along infinitely many 
times, so understood. Another strange feature of times understood as space-like hyperplanes is that there 
will be no objectively distinguished linear ordering of times. This is a consequence of the fact that there is 
no privileged way of ordering a given pair of intersecting space-like hyperplanes with respect to “before” 
and “after.” These are strange consequences of the identification of times with space-like hyperplanes, but 
they are derivative upon the strangeness of Minkowski space-time itself.
 For simplicity, I assume that Albert occupies an inertial frame.55
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invariant. When restricted to a space-like hyperplane, it is formally equivalent to a metric 
function on three-dimensional Euclidean space.56
As in Galilean space-time, we can associate ordinary persisting objects in 
Minkowski space-time with four-dimensional world paths. As before, we will call the 
region that results from intersecting the world path of a persisting object x with a given 
time (space-like hyperplane) t “the region x occupies at t.” We can therefore answer 
question (iii) just as we did before, with our Correspondence principle. In other words, in 
Minkowski space-time, as in Galilean space-time, the shape of a persisting object at a 
time is the shape of the region it occupies at that time. Now, the world path of an object x 
is not a frame-relative matter. (Observers in different reference frames might disagree on 
how to slice up its world path into “simultaneity slices,” but they will not disagree on 
which space-time points belong to the world path.) Nor, given some space-like 
hyperplane t, is it a frame relative matter which region x occupies at t. And crucially, it is 
not a frame-relative matter what shape that region has, at least inasmuch as the shape of a 
region is part of its objective physical structure. As we’ve seen, the shape of a three- (or 
fewer-) dimensional subregion of a space-like hyperplane is furnished by the Interval, an 
objective, frame-invariant magnitude. It follows, given our Correspondence principle and 
the identification of times with space-like hyperplanes, that within Minkowski space-time, 
 The interval between space-time points p and q is represented in any Lorentz coordinate system by the 56
equation I(p,q) = √((X(p) − X(q))2 + (Y(p) − Y(q))2 + (Z(p) − Z(q))2 − (T(p) − T(q))2). Here X, Y , Z, and 
T are functions mapping space-time points to coordinate values. The points constituting a space-like 
hyperplane are those that have the same T value in some Lorentz coordinate system. Where p and q have 
the same T value in a given coordinate system, the equation for the Interval between p and q reduces to 
√((X(p) − X(q))2 + (Y(p) − Y(q))2 + (Z(p) − Z(q))2), the form of a metric function on three-dimensional 
Euclidean space.
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the shape an object has at a time is not a frame-relative matter. An object’s shape at a 
time does not involve any relations to reference frames, for it is a property that may be 
possessed by objects in a Galilean space-time, where the notion of a frame-relative shape 
has no meaningful application. I conclude that P1 in the above argument against RES is 
false.
Then what of the familiar claim that, in SR, the length of an object is frame-
relative, or its corollary, that the shape of an object is frame-relative? It turns out that the 
alleged frame-relativity of shape in SR amounts to nothing more than the truism that 
objects have different shapes at different times, something we knew to be possible well 
before Einstein. We may illustrate this point by reference to Chalmers’s Lorentz- Earth 
scenario. Albert measures (and experiences) O1 to be a square. Twin Albert, relative to 
whom O1 is traveling at 0.87 the speed of light, measures O1 to be a 2:1 rectangle. On the 
above proposal, the “time of Albert’s experience” is a space-like hyperplane t1 on which 
Albert’s experience falls and whose constituent points are all simultaneous relative to 
Albert’s frame of reference. In the scenario we’ve described, the world path of O1 will 
carve out a square-shaped region from t1—a two-dimensional four-sided region with 
equal angles and sides, as measured by the Interval. Given our Correspondence principle, 
this means that O1 is square at t1. But the world path of O1 cuts through other times 
besides t1. One such time, which partially overlaps t1, is t2: the space-like hyperplane on 
which Twin Albert’s experience falls and whose constituent points are all simultaneous 
relative to Twin Albert’s frame of reference. The region that O1’s world path carves out 
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from t2 is a 2:1 rectangle rather than a square. Given our Correspondence principle, this 
means that O2 is a 2:1 rectangle at t2. Here we simply have a case of one thing having 
different shapes at different (albeit overlapping) times, something which happens in 
Newtonian worlds as well (though of course distinct times never overlap in Newtonian 
worlds). The shape of an object is frame-relative in SR only in the sense that the class of 
times one cares about (the class of times relative to which both experience and standard 
measuring equipment represents the shapes of things) is determined by one’s frame of 
reference.
It follows from what has been said that Albert’s and Twin Albert’s experiences are 
veridical. As I’ve suggested, Albert’s experience, considered in terms of its Edenic 
content, represents O1 as being (absolutely) square at the time of the experience. As 
we’ve seen, O1 is (absolutely) square at the time of his experience; it is square at the time 
of experience in the same sense in which an object might be square at a time in a classical 
Newtonian world. So it appears that his experience, considered in terms of its Edenic 
content, is veridical. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for Twin Albert’s experience. I 
conclude that Edenic shapes are just as much at home in our own relativistic world as 
they are in a classical Newtonian world. SR provides no reason to reject realism about 
Edenic shape.
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4.9    The Argument from Phenomenal Relationism
I conclude this chapter with one further argument for realism, which I call the argument 
from phenomenal relationism. Like the argument (template) in §4.3, the argument from 
phenomenal relationism applies to every major class of sensible qualities.
Many have observed that the sensible qualities seem to stand in an intimate, 
constitutive relation to phenomenal properties. In particular—restricting our attention to 
sensory phenomenology—having an experience with a given phenomenal character 
seems to be a matter of standing in a certain relation to a sensible quality or complex of 
sensible qualities, a relation which might variously be called “sensory awareness,” 
“sensory acquaintance,” or “sensory representation.” More precisely, we can say that for 
any sensory phenomenal property P, there is some sensible quality (or complex of 
sensible qualities) Q such that what it is to have P is to be sensorily aware of Q. If we 
consider a highly specific or detailed phenomenal property, such as the complex 
phenomenal property that characterizes your total current sensory phenomenology, then 
the relevant instance of Q will be a rich complex of sensible qualities.  On the other 57
hand, for highly general phenomenal properties, such as “phenomenal reddishness,” the 
relevant instance of Q may be an individual sensible quality, such as redness.
The view espoused here, that (sensory) phenomenology consists in a relation of 
phenomenal awareness to (something in the vicinity of) sensible qualities or sensible-
 Some will prefer an alternative on which these determinate phenomenal properties consist in a relation to 57
structured propositional contents. So long as these propositional contents of experience are taken to involve 
sensible qualities, then such philosophers will agree that phenomenal properties constitutively involve 
relations to sensible qualities, which is the important point for my purposes.
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quality complexes is sometimes called relationism about sensory phenomenology, and 
has a wide following among contemporary philosophers of mind (Campbell 1993, 
Johnston 2004, Chalmers 2006, Pautz 2009, Byrne 2009, Tye 2014). In my view, the 
relation in question is an intentional relation. By this I mean that when a subject stands in 
this relation to a quality, the subject, or her experience, may be said to (sensorily) 
“attribute” or “ascribe” that quality to the object of her experience—to (sensorily) 
represent the object as having that quality. The subject, or her experience, may then be 
described as veridically representing that object just in case the object has the quality in 
question (cf. Chalmers 2006, Pautz 2009, Tye 2014). For convenience I will presuppose 
this intentional conception of phenomenal awareness in what follows, but what I say 
should be adaptable to other relationist theories, e.g. versions of direct realism that 
construe the relation of phenomenal awareness in non-intentional terms.
Loosely speaking, relationism about sensory phenomenology (hereafter 
“phenomenal relationism”) is the converse of the relationist theories of sensible qualities 
discussed above. A relationist about color might hold, for example, that what it is to be 
red is to bear a certain relation to phenomenal reddishness, (e.g. the dyadic relation 
expressed by the open sentence “x is disposed to cause normal perceivers to [have 
experiences which] instantiate y in normal viewing conditions”), where phenomenal 
reddishness may be construed as an intrinsic phenomenal property of subjects (or their 
experiences). By contrast, a phenomenal relationist will hold that what it is for a subject 
to undergo phenomenal reddishness is to bear a certain relation to redness. Intuitively, it 
is phenomenal relationism that has things the right way around. Color (shape, loudness, 
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pitch...) seems to be intrinsic and non-relational, whereas color (shape, loudness, 
pitch . . .) experience seems essentially to relate us to objects and qualities beyond 
ourselves.
Many irrealists about the secondary qualities embrace phenomenal relationism 
(Chalmers 2006; Pautz 2011, ms.). But phenomenal relationism creates formidable 
difficulties for irrealism. For it apparently follows from irrealism that we do not bear any 
ordinary physical or functional relations to the secondary qualities. For example, we do 
not bear any causal or informational relations to them; our internal states do not “track” 
or causally co-vary with exemplifications of secondary qualities. So it is not clear where 
the irrealist about the secondary qualities would even begin in trying to give an 
explanation, whether reductive or non-reductive, of how we come to sensorily represent 
these qualities. By contrast, if realism is true and the secondary qualities are instantiated 
in the world more or less as they seem to be, then we bear various interesting physical, 
causal, and informational relations to them. We therefore have the materials to at least 
begin to venture explanations of how we come to sensorily represent a given secondary 
quality. For example, it is natural to suggest that we come to be aware of certain sensible 
qualities in virtue of standing in broadly informational, or informational-cum-
teleological, relations to them (Millikan 1984, Fodor 1987, Dretske 1988, Tye 1995). 
Some simplistic suggestions, which are surely overly simplistic but are plausibly on the 
right track, include the relation expressed by the open sentence “x is undergoing some 
state or other which causally co-varies under normal conditions with exemplifications of 
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y” or “x is undergoing some state or other which has the biological function of indicating 
that y is exemplified.”
Although proposals of this kind are typically associated with reductive theories of 
sensory awareness, the points above hold whether one is aiming for a reductive 
explanation of our phenomenal awareness of sensible qualities or a non-reductive 
explanation. On a reductive view, we might simply identify the relation of phenomenal 
awareness with (some refinement of) one of the broadly informational relations 
mentioned above. On a non-reductive view, we might say that phenomenal awareness is 
grounded in, but not identical to, some such relation. Alternatively, dualist phenomenal 
relationists like Chalmers and Pautz might use some such relation R to formulate the 
psychophysical laws governing our phenomenal awareness of sensible qualities. It might 
be suggested, for example, that the fundamental psychophysical law governing sensory 
phenomenology takes something like the following form: for all individuals x and 
qualities q, x is phenomenally aware of q iff xRq.
Again, the above suggestions are obviously simplistic and in need of various 
refinements. The point is that, given realism about the sensible qualities, we stand in 
various natural relations to sensible qualities in terms of which sensory phenomenology 
might be explained, either reductively or non-reductively. We can therefore at least begin 
to develop proposals and subject them to progressive refinements. On the other hand, 
with an irrealist starting point, one has no idea even where to begin in offering an 
explanation, whether reductive or non-reductive, of how we come to be phenomenally 
acquainted with the various sensible qualities.
 172
Kant (1783/2004) famously derided the realist view that sensory experience 
presents us with objects as they are in themselves, saying, “[I]t is incomprehensible how 
the intuition of a thing that is present should allow me to cognize it the way it is in itself, 
since its properties cannot migrate over into my power of representation” (p. 34). I hope 
the above discussion makes clear that this objection gets matters backwards. We can at 
least begin to comprehend how properties that feature in our environment, to which we 
therefore stand in various natural relations, might come to be sensorily represented. What 
is incomprehensible is rather how qualities to which we bear no natural relations at all 
should find their way into our “power of representation.”
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Chapter 5: Russellian Monism about the Secondary Qualities
5.1    The Non-Reductive Realist’s Dilemma
In the last chapter, I mentioned, and set aside, two objections to a non-reductive realist 
view of the secondary qualities. The first was the causal-exclusion objection, which runs 
roughly as follows: if realism about the secondary qualities is true, then the secondary 
qualities have causal relevance. If the secondary qualities have causal relevance, then 
they must be identical to physical properties, in which case reductionism is true. 
Therefore, if realism is true, then reductionism is false. Equivalently, non-reductive 
realism is false.
The second objection was the objection from simplicity: the non-reductive realist 
is committed to a significantly more metaphysically complex world than the reductionist 
or the irrealist. Considerations of parsimony therefore favor reductionism or irrealism 
over non-reductive realism.
As I mentioned in §4.6, it is not possible to give an adequate reply to these 
objections without answering what I’ll call the question of integration: how do the 
secondary qualities relate to, or integrate into, physical reality? It is the primary task of 
this section develop and defend a particular answer to this question.
One initially attractive answer to the question of integration is given by the 
following thesis:
Qualitative Grounding: Instantiations of secondary qualities are grounded in 
instantiations of physical properties.
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“Grounded in” here expresses the converse of the relation of metaphysical grounding, 
familiar from the writings of Kit Fine (2001), Jonathan Schaffer (2009), Gideon Rosen 
(2010), and others (cf. §3.5.2). Officially, I’ll take grounding to be a relation between a 
collection of facts (the facts doing the grounding) and an individual fact (the grounded 
fact). For definiteness, I will take facts to be true propositions, but other conceptions of 
facts (e.g. one on which facts are more like concrete states of affairs) would serve our 
purposes just as well. An “instantiation of” a property F should be understood as a fact 
consisting in something’s having F. In order to keep my sentences readable and down to a 
reasonable length, I’ll sometimes speak in terms of one property grounding another. But 
this should always be taken as an abbreviated way of saying that an instantiation of the 
one property grounds an instantiation of the other.
For our purposes, there are two important features of the grounding relation. First, 
grounding entails metaphysical necessitation. That is, if facts A1…An ground a fact B, 
then it’s metaphysically necessary that if A1…An obtain, then B obtains. It is therefore a 
consequence of Qualitative Grounding that the secondary qualities supervene with 
metaphysical necessity on physical properties. The second important fact about 
grounding is that grounding claims entail a corresponding “because” claim. That is, if 
A1…An ground B, it follows that B obtains because A1 … An obtain. The relevant notion 
of grounding here is what’s sometimes called “full” or “total” grounding. It’s going to be 
convenient later on to have at our disposal a derivative notion of partial grounding. 
Partial grounding may be defined in terms of full grounding in the expected way, namely: 
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a fact A partially grounds a fact B iff A belongs to some collection of facts which fully 
ground B.
As others have noted, the objections from causal exclusion and simplicity do not 
have much bite against a version of non-reductive realism that endorses Qualitative 
Grounding. Qualitative Grounding defangs the objection from causal exclusion because, 
as many have observed (especially in response to analogous objections to non-reductive 
physicalist theories of mental properties), supervenient properties aren’t generally 
excluded from causal relevance by subvening properties (Campbell 1993; Yablo 1992, 
1995, Tye 2000; Byrne and Hilbert 2007). Consider the following case (identical in form 
but not in content to an example from Yablo 1995, pp. 486-7): John’s body is so 
constituted that he always perspires when the room is 85 degrees or hotter—to 
abbreviate, when the room is “hot.” The current temperature of the room is just over 85 
degrees—to abbreviate, it is “barely hot.” The room’s being barely hot is nomically 
sufficient in the circumstances for John’s perspiring. But the room’s bare hotness does not 
exclude its hotness from causal relevance. Indeed, although we could explain John’s 
perspiring by citing either property, if we had to pick one, we should cite the supervenient 
property of being hot, not the subvening property of being barely hot. For the former is, 
as Yablo says, “commensurate with the effect, in the sense of including what the effect 
needed with a minimum of irrelevant extras (p. 487). John would still have perspired if 
the room hadn’t been barely hot, so long as it had still been hot. Likewise, if secondary 
qualities supervene on physical properties, then it would appear that the former, far from 
being “screened off” by the latter, are often in a better position to explain why objects 
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appear the way they do. As Campbell (1993) puts the point, although the microphysical 
properties of an object may be nomically sufficient in a given circumstance for its looking 
red, “the explanation in terms of redness adds modal data to a description of the physical 
sequence. It says that in nearby worlds in which the physical character of the thing was 
varied but its redness maintained, an experience of redness was still the upshot.” (p. 263, 
cf. Watkins 2005).
Qualitative Grounding also defangs the simplicity objection because, plausibly, 
supervenient properties do not increase the metaphysical complexity of a world in any 
sense of “metaphysical complexity” relevant to theory choice. Consider just about any 
property expressed by a predicate of English, e.g. the property of being a cat, the property 
of being a paint can, or the property of being clumsy. It is highly unlikely that we can 
give reductive analyses of any of these properties in the vocabulary of the physical 
sciences. A reductive definition of a property minimally specifies some non-trivial 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the instantiation of that property. And it should not 
come as news to philosophers of this generation that it is very difficult to give non-trivial 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the instantiation of just about any property, much 
less necessary and sufficient conditions that satisfy whatever other requirements there 
may be on reductive definitions. But of course, even if it turns out that there are no 
reductive definitions of such properties, realism about cats, paint cans, and clumsy 
individuals is not on that account metaphysically inflationary, at least not in any 
objectionable sense. Plausibly this is because these properties, while not reducible to 
physical properties, nonetheless are grounded in or supervene on physical properties.
 177
Given that Qualitative Grounding defangs the objections from causal exclusion 
and simplicity, it is no surprise that non-reductive realists tend to endorse Qualitative 
Grounding (Campbell 1993, McGinn 1996, Watkins 2005, Yablo 1995). But there is a 
problem with Qualitative Grounding which non-reductive realists have not squarely 
faced: it seems to be false. As many have observed, there is a close analogy between 
secondary qualities and phenomenal properties on this point (cf. Johnston 1996, Byrne 
2006, Shoemaker 2003, Campbell 1993). Secondary qualities resist integration into the 
“scientific image” of the world much as phenomenal consciousness does. The connection 
between the physical properties of an object and its secondary qualities has at least an 
appearance of contingency, much like the connection between the physical properties of 
a conscious organism and its phenomenal or experiential properties. Just as a complete 
physical description of a human perceiver, on an occasion of viewing a ripe tomato, 
seems to be consistent with a range of alternative hypotheses about her phenomenology 
(e.g. that she’s having a phenomenally reddish experience, that she’s having a 
phenomenally greenish experience, or that she’s having no experience at all), so too the 
complete physical description of a ripe tomato seems to be consistent with a range of 
alternative hypotheses about its color (e.g. that it’s red, that it’s green, or that it has no 
color at all).
Of course, the non-reductive realist can declare this appearance of contingency an 
illusion of contingency. But this blunt response is inadvisable, for at least two reasons. 
First, the principal advantage of non-reductive realism over its reductionist and irrealist 
rivals lies in its respect for appearances. Such a declaration would undermine the non-
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reductive realist’s theoretical advantage, especially relative to the irrealist, who after all 
can readily accept these apparent modal truths. Second, the relevant modal appearances 
seem to belong to the same broad class as the second-order appearances leveraged against 
the reductionist in chapters 2 and 3. Like the latter appearances, the former appearances 
pertain to the nature of the sensible qualities in some broad sense.  If these modal 58
appearances are systematically deceptive, the broader class of appearances to which they 
belong are called into doubt, thus vitiating the case against reductionism.
Hence, the non-reductive realist faces a dilemma: accept Qualitative Grounding 
and systematically flout modal appearances, or deny Qualitative Grounding and fall prey 
to the objections from causal exclusion and simplicity. In the following section, I develop 
and defend a model of the relation between secondary qualities and the physical inspired 
by Russellian Monist views on the mind-body problem which resolves this dilemma for 
non-reductive realism.
5.2    Secondary Quality Russellian Monism
In this section, I begin by characterizing Rusellian Monism, a view about the relationship 
between phenomenal consciousness and the physical inspired by ideas in Russell’s The 
Analysis of Matter and other works. My characterization will not be overly concerned 
with the details of Russell’s own view(s), but with articulating a distinctive position on 
the phenomenal-physical relation on which there is rough agreement among philosophers 
 Indeed, the relevant class of apparent modal truths is probably best considered a subclass of the apparent 58
second-order truths about the secondary qualities, as the former are equivalent to predications of modal 
properties to secondary qualities, e.g. “the color yellow is possibly uninstantiated by something with such-
and-such physical property.” (I.e. λF♢∃y[y has such-and-such physical property and y does not have 
F])Yellowness.)
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in the Russellian Monist tradition (Eddington 1928, Maxwell 1979, Lockwood 1989, 
Stoljar 2001, Strawson 2006, Montero 2010, Chalmers forthcoming-b). After 
characterizing the Russellian Monist view of the phenomenal-physical relation, I 
introduce an analogous view of the relation between secondary qualities and the physical. 
Although the Russellian Monist framework was originally designed to account for the 
former relation, I argue that it is much better suited to account for the latter relation. 
Finally, I show how my proposed Russellian-Monist-inspired view resolves the dilemma 
described above for non-reductive realism.
At the foundation of Russellian Monism is the observation, due to Russell (1927), 
Eddington (1928), and others, that physics characterizes matter in terms of its relational 
structure, but does not reveal its intrinsic nature. In other words, physics characterizes the 
fundamental physical entities in terms of their relations to other things, including their 
spatiotemporal and causal relations to other things, but physics doesn’t tell us how the 
fundamental physical entities are intrinsically. It’s true that physics tells us that the 
fundamental physical entities have certain properties like mass and charge. But such 
attributions just amount to more relational information—in particular, information about 
their causal relations to other things. After all, it seems that the cash value of the claim 
that something has mass is just that it resists acceleration, attracts other massive things, 
and so forth. But this is just information about how it is disposed to affect and be affected 
by other things. We might put the point by saying that physics tells us about the causal 
dispositions of the fundamental physical entities, but does not tell us which intrinsic 
qualities serve as the categorical bases for these causal dispositions. Or, to put the point 
 180
within a somewhat different theoretical framework, we might say that physics tells us 
about the second-order role properties of the fundamental physical entities—for instance, 
that a given particle has some property or other that plays the “mass role,” a role which is 
characterized in great detail and mathematical precision—but it gives us no insight into 
which first-order properties occupy these causal roles.59
Let’s use the term “quiddity” for these unknown qualities of matter. That is, the 
“quiddities” are those properties which serve as the categorical bases for the basic causal 
dispositions characterized by physics, or (alternatively) the properties that occupy the 
causal roles associated with the basic theoretical terms of physics. For now, let’s take for 
granted that there are quiddities. (Later we’ll return to the question of whether this is a 
warranted assumption.) If there are quiddities, the question arises: are quiddities physical 
properties? On the one hand, physics is supposed to be silent about them, which suggests 
that we should not count them as physical properties. On the other hand, they are 
properties of the fundamental physical entities and serve as the grounds for the 
dispositional/relational properties that physics attributes to the fundamental physical 
entities, which suggests that perhaps we should count them as physical properties.
The question seems to be verbal, not substantive. We can resolve it by simply 
distinguishing two senses of the term “physical property.” Following Chalmers’s 
(forthcoming-b) helpful terminology, we’ll say that physical properties in the narrow 
 This foundational idea of Russellian Monism is closely related to what Frank Jackson (1998, p. 23) calls 59
“Kantian physicalism”—“a large part (possibly all) of the intrinsic nature of our world is irretrievably 
beyond our reach”—and what David Lewis (2009) calls “Ramseyan humility”: “We are irremediably 
ignorant about the identities of the fundamental properties that figure in the actual realization of the true 
final theory” (p. 214).
 181
sense, or narrowly physical properties, exclude quiddities, and include only the 
relational/structural properties in terms of which physics characterizes matter, including 
spatiotemporal properties/relations and the causal dispositions (or second-order role 
properties) associated with mass, charge, etc. And we’ll say that physical properties in the 
broad sense, or broadly physical properties, include quiddities, as well as all the narrowly 
physical properties.
How is the idea that we are ignorant of the intrinsic, qualitative nature of matter 
relevant to the mind-body problem? Well, it has often been assumed that physical reality 
has an intrinsic nature different from and incongruous with the nature of consciousness 
and that the latter therefore cannot be a physical phenomenon. The Russellian Monist 
contends, to the contrary, that given the abstract and structural character of our 
knowledge of physical reality, this assumption is unfounded. As Russell (1949) says, 
“The physical world is only known as regards certain abstract features of its space-time 
structure—features which, because of their abstractness, do not suffice to show whether 
the physical world is, or is not, different in intrinsic character from the world of mind” (p. 
240). Because physics doesn’t tell us what the quiddities are like, it is tempting to 
suppose that the qualitative character of experience is somehow continuous with or 
grounded in the quiddities. As Chalmers (1996) says, echoing Russell (1927, pp. 382-93) 
and Eddington (1928, pp. 258-60):
There is only one class of intrinsic, non-relational property with which we have 
any direct familiarity, and that is the class of phenomenal properties. It is natural 
to speculate that there may be some relation or even overlap between the 
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uncharacterized intrinsic properties of physical reality, and the familiar properties 
of experience (pp. 153-4).
In this way, our ignorance of the nature of the quiddities has been taken to suggest the 
core claim of Russellian Monism: that the quiddities of which physics leaves us ignorant 
play an important role in the explanation of phenomenal consciousness.60
In order to give a more precise definition of Russellian Monism, it will be helpful 
to introduce two versions of the “physicalist” thesis that phenomenal consciousness is 
grounded in the physical:
Narrow Phenomenal Grounding: Instantiations of phenomenal properties are 
grounded in instantiations of narrowly physical properties.
Broad Phenomenal Grounding: Instantiations of phenomenal properties are 
grounded in instantiations of broadly physical properties.
Note that because the narrowly physical properties are a subset of the broadly physical 
properties, Narrow Phenomenal Grounding entails Broad Phenomenal Grounding but not 
vice versa.
From here, we can define Russellian Monism (about phenomenal properties) as 
the conjunction of Broad Phenomenal Grounding with the denial of Narrow Phenomenal 
Grounding. That is, the Russellian Monist holds that instantiations of phenomenal 
properties are grounded in instantiations of broadly physical properties, but not (wholly) 
 Cf. Pereboom’s (2011) characterization of Russellian Monism: “Russellian Monism is any view that 60
combines [...] the claim that physics, or at least current physics, leaves us ignorant of certain categorical 
bases of physical dispositional properties, with [...] the proposal that these categorical properties have a 
significant role in explaining consciousness or experience” (p. 89).
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in instantiations of narrowly physical properties. It is therefore a consequence of 
Russellian Monism that the quiddities play an essential role in the explanation of 
phenomenal consciousness.
Although it won’t be included in the official definition of Russellian Monism, it is 
common for Russellian Monists to endorse something like the following:
Broad Phenomenal Scrutability: There is an intelligible or a priori connection 
between information about the distribution of broadly physical properties and 
information about the distribution of phenomenal properties.
It is a familiar point that an intelligible or a priori connection is wanting between the 
scientific description of a conscious organism and its phenomenal properties. The 
Russellian Monist has a natural diagnosis of this explanatory gap: the physical sciences 
only characterize things in terms of their narrowly physical features; as there is a genuine 
“ontological” gap between the the narrowly physical features of a conscious organism 
and its phenomenal properties, an explanatory gap here is to be expected. But there is no 
ontological gap between the broadly physical features of a conscious organism and its 
phenomenal properties, so we may reasonably suppose that there is an intelligible or a 
priori connection between them. 
Hereafter I shall call the Russellian Monist position on the phenomenal-physical 
relation Phenomenal Russellian Monism (PRM), to distinguish it from the analogous 
position on the relation between secondary qualities and the physical, which I shall call 
Secondary Quality Russellian Monism (SQRM). In order to define SQRM, we’ll need to 
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define counterparts to Narrow Phenomenal Grounding and Broad Phenomenal Grounding 
for the secondary qualities:
Narrow Qualitative Grounding: Instantiations of secondary qualities are grounded 
in instantiations of narrowly physical properties.
Broad Qualitative Grounding: Instantiations of secondary qualities are grounded in 
instantiations of broadly physical properties.
SQRM can then be defined as the conjunction of Broad Qualitative Grounding with the 
denial of Narrow Qualitative Grounding.
Again, although it won’t be included in the official definition of SQRM, it is 
natural for the proponent of SQRM to endorse something like the following:
Broad Qualitative Scrutability: There is an intelligible or a priori connection 
between information about the distribution of broadly physical properties and 
information about the distribution of secondary qualities.
The apparent contingency discussed in §5.1 between an object’s scientific description and 
its secondary qualities is closely related to the absence of an intelligible or a priori 
connection from the former to the latter. As before, the proponent of SQRM has a ready 
diagnosis of this explanatory gap: the physical sciences only reveal the narrowly physical 
features of objects. Between these and the secondary qualities there is a genuine 
contingency, an “ontological gap,” so an apparent contingency or explanatory gap is to be 
expected. But there is no ontological gap between an object’s broadly physical properties 
and its secondary qualities. We may therefore reasonably suppose that there is an 
intelligible or a priori connection between the broadly physical features of an object and 
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its secondary qualities. More precisely, since a priori entailment is not, strictly speaking, 
a relation between properties but a relation between properties-under-concepts (or modes 
of presentation), we should say that there is an a priori entailment between an object’s 
broadly physical properties conceived under revelatory or nature-revealing concepts and 
its secondary qualities conceived in the standard way.  Of course, we are not in 61
possession of revelatory concepts of the quiddities. So we aren’t in a position to 
apprehend the a priori connection that exists between the broadly physical features of an 
object and its secondary qualities, just as a creature lacking adequate geometric concepts 
could not apprehend the a priori connection that exists between the fine-grained 
geometric properties of a slab of marble and its smoothness. But if Broad Qualitative 
Scrutability is true, it would be clear to a Laplacian intelligence who had insight into the 
natures of the quiddities that any object with such-and-such broadly physical properties 
must have so-and-so secondary qualities. 
5.3    The Non-reductive Realist’s Dilemma Revisited
In §5.1 the non-reductive realist was presented with a dilemma: accept Qualitative 
Grounding and contradict modal appearances, or deny Qualitative Grounding and fall 
prey to the objections from causal exclusion and simplicity. SQRM resolves this dilemma 
by accepting Qualitative Grounding with respect to broadly physical properties (Broad 
 Chalmers (2005) characterizes a revelatory concept as, intuitively, “a property-concept such that 61
possessing the concept puts one in a position to know (through a priori reflection) what the property is.” 
Within the framework of epistemic two-dimensionalism, revelatory concepts will be epistemically rigid 
property-concepts, concepts whose primary intensions pick out the same property in each scenario, in 
contrast with epistemically non-rigid concepts such as water, whose primary intensions pick out different 
properties in different scenarios.
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Qualitative Grounding) and denying Qualitative Grounding with respect to narrowly 
physical properties (Narrow Qualitative Grounding). That is, SQRM maintains that 
instantiations of secondary qualities are grounded in the distribution of broadly physical 
properties, but not (wholly) grounded in the distribution of narrowly physical properties. 
Plausibly, whatever apparent contingency exists between the physical properties of an 
object and its secondary qualities concerns its narrowly physical properties. As we have 
no insight into the natures of broadly physical properties beyond the horizon of the 
narrowly physical, we cannot say that broadly physical properties either seem to be, or 
seem not to be, modally independent of the secondary qualities. It is therefore only 
Narrow Qualitative Grounding, not Broad Qualitative Grounding, that conflicts with 
modal appearances. By denying Narrow Grounding, SQRM affirms the apparent modal 
truths.
Moreover, by accepting Broad Qualitative Grounding, SQRM overcomes the 
objections from causal exclusion and simplicity. As we’ve seen, properties that supervene 
on other causally efficacious properties are generally not excluded from causal relevance. 
Quiddities, if they exist, are causally efficacious par excellence. SQRM’s commitment to 
Broad Qualitative Grounding entails that secondary qualities supervene on broadly 
physical properties, including quiddities, so epiphenomenalism about the secondary 
qualities does not threaten SQRM.  SQRM also answers the simplicity objection: no 62
 As many have observed, PRM avoids worries about the causal exclusion of phenomenal properties for 62
the same sorts of reasons (Chalmers 1996, forthcoming-b; Stoljar 2001; Alter and Nagasawa 2012).
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view that endorses Broad Qualitative Grounding may reasonably be accused of endorsing 
a metaphysically inflationary view of the secondary qualities.
Accepting SQRM therefore enables the non-reductive realist to resolve the 
dilemma raised in §5.1. Inasmuch as we have independent reason to accept non-reductive 
realism, as I have argued we do, this provides a reason to accept SQRM. But beyond its 
connections to non-reductive realism, SQRM is an interesting thesis in its own right. I 
shall therefore conclude this chapter by setting out several further more-or-less 
independent considerations in support of SQRM. PRM is one of the major contenders in 
the contemporary debate about consciousness. It is therefore somewhat surprising, given 
the tight parallels between phenomenal properties and the secondary qualities, that 
SQRM, the analogue to PRM, seems to have no proponents (other than myself) within 
the contemporary debate about color and other secondary qualities. In §§5.4-5.7, I hope 
to show not only that SQRM is a viable position, but that the sorts of considerations 
normally taken to support PRM actually do a better job supporting SQRM.
First, though, I want to return briefly to the question of whether there are 
quiddities. Quiddities are supposed to be the properties which serve as the categorical 
bases for the causal dispositions characterized by fundamental physics. But it’s not clear 
that there are quiddities, so understood. After all, it’s not obviously incoherent to suppose 
that the basic causal dispositions characterized by physics are “bare dispositions,” 
dispositions without any categorical bases (Mumford 2006). Now, some have argued 
against the possibility of bare dispositions on general metaphysical grounds (Prior et al. 
1982). For my part, I’m not sure if these attempts are successful. For this reason, I will 
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not presuppose that there are quiddities in what follows. To be sure, the conclusion for 
which I’ll be arguing—SQRM—entails that there are quiddities. So we’ll get our 
quiddities in the end, but not by begging the question against the opponent of quiddities. 
In other words, I will not invoke any premise in what follows such that our justification to   
believe it depends on our having antecedently accepted the existence of quiddities.
5.4    Considerations Favoring PRM Provide More Support for SQRM
It seems to me that the sorts of motivations that have led philosophers to accept PRM 
actually provide much stronger support for SQRM. As mentioned above, proponents of 
PRM are often motivated by something like the following thought: conscious experience 
has a mysterious “qualitative character” that is famously difficult to integrate into 
physical descriptions of reality. It is therefore natural to suppose that the intrinsic 
qualitative character of physical reality left unspecified by physics is somehow related to 
the qualitative character of experience.
However, the qualities which give a sensory experience its mysterious “qualitative 
character” are simply the sensible qualities. As argued in §2.2.3, these are not qualities of 
the experience (as the Qualia View supposes), but rather qualities the experience is an 
experience of—qualities represented by the experience. As Campbell (1993) puts the 
point: “the qualitative character of a color-experience is inherited from the qualitative 
character of the color” (p. 268). Similarly, Byrne (2006) writes, “If we like, we can say 
experiences of blue have a ‘qualitative character,’ but that is simply because they 
represent that objects have a ‘qualitative’ property—namely, blueness.” These remarks 
are closely related to the oft-made observation that experience is transparent: when one 
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goes looking for the supposed intrinsic qualities of one’s experience of blue, for example, 
“one cannot help but see right through [the experience] so that what one actually ends up 
attending to is the real color blue” (Tye 1992, p. 160; cf. Harman 1990). If we are aware 
of no intrinsic qualities of experience, then a fortiori, we are aware of no intrinsic 
qualities of experience whose integration into physical reality poses a problem. If there 
are any qualitative properties in the vicinity of sensory experience whose integration into 
physical reality poses a problem, it is the sensible qualities, especially the secondary 
qualities.  So if the intrinsic qualitative character of physical reality left unspecified by 63
physics is somehow related to the qualitative character of experience, this can only be 
because the former is somehow related to the sensible qualities. And the latter suggestion 
is most naturally implemented with SQRM.
In the passage quoted in §5.2, Chalmers motivates PRM with the claim that 
phenomenal properties are the only “class of intrinsic, non-relational property with which 
we have any direct familiarity.” But this claim is doubly mistaken. First, the transparency 
observation suggests that the phenomenal properties of experience are not “intrinsic, non-
relational properties.” They seem rather to be relational properties. In particular, as 
suggested in §4.9, having a (sensory) experience with a given phenomenal character 
seems to be a matter of standing in a certain relation to a sensible quality or complex of 
sensible qualities, a relation which might variously be called “sensory awareness,” 
 I do not mean to suggest that once we have shown how to integrate the sensible qualities into physical 63
reality, the work of integrating phenomenal consciousness into physical reality will be finished. For there 
would remain the question of how we come to represent the sensible qualities in experience. But it is not 
clear how the Russellian Monist framework would help with this problem.
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“sensory acquaintance,” or “sensory representation” (Campbell 1993, Johnston 2004, 
Chalmers 2006, Pautz 2009, Byrne 2009, Tye 2014). Second, there is another class of 
properties with which we have “direct familiarity,” which really do seem to be “intrinsic, 
non-relational properties”—namely, (at least some of) the sensible qualities. (Notably, in 
later writings, Chalmers comes around to endorse both of these claims [Chalmers 2006, 
2012].)
Nonetheless, Chalmers and others who have voiced similar sentiments seem to be 
correct in thinking that the Russellian Monist framework is well suited to account for the 
intrinsic qualitative properties of macrophysical objects. Since phenomenal properties are 
not properties of this sort, and (many of) the secondary qualities are, it would appear that 
this framework is best suited to provide an account of the latter. It sometimes happens 
that the function a thing is destined to serve is not the function for which it was designed. 
So it is with the Russellian Monist framework, originally designed to handle the mind-
body problem, but ultimately destined to handle the problem of the secondary qualities.
5.5    The Happy-Synthesis Argument
In this section, I argue that a fairly standard argument for PRM, which I call the happy-
synthesis argument, can be straightforwardly adapted to support SQRM as well.  I shall 
then proceed to argue in §5.5.1 that this sort of argument actually provides more support 
for SQRM than for PRM.
What I’m calling the happy-synthesis argument can be found in several recent 
papers on PRM, e.g. Chalmers (forthcoming-b), Stoljar (2001), and Alter and Nagasawa 
(2012). The basic idea is that PRM is supposed to be a happy-synthesis of standard forms 
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of physicalism and standard forms of dualism, retaining the strengths of each while also 
avoiding the weaknesses of each. To put it another way: it’s said that the standard 
arguments in favor of physicalism, such as the causal exclusion argument, don’t 
specifically support physicalism in its standard narrow form (what I earlier called Narrow 
Phenomenal Grounding), but rather support physicalism in its weaker broad form (what I 
earlier called Broad Phenomenal Grounding). On the other hand, it’s said that the 
standard dualist arguments against physicalism, such as the conceivability argument or 
the knowledge argument, only tell against narrow physicalism; they don’t tell against 
broad physicalism. That means we can respect all the standard considerations on each 
side simply by accepting physicalism in its broad form and denying physicalism in its 
narrow form, which gives us PRM as a happy synthesis.
To give you a feel for how this goes: the main argument for physicalism about 
phenomenal properties is the causal exclusion argument. We begin with the idea that 
phenomenal properties are causally relevant to what happens in the world, for example to 
how we behave. We then invoke some sort of causal-completeness-of-the-physical 
principle to motivate the claim that phenomenal properties can have causal relevance 
only if they are grounded in physical properties. The idea here is that physical properties 
are in some sense the causally basic properties, and that other causally relevant properties 
inherit causal relevance only by being grounded in physical properties. Finally, it’s 
concluded that phenomenal properties are grounded in physical properties. 
Here the Russellian Monist points out, rightly it seems, that these causal 
considerations don’t get us the stronger thesis of Narrow Phenomenal Grounding, but 
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only the weaker thesis of Broad Phenomenal Grounding. As mentioned in §5.3, if there 
are quiddities, then quiddities are certainly among the “causally basic” properties. After 
all, quiddities are supposed to be the properties that play the fundamental causal roles 
characterized by physics. So properties grounded in quiddities ought to be able to inherit 
causal relevance just as well as properties grounded in narrowly physical properties. So it 
looks like considerations of causal relevance at best can establish physicalism in its 
weaker, broad form, not physicalism in its stronger, narrow form.
On the other side, consider some standard dualist argument against physicalism, 
such as the conceivability argument (Chalmers 1996). The conceivability argument runs 
roughly as follows: we begin with the claim that it’s coherently conceivable that there 
should be a physical duplicate of me who differs from me with respect to his phenomenal 
or experiential properties. It’s then said that if this is coherently conceivable, then it’s 
possible, and if it’s possible, it follows that my physical properties don’t necessitate, and 
therefore don’t ground, my phenomenal properties.
Here again, the Russellian Monist claims that these considerations plausibly only 
tell against Narrow Qualitative Grounding. After all, when we imaginatively hold fixed 
the physical properties of a human subject, presumably we’re holding fixed properties of 
the sort that the physical sciences reveal. But that does not include the quiddities. Since 
we don’t know what the quiddities are like, it’s arguable that we have no grounds for 
thinking that a broadly physical duplicate of me without my actual phenomenal 
properties is coherently imaginable.
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Now it seems clear that these considerations can be adapted very 
straightforwardly to support SQRM as well. To begin with, as we saw in §4.6, there are 
causal exclusion arguments that apply to the secondary qualities running more-or-less 
exactly parallel to causal exclusion arguments in the philosophy of mind, and which 
(given the assumption of realism) can be used to support something like Qualitative 
Grounding. And as we’ve seen, for the reasons given above, it’s plausible that these 
considerations at best establish the weaker thesis of Broad Qualitative Grounding, not the 
stronger thesis of Narrow Qualitative Grounding.
On the other side, as we saw in §5.1, there will be conceivability arguments 
against Qualitative Grounding that run perfectly parallel to conceivability arguments in 
the philosophy of mind. And for the reasons given in §5.3, it can be argued that these 
considerations only tell against Narrow Qualitative Grounding, but not against Broad 
Qualitative Grounding.
As with the happy-synthesis argument for PRM, we can respect the considerations 
on each side by accepting Broad Qualitative Grounding and rejecting Narrow Qualitative 
Grounding, which gives us SQRM as a happy synthesis.
5.5.1   Advantages of Happy-Synthesis Argument for SQRM
In fact, as I shall now argue, the happy-synthesis style of argument actually does a better 
job motivating SQRM than it does in motivating PRM. This is for two reasons: first, it 
seems that the causal considerations that support Broad Phenomenal Grounding provide 
even more support for Broad Qualitative Grounding. This is a consequence of the 
following rough and intuitive principle:
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Principle of Increasing Confidence: The lower something is on the Great Chain of 
Being, the more confident we should be that its causally relevant properties are 
grounded in broadly physical properties.
Without taking the the idea of the Great Chain of Being with too much 
metaphysical seriousness, we can all nonetheless recognize a kind of hierarchy among 
beings—a (very) partial ordering where, generally speaking, animate beings outrank 
inanimate beings, sentient beings outrank non-sentient beings, rational beings outrank 
non-rational beings, and so on. The idea behind the Principle of Increasing Confidence 
principle is that, however confident we are that causally relevant properties of sentient 
beings, such as humans, are grounded in broadly physical properties, we should be even 
more confident that causally relevant properties of inanimate physical objects, like rocks, 
are grounded in broadly physical properties. After all, there’s a lot about humans and 
other sentient things that remains pretty mysterious. Even if we’re fairly confident that 
there’s nothing about humans that transcends the merely physical, we should be even 
more confident that there’s nothing about rocks that transcends the merely physical. Now, 
phenomenal properties seem to be peculiar to beings fairly high up on the Great Chain of 
Being. By contrast, if our senses can be trusted, the secondary qualities belong to things 
very low on the Great Chain of Being. We should therefore be even more confident that 
the secondary qualities are grounded in the broadly physical than we are about 
phenomenal properties.
The second reason why I think the considerations above provide more support for 
SQRM than for PRM is that the familiar arguments against Narrow Phenomenal 
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Grounding, such as the conceivability argument, threaten to undermine Broad 
Phenomenal Grounding as well, and thereby to undermine PRM. By contrast, the 
corresponding arguments against Narrow Qualitative Grounding aren’t apt to undermine 
Broad Qualitative Grounding, and therefore aren’t apt to undermine SQRM in the same 
way.
Suppose a proponent of PRM rejects Narrow Phenomenal Grounding on the basis 
of the conceivability argument. In other words, she holds that it’s coherently conceivable 
that the narrowly physical facts be just as they actually are while the phenomenal facts 
differ, and on this basis she concludes that the phenomenal facts are not necessitated by, 
and thus not grounded in, the narrowly physical facts. Now whatever this conceivability 
claim ultimately comes to, at a minimum it involves rejecting the following thesis.
Narrow Phenomenal Scrutability: There is an intelligible or a priori connection 
between information about the distribution of narrowly physical properties and 
information about the distribution of phenomenal properties.
But if the proponent of PRM is going to rule out Narrow Phenomenal Grounding on the 
basis of such conceivability considerations, then she will want to hold that similar 
considerations do not tell against Broad Phenomenal Grounding. So while she rejects 
Narrow Phenomenal Scrutability, there will be pressure to accept the corresponding 
thesis about broadly physical properties introduced in §5.2, namely:
Broad Phenomenal Scrutability: There is an intelligible or a priori connection 
between information about the distribution of broadly physical properties and 
information about the distribution of phenomenal properties.
 196
Of course, for similar reasons, the proponent of SQRM, at least if she wants to use 
conceivability arguments to rule out Narrow Qualitative Grounding, will want to make 
analogous claims. In particular, she’ll want to reject the following thesis:
Narrow Qualitative Scrutability: There is an intelligible or a priori connection 
between information about the distribution of narrowly physical properties and 
information about the distribution of secondary qualities.
And for the reasons just given, she’ll want to accept the corresponding thesis about 
broadly physical properties, which was also introduced in §5.2, namely:
Broad Qualitative Scrutability: There is an intelligible or a priori connection 
between information about the distribution of broadly physical properties and 
information about the distribution of secondary qualities.
For both kinds of Russellian Monists, the hope is that, even though we have 
reason to reject the relevant narrow scrutability theses, we don’t have any reason to reject 
the relevant broad scrutability theses because physics doesn’t tell us what the quiddities 
are like. But it seems to me that, although we don’t have good reason to reject Broad 
Qualitative Scrutability, we do have principled reason to reject Broad Phenomenal 
Scrutability. That’s because we know enough about phenomenal properties—or, better, 
our concepts of phenomenal properties—to rule it out. In particular, it seems to be a 
perfectly general feature of our concepts of phenomenal properties that, roughly 
speaking, information about the phenomenal properties of an individual x is never a 
priori entailed by information about things distinct from x, even if those things happen to 
compose x. Put more carefully, we can formulate the principle as follows:
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Phenomenal Distinctness Principle: If x is distinct from each of the ys, then 
information about the phenomenal properties of x is not a priori entailed by 
information about the intrinsic qualities and structural organization of the ys (even 
given the information that the ys compose x).64
Given phenomenal distinctness, it’s going to follow that Broad Phenomenal Scrutability 
is false. That’s because if Broad Phenomenal Scrutability is true, then it should turn out 
that information about the intrinsic qualities (quiddities) and structural organization 
(narrowly physical properties/relations) of the fundamental physical entities a priori 
entails that things other than the fundamental physical entities—macroscopic things like 
humans—have certain phenomenal properties. But that would be a violation of the 
Phenomenal Distinctness Principle. So it looks like we have principled reason to reject 
Broad Phenomenal Scrutability.
It’s important to note that similar principles don’t hold for all properties. For 
example, nothing like this is true for geometric properties. We can often work out the 
shape of a thing a priori given sufficient information about the shapes and structural 
organization of its parts. Given the information that x is composed of two squares of the 
same size lying on a single plane and pressed up against each other edge to edge, I can 
infer a priori that x is a 2:1 rectangle. The same plausibly holds for secondary qualities as 
well. Given the further information that those two square parts of x are red, I can 
 Every more precisely: where ɸ(x1, x2, …xn) is any open sentence expressing the concept of some n-place 64
structural relation, Ψ(y) is any open sentence expressing an ordinary introspective concept for a 
phenomenal property, and Μ(x1, x2, … xn, y) is any open sentence expressing a purely mereological 
concept (e.g. composition), the following is not a priori: ∀x1, x2,…xn, y((ɸ(x1, x2, …xn) & Μ(x1, x2, …xn, 
y)) → Ψ(y))
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plausibly infer a priori that x is red. So this means that the corresponding principle about 
secondary qualities is plausibly false:
Secondary Quality Distinctness Principle: If x is distinct from each of the ys, then 
information about the secondary qualities of x is not a priori entailed by information 
about the intrinsic qualities and structural organization of the ys (even given the 
information that the ys compose x).
If the foregoing is correct, then it looks like the familiar arguments against Narrow 
Phenomenal Grounding threaten to undermine Russellian Monism about phenomenal 
properties by undermining Broad Phenomenal Grounding as well. On the other hand, the 
corresponding arguments against Narrow Qualitative Grounding aren’t apt to undermine 
SQRM.
5.6    The Argument from Qualitativeness
The next argument for SQRM, which is loosely inspired by an argument from Chalmers 
(1996, pp. 118-20) known as the “structure-and-dynamics argument,” begins with the 
premise that the secondary qualities are qualitative properties. The relevant notion of a 
qualitative property is to be understood in contradistinction to the notion of a (purely) 
structural property. As we saw above, the Russellian Monist holds that the physical 
sciences tell us a great deal about the abstract structural features of physical reality, but 
do not reveal its intrinsic qualitative features. Let us try to make these notions a bit more 
precise. We’ll say that a property is purely structural iff it admits of real definition in 
purely structural vocabulary. Following Chalmers (2012, forthcoming-b), we’ll take 
“structural vocabulary” to include mathematical and logical vocabulary (including 
 199
devices for first- and second-order quantification), causal or nomic vocabulary, and also 
spatiotemporal vocabulary. (Narrowly physical properties are therefore purely structural.) 
We can then say that a property is qualitative iff it is not purely structural.65
The premise that the secondary qualities are qualitative properties has a great deal 
of intuitive support. Any analysis in purely structural terms of a secondary quality like 
sea-foam green, sweetness, or middle C would seem to leave something out. What it 
would leave out, one wants to say, is its intrinsic qualitative nature—what Chalmers 
(2006, p. 66) calls its “distinctive sensuous nature.”
Another route to the same conclusion comes from familiar considerations about 
“qualia.” Many have claimed that qualia are, or at least seem to be, qualitative in 
something like the sense at issue here (Jackson 1982, Block 1978, Chalmers 1996, Stoljar 
2001). Qualia are supposed to be directly consciously accessible qualities that determine 
the phenomenal character of an experience. But as argued in §2.2.3, the only qualities 
associated with sensory experience that satisfy this description are the sensible qualities 
represented by the experience. The only quality in view—the only quality “before the 
mind”—when we make intuitive pronouncements about the quale associated with an 
experience of red (for example) is the color red. So any intuitive support there is for the 
 There is another notion of a “qualitative property” in currency within metaphysics which is opposed 65
primarily to the notion of an object-involving property (e.g. being next to Napolean) and which includes 
structural properties. It is perhaps an odd result of my defining “qualitative” in contradistinction to 
“structural” that object-involving properties classify as qualitative. If one finds this result objectionable, 
nothing in what follows should be affected by amending the definition to require that qualitative properties 
(in the sense relevant here) be “qualitative properties” (in the sense opposed to object-involving properties). 
 200
view that color qualia are qualitative is really support for the view that colors are 
qualitative. The same holds true for other secondary qualities as well.
The next premise in our argument is the intuitively plausible principle that, when 
an object possesses a qualitative property, it never does so wholly in virtue of its purely 
structural properties. In slogan form: no quality from structure. It follows from this 
principle, together with our initial premise that the secondary qualities are qualitative, 
that instantiations of secondary qualities are not wholly grounded in instantiations of 
narrowly physical properties alone, since narrowly physical properties are purely 
structural. In other words, Narrow Qualitative Grounding is false. Given the reasonable 
assumption that the secondary qualities are wholly grounded at least in instantiations of 
broadly physical properties—Broad Qualitative Grounding—it follows that SQRM is 
true.
5.7    The Argument from Categoricity
The final argument for SQRM, which I call the argument from categoricity, runs as 
follows:
C1. If Narrow Qualitative Grounding is true, then instantiations of colors are at least 
partially grounded in instantiations of microphysical dispositions (i.e. the basic causal 
dispositions characterized by fundamental physics). (Premise)
C2. Colors are categorical properties. (Premise)
C3. No instantiation of a categorical property is grounded, even partially, in an 
instantiation of a disposition. (Premise)
C4. Therefore, Narrow Qualitative Grounding is false (C1-C3).
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C5. Broad Qualitative Grounding is true. (Premise)
C6. Therefore, SQRM is true. (C3, C5)
Let us consider the premises of the argument, beginning with C1. C1 is very 
plausible. If Narrow Qualitative Grounding is true, it follows that instantiations of colors 
are grounded in instantiations of narrowly physical properties, which include 
spatiotemporal properties/relations together with microphysical dispositions. Assuming 
the proponent of Narrow Qualitative Grounding doesn’t just want to ground color in 
spatiotemporal structure, she’s going to have to say that certain microphysical 
dispositions, such as those associated with electromagnetic charge, for example, are 
going to play at least a partial role in grounding instantiations of colors.
Turning to C2: this premise claims that colors are categorical properties. As 
mentioned in §2.2, the notion of a categorical property is, intuitively, the notion of a 
wholly non-modal property, or alternatively, a property the instantiation of which does 
not constitutively depend on what goes on in other possible worlds. As urged in §2.2, 
colors seem to be categorical. Being red, like being round and unlike being fragile, is in 
some intuitive sense a situation wholly contained within actuality.
In order to make things a bit rigorous, it will be helpful to give a more precise 
analysis of the notion of a categorical property. To a first approximation, we want to say 
that F is a categorical property iff instantiations of F aren’t grounded, even in part, in 
modal facts. Here we can identify the modal facts as those facts whose linguistic 
expression involves modal vocabulary, where modal vocabulary minimally includes the 
familiar unary modal operators “possibly” and “necessarily,” as well as familiar binary 
 202
modal operators like the “would” counterfactual and the “might” counterfactual. 
Officially, our analysis will be as follows:
F is a categorical property iff necessarily, instantiations of F are not weakly partially 
grounded in modal facts.
Here weak partial grounding is just the reflexive closure of partial grounding. The reason 
we want weak partial grounding rather than partial grounding is that, in the case where 
instantiations of F are modal facts, we’d want F not to count as a categorical property.
With this analysis in hand, we’re ready to move on to the third premise, C3. C3 
says that no instantiation of a categorical property is grounded, even partially, in an 
instantiation of a disposition. Why think this? Well, it’s plausible that dispositional facts 
are themselves modal facts. Arguably, predicates for dispositions should be regarded as 
(paradigmatic!) modal expressions, in which case instantiations of dispositions will 
trivially count as modal facts. Another route to the conclusion that dispositional facts are 
modal facts is through the idea that dispositions can ultimately be analyzed in terms of 
subjunctive conditionals (Ryle 1949, Goodman 1954, Quine 1960). If dispositions can be 
analyzed in terms of subjunctive conditionals, it plausibly follows that dispositional facts 
are subjunctive facts. Since subjunctive facts are (paradigmatic) modal facts, it therefore 
follows that dispositional facts are modal facts. 
Now, if dispositional facts are themselves modal facts, it will follow straightaway 
from our analysis of a categorical property that C3 is true. But perhaps you’re not sure 
whether dispositional facts should count as modal facts. Here’s an argument that C3 is 
true either way:
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D1. If dispositional facts are modal facts, then C3 is true.
D2. If dispositional facts are not modal facts, then dispositional facts are grounded in 
modal facts.
D3. If dispositional facts are grounded in modal facts, then C3 is true.
D4. Therefore, (whether or not dispositional facts are modal facts) C3 is true.
As just mentioned, D1 follows from our analysis of categoricity. Why think D2 is true? 
Well, if it weren’t true, then given our analysis of categoricity, we’d have the result that at 
least some dispositions count as categorical properties. But I take it that one of the basic 
desiderata of a theory of categorical properties and dispositions is that it should turn out 
that categorical properties and dispositions form disjoint classes. To ensure that, we’ll 
need to accept D2. Finally, D3 follows from our analysis of categoricity, together with the 
reasonable assumption that partial grounding is transitive (Fine 2001, Rosen 2010, Raven 
2013). For in that case, if an instantiation of a categorical property were partially 
grounded in an instantiation of a disposition, then given the transitivity of partial 
grounding, it would follow that the categorical fact is grounded in subjunctive facts. And 
since subjunctive facts are modal facts, that again would violate our analysis of a 
categorical property. Therefore, whether or not we count dispositional facts as modal 
facts, we get the truth of C3.
C1-C3 entail the falsity of Narrow Qualitative Grounding. The final premise is 
C5, which asserts the truth of Broad Qualitative Grounding. This argument has nothing 
new to say in support of Broad Qualitative Grounding. But we can appeal to the 
considerations mentioned earlier in support of Broad Qualitative Grounding, e.g. causal 
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considerations or considerations of parsimony. Given Broad Qualitative Grounding, 
together with the falsity of Narrow Qualitative Grounding, SQRM follows.
5.8    Conclusion
I argued in chapters 2-4 that if we respect the first- and second-order appearances that 
constitute that fragment of the Manifest Image which pertains to the sensible qualities, we 
will accept realism about all the sensible qualities and non-reductive realism about the 
secondary qualities. But there is a prima facie tension between the Scientific Image and 
the non-reductive realist view of the secondary qualities embodied in the Manifest Image, 
a tension which finds its most forceful expression in the dilemma described in §5.1. As 
we’ve seen, SQRM, an independently motivated view about the relation between the 
secondary qualities and physical reality, resolves this dilemma. In doing so, SQRM 
resolves the apparent conflict between the Manifest Image and the Scientific Image 
without denying or diluting either. Through SQRM, we may hold the two images together 
in one stereoscopic view.
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